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JNTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
cm 
-- 
The term “relevant market” is used in two different senses and this has caused confusion 
in some earlier discussions. The market defined may be that which is relevant to the 
calculation of market shares, based on current sales of substitutable products in an area 
within which customers may compare value for money. The word “relevant” is also 
applied in the sense of relevance to competition policy - does dominance of the market 
defined in terms of current sales of substitutable products constitute a position of power 
which may be abused to the detriment of consumers? Such power may be limited by 
the threat of potential competition or by competition in an interdependent market, eg a 
monopoly supplier of a component may be constrained by competition in the market for 
the final product. In designing a framework for relevant market definition in 
competition policy, these two senses must be recognised. 
Chapter 1 discusses the need for definition of the relevant market. The chapter begins 
with a discussion of the objectives of competition (“anti-trust”) policies and contrasts the 
principles of control of conduct on the one hand and maintenance of competitive 
structure on the other. National policies are compared and contrasted: the drift away 
from “structuralism” in the USA is compared with a move towards greater emphasis on 
avoidance of product concentration in the United Kingdom. Finally, policy in the 
European Community is considered, together with arguments that this policy has become 
more directed towards the maintenance of competitive structure, rather than regulation 
of abuse. 
Chapter 2 is a literature survey, After discussing the importance of relevant market 
definition in current jurisprudence in the European Community and the USA, the 
survey outlines the neo-classical origins of the theoretical background and shows that 
this is based on perfect competition. The limitations of this neo-classical approach are 
listed and some alternatives are discussed. One issue examined is whether the definition 
of the product market should be based on substitution in demand or whether supply 
substitution should also be incorporated (US and German official policies differ on this 
point). The literature survey includes a summary of the (more limited) material on 
geographical market definition and the chapter ends with a discussion of the anti- 
competitive implications of conglomerate growth. 
Chapter 3 develops the analytical framework recommended for use in analysis of 
dominance. A five stage process is proposed: (I) definition of the product; (2) 
definition of the geographical area; (3) measurement of sales; (4) analysis of potential 
competition; (5) consideration of product interdependence. The first three stages define 
the market relevant to calculation of market share, the last two provide for analysis of 
whether this first market is relevant to definition of dominance. Appendix 2 of this 
chapter (pp.82-7) is a check-list based on the detailed framework and is intended as an 
executive summary. 
Chapter 4 contains detailed analysis of case studies - three of “horizontal” seller 
dominance, three which are more concerned with vertical interdependence and one 
recent case which combines horizontal and vertical aspects. Three further cases are 
introduced to illustrate particular elements of the framework dealing with seller 
dominance. Finally, there is an analysis of concentration of purchasing and discussion 
of how the framework outlined in Chapter 3 can be applied to “monopsony”. It is shown 
that, with a few exceptions, the competition authorities of the European Community, the 
United Kingdom and France have followed analytical procedures quite similar to those 
set out in the framework of Chapter 3. More rigorous adherence to such a framework 
may have avoided some of the few apparent errors. The analysis of cases ends with 
appraisal of dependence (parlenaire obligufoire) as an alternative to relevant market 
definition in cases of vertical dominance in particular. This assessment concludes that, 
while the study of dependent relationships may be more revealing in certain cases, these 
are exceptional. 
Chapter 5 considers the application of the concepts developed in the three previous 
chapters to agreements between companies, prohibited under Article 85, and to aids to 
undertakings made by member states, prohibited under Article 92. It is pointed out that 
exemptions to the general prohibition under Article 85 require consideration of the 
relevant market. The framework of Chapter 3 is shown to be adaptable to Article 85 
cases. A decision of the Court of Justice seems to imply that definition of the relevant 
market is not necessary for Article 92 cases. Certain forms of assistance may not be 
related to specific products, for example aid for research and development, for product 
diversification or to ensure the survival of multi-product firms. In such cases it will not 
be possible to apply the concept of product market. Definition of the geographical 
market may be possible in even fewer cases, because state assistance may enable 
companies to widen the geographical area of their activities. It is therefore concluded 
that, although the concepts presented in Chapters 2 and 3 may be useful in the 
assessment of the anti-competitive effects of state aids, the framework for definition of 
the relevant market is not generally applicable. 
-- 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Thanks are due to economists in the Directorate General for Competition of the 
Commission of the European Communities in Brussels for their patient guidance and 
comments. Much of the analysis of case studies in Chapter 4, applying the framework 
developed in the previous chapter, was undertaken by my son, David Fishwick. 
However, all the analysis and conclusions in the report reflect my own views and 
judgement and I accept sole responsibility for them. 
The typing and reproduction of a report of this length, modified in numerous drafts, 
represents a considerable task. My thanks for this are due to Jane Elrick and Gillian 
Farrow, whose dilligence and patience have been remarkable. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
.- 
..a 
*.. 
..*- 
CHAPTER 1 THE NEED FOR DEFINITION OF THE RELEVANT MARKET 
A. SOME RELATED ISSUES IN COMPETITION POLICY 
B. THE USE OF THE RELEVANT MARKET IN NATIONAL 
COMPETITION POLICIES 
1. The USA 
2. Germany 
3. The United Kingdom 
4. France 
C. THE RELEVANT MARKET IN COMMUNITY COMPETITION 
POLICY 
1. A structuralist or pragmatic approach? 
2. Definition of the market in Community practice 
3. Some conclusions 
m AN OUTLINE OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO 
DEFINITION 
A. 
B. 
C. 
DOMINANCE AND THE RELEVANT MARKET 
1. The Community 
2. The predominant American approach 
3. Implications for definition of the relevant market 
THE NEO-CLASSICAL APPROACH TO MARKET DEFINITION 
SOME GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND CRITICISMS 
1. Introduction 
2. Measurement of monopoly power 
3. Statistical studies of concentration and performance 
4. Alternatives to the neo-classical approach 
Ii; 
Workable competition 
Contestable markets 
(cl Conclusion 
AN OUTLINE OF THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES WITHIN 
THE NEO-CLASSICAL FRAMEWORK 
1. The Industry 
2. Substitutability in end-use 
I”d, 
Discrete gaps in substitutability between goods? 
Triffin’s concept of external interdependence 
(cross-elasticity) 
g; 
Market relationships - price tests 
The basic need concept 
:;; 
The WirtschaftspQne concept 
3. 
Conclusions on substitutability in demand 
Combination of demand-substitution and supply-elasticity 
1 
8 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
17 
18 
18 
20 
21 
22 
22 
24 
25 
27 
28 
28 
31 
34 
35 
36 
36 
D. SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN GEOGRAPHICAL MARKET DEFINITION 
I. Introduction 
2. Shipments data and elasticity of supply 
3. Prices evidence 
4. The effects of national differences 
E. CONGLOMERATE ACTIVITIES 
F. CONCLUSIONS OF LITERATURE SURVEY 
CHAPTER 3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEFINITION OF THE 
MARKET RELEVANT TO DOMINANT POSITIONS 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
INTRODUCTION 46 
DEFINITION OF THE RELEVANT PRODUCT 
1. Starting-point 
2. Choice of products for consideration of substitutability 
3. Criteria of substitutability 
4. Direct tests of substitutability 
5. Indirect tests of substitutability 
6. Discontinuities in substitution (substitution “gap”) 
GEOGRAPHICAL MARKET DEFINITION 
I. General principles 
2. Broad factual evidence 
3. Further examination of the specific conditions 
(4 Transferability of demand 
@I Transferability of supply 
4. Summary comments 
DEFINITION OF RELEVANT MARKET SALES 
49 
49 
49 
50 
51 
52 
52 
54 
55 
55 
56 
57 
58 
DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF POTENTIAL SUPPLY 
I. Potential supply from companies already selling the 
relevant products within the relevant geographical market 
:“d, 
Unused capacity 
Output not currently sold 
(cl Variable production of joint products 
Transferable capacity 
Geographical transfer 
59 
59 
59 
60 
60 
61 
2. Potential supply from companies not currently selling the relevant 
product within the relevant geographical market 63 
(a) Barriers to entry 63 
(b) Factors tending to reduce significance of certain barriers 64 
3. Some practical suggestions 66 
4. Special note on horizonta) mergers and. horizontal effects 
of other mergers 67 
5. Concluding remark on potential competition 67 
VERTICAL AND OTHER INTERDEPENDENCE 
1. Relevant products as parts of other products 68 
(a) Intermediate good 68 
(b) Part of wider complementary group 69 
39 
39 
40 
41 
41 
43 
,- 
I- 
.- 
..- 
*- 
111 
#I..” 
2. 
(c l Some wider considerations  
Relevant market dominated indirec tly? 
Inputs 
O ther components of a composite product 
71 
72 
72 
73 
F. PRODUCT DEFINITION IN CASES OF  HORIZONTAL BUYER 
DOMINANCE 
1. Introduction 
2. The relevant purchasing market 
74 
75 
G . IDENTIFICATION OF  DOMINANCE THROUGH DEPENDENT 
RELATIONSHIPS (“PARTENAIRE OBLIGATOIRE”) 76 
APPENDIX 1 
APPENDIX 2 
TESTS OF  SUBSTITUTABILITY (MATHEMATICS) 79 
CHECK-LIST FOR ANALYSIS 83 
CHAPTER 4 CASE STUDIES IN THE APPLICATION OF  THE FRAMEW O R K TO 
ASSESSMENT OF  DOMINANCE 
INTRODUCTION 89 
CASE STUDY 1 : Continental Can (EEC) 91 
2 : Ferry and Hovercraft serv ices  (UK) 97 
3 : Cat and Dog Foods (UK) 106 
4 : Commercial Solvents Corporation (EEC) 110 
5 : Hugin v . Lipton (EEC) 115 
6 : Replacement body panels  for Ford cars  (UK) 123 
7 : AKZO v . ECS Ltd (EEC) 131 
l 8 : Outdoor advertising (UK and France) 134 
+9 : United Brands (Bananas - EEC) 139 
*lo : Ice Cream (UK) 143 
11 : Pooled purchasing organisations in retailing 147 
(+ Part analy s is  only )  
SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS FROM ANALYSIS OF  CASE STUDIES 
(Cases 1 to 10) 
I. Definition of the relevant product 
2. Definition of the geographical market 
3. Potential competition 
4. Product interdependence 
5. The concept of partenaire obiigatoire 
149 
150 
151 
151 
152 
CHAPTER 5 DEFINITION OF THE MARKET IN CASES NOT INVOLVING 
ALLEGED ABUSE OF DOMINANCE 
INTRODUCTION 154 
A. DEFINITION FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE 85 
I. General comments 
2. Block exemptions under Article 85(3) 
3. Wider considerations 
4. Application of the framework of Chapter 3 to agreements 
covered by Article 85 
Ii; 
Definition of the relevant product 
Geographical markets 
(c) Definition of relevant market sales 
(d) Potential competition 
I;,) 
Product interdependence 
Conflict of interest among contracting parties 
(id Conclusions 
154 
154 
155 
156 
159 
160 
160 
161 
161 
163 
164 
165 
B. DEFINITION FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE 92 
:: 
Definition of the relevant market not really necessary? 
The effects of state aids on intra-Community 
competition: some basic principles 
3. The applicability of Chapter 3 framework to 
consideration of state aids 
04 Product market 
(b) Geographical market 
I:; 
Potential competition 
Product interdependence 
Cd Conclusion 
165 
166 
167 
167 
167 
168 
169 
170 
171 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 172 
-a 
L. 
-. 
I- 
,.- . 
CHAPTER 1 THE NEED FOR DEFINITION OF THE RELEVANT MARKET 
A. SOME RELATED ISSUES IN COMPETITION POLICY 
The broad objectives of competition (or “anti-trust”) policies were summarised by 
Jacquemin and de Jong (1975) as follows:- 
diffusion of economic power, even with the sacrifice of efficiency; 
economic freedom  of market participants, specifically of small and medium- 
size firms; 
efficient allocation of resources and the maximum satisfaction of consumers. 
Several authors have pointed to some inconsistency between these goals, in particular 
between the interests of consumers and those of small businesses. In an introduction to 
a paper on US legislation to strengthen powers against mergers and extend these to the 
effects of vertical integration, Adelman (1961) commented: 
“Legislators have never shown much interest in consumer welfare. Their 
chief concern has always been to protect some business firms  against 
others, chiefly larger ones, and to protect businessmen from  being shut 
out of any particular market.” (op.cit., p.236) 
This argument reflects a fundamental difference which becomes evident continually in a 
study of competition policies and critically influences the importance of the “relevant 
market” concept. This is the difference between (a) those who believe that the 
intervention of public authorities should be confined to control of abuse of monopoly 
power and (b) those who believe that the public interest is best served by the 
maintenance of competitive market structures. This distinction may be summarised as 
“control of conduct” versus “structuralism ”. 
Those who emphasise the need to maintain competitive structures, even if this means 
loss of potential economies of scale, argue that effective competition is in the long-term  
interest of society. By ensuring survival of and competition among small and medium- 
size producers, anti-trust policies ultimately benefit the consumer. The contrary view 
sees concentration as part of the process of competition, which will normally ensure that 
dominant positions are only ephemeral. This latter approach, associated with the 
Chicago School in the USA, has found some support among economists for many years - 
see Vickers (1985) for a summary. According to this view, action by anti-trust 
authorities is required only in (relatively rare) cases of abuse of dominance to the 
detriment of the consumer. 
In a recent British article, George (1985) pointed out that concentration ratios played a 
dual role in competition policy: (a) a guide to policy makers towards industries where 
abuse might occur and (b) a goal of policy “directed towards maintaining competitive 
market structures.” If the ratios are intended primarily for purpose (b) then the correct 
definition of the denominator is of greater importance. 
The divergence of opinion about the importance of market structure is not simply two- 
fold. Until very recently most American economists have adopted a strongly 
structuralist approach to competition issues. However, at the same time they have 
tended to identify markets at the level of the final consumer, ignoring possible 
detriment to intermediaries in the vertical chain of supply. Some examples in Section C 
of comments by US authors on European Community cases illustrate this point. 
Another point of divergence concerns the treatment of large conglomerate companies. 
Glais and Laurent (1983) are among several European authors who emphasise the 
economic power conferred by diversity of activities. This long-standing objection to 
the more formal structural approach, was raised much earlier by Adelman (1961). A 
conglomerate firm may be in a position of great economic power without having a 
dominant share of any single market. 
When an anti-trust authority alleges abuse of a dominant position, does it need to prove 
the existence of the dominance, or is the firm’s conduct itself sufficient proof? In the 
latter case definition of the relevant market would not be necessary: 
“Dans un grand nombre de cas, la preuve de la position dominante resulte 
de l’autonomie de comportement dont dispose I’entreprise. 11 n’est pas 
done nBcessaire de dtfinir avec precision Ie march&....* (Waelbroeck 
1977, p.130) 
A counter-argument in favour of the market structure approach is that it aids 
consistency and reduces uncertainty for businessmen (Merkin and Williams 1984, p.149). 
For evaluation of proposed mergers, shares in the relevant market are especially 
important, a point made by the Buadeskartellamt in Germany in 1974. Control of 
mergers relates to the creation or reinforcement of dominant positions, with the 
consequent danger of abuse; it cannot be based on considerations of previous conduct. 
- 
-, 
While there are strong arguments for using the market structure approach for purposes 
of consistency and transparency of policy, it is clear from this outline of fundamental 
issues that this approach is not always necessary and may not always be appropriate. 
B. THE USE OF THE RELEVENT MARKET CONCEPT IN NATIONAL 
COMPETITION POLICIES 
I. The USA 
In a very comprehensive article, Fox (1983) compared US and EEC competition policies 
and argued that over the previous 20 years the contrast between the two systems had 
been reversed. Until a few years ago the emphasis in US anti-trust policy was almost 
entirely on market structure and prevention of monopoly per se. Several authors (Fox, 
Hay, Waelbroeck) have emphasised that US policy is not concerned with regulation of 
abuse, other than that which leads to the creation or reinforcement of monopoly. 
Monopoly tended to be defined (at least until 1980) in terms of share of the relevant 
market, delineated both in terms of product range and geography. 
Research of the American literature reveals the consistency with which the courts 
insisted on the use of market shares to define the degree of monopoly which already 
existed or would be created by the action under consideration. In his paper to the 1977 
Bruges Seminar, Holley (1977) referred to numerous cases in which the importance of 
the relevant market was stressed. In the conclusion of his section on the evaluation of 
market power he wrote:- 
“...in virtually all of the US cases the market share percentage is the 
starting point for an examination of the possible existence of monopoly 
power, even if specific acts consistent with monopoly power are alleged.” 
(op.cit. pp.1 80- 1) 
From guidance published in the Columbia Law Review (1954) and from the Merger 
Guidelines issued by Department of Justice in 1968, it is clear that market shares related 
to existing sales in markets defined in principle by end-use substitutability (often 
described in terms of cross-elasticity of demand). The deterrent effects of potential 
competition (freedom of entry) and the power conferred by diversity of activities, while 
mentioned, played only a minor role in the judicial assessment of monopoly and 
“monopoIization.” 
The emphasis in US anti-trust policy has changed in two respects. First, greater 
emphasis is given to the possibility that gains in efficiency from mergers or increased 
concentration may outweigh the adverse effects on competitive structure. This greater 
emphasis is made clear in the revised Merger Guidelines of 1982 and 1984. Secondly, 
these same revised Guidelines, reflecting the views of several economic and legal experts 
published in the previous few years, implied that in future the Department of Justice 
will give as much weight to potential competition as to shares of existing output. 
Although the term “relevant market” is still used, the meaning is substantially extended 
to cover both (a) products to which consumers might transfer and (b) capacity which 
existing or potential producers might transfer to production of the relevant product. 
The same principle is extended to the geographical definition. 
Both Fox and Hay (1985), in comparing the US and UK merger policies asserted that the 
US Department of Justice had departed significantly from the structural approach 
explicitly laid down in the 1968 Guidelines and reflected in most US court decisions 
from 1950 to 1980. Hay remarked:- 
“Despite the superficial appearance, therefore, of simplicity and 
predictability, it could be argued that the practical effect of the emphasis 
given to entry considerations and of the attempt to make further 
allowance for efficiencies is to make US merger policy resemble the ad 
hoc approach to mergers that is used by the MMC.” (Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission, UK). (op.cit., p.70) 
Hay also suggested (p.63) that in practical terms US competition policy has moved away 
from the assumption that conduct can be controlled by market structure to ‘economic 
intuition’ or rule of thumb. He echoed Fox’s view that in Europe certain national 
policies and those of the EEC are moving closer to the structuralist approach. 
In his comparative study presented to the Bruges Seminar, Waelbroeck (1977) asserted 
that compared with other European countries surveyed (France, UK, Scandanavian 
countries, Belgium, Holland and Ireland), Germany (BRD) had a competition policy most 
closely resembling that of the USA. Waelbroeck argued that in German law “le libre jeu 
de Ia concurrence constitue I’objectif primordial” while all other national laws adopted 
“un point de vue plus pragmatique.” This opinion was supported at the same seminar by 
Markert (1977) who commented: 
,L 
a*- 
..- 
,.- 
“The GWB (= Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrtinkungen) is largely based 
on the neoliberal concept of a competitive market economy in which the 
state is to play an active role to guarantee the functioning of 
competition.” (op.cit., p.197) 
German legislation extends both to abuse of a dominant position and to control of 
mergers. Market dominance is defined by absence of competition, a “paramount market 
position” or (a rebuttable presumption) a market share of at least l/3. According to 
Markert (1977), in both merger cases and in those concerned with control of abuse, the 
major criterion of market dominance had been shares of the existing market, reflecting 
the basically structural orientation of the legislation. 
Following the appearance of the 1982 Merger Guidelines in the USA, the German 
Monopolkommission (1983) produced its own notes for guidance on the definition of the 
relevant market. This suggested a two-stage evaluation of the competitive position of a 
company - the relevant market (“in the narrow sense”) and the “MarktnBhebereich.” The 
latter would include potential competition from  substitution of production, long-term  
substitution by consumers and some consideration of advantages of joint supply of a 
wider product range. Despite its theoretical elegance, the Monopolkommission’s 
approach (discussed further in Chapter 2) may be very difficult to apply in practice. 
Since the relevant market (“in the narrow sense”) corresponds with common usage, that is 
shares of current sales, this may be expected to receive more attention than the 
“Marktnahebereich”, which is less easy to comprehend. 
3. The United Kingdom 
There is a significant division in UK competition policy between the arrangements for 
registration and judicial consideration of restrictive agreements between companies and 
those for dealing with the existence or creation of monopoly (dom inance). Restrictive 
agreements are presumed by the legislation to be against the public interest unless 
proven otherwise; there is no such presumption about monopoly. K.D. George, himself 
a part-time member of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, recently asserted: 
“No presumption is built into UK legislation that monopoly is necessarily 
bad, and the onus is on the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) 
to show whether or not a monopoly which has been referred for 
investigation operates against the public interest.” (George, 1985, p.34) 
The same approach applies to control of mergers:- 
5 
“The underlying attitude is that most mergers are beneficial but that a 
small number may operate against the public interest and therefore need 
to be investigated.” (ibid) 
The references to the MMC involve some definition of product and geographical area, 
on the part of the Director of Fair Trading, An investigation cannot proceed if it is 
found that less than 25% (formerly one-third) of total supply is controlled by the largest 
firm. However there is no implication that the reference product and geographical area 
constitute a market. Having verified that the statutory “monopoly” (25% plus) exists, the 
MMC “may then conclude that it does not form the relevant market for the purpose of 
assessing dominance.” (Merkin and Williams 1984, p.136). It does not need to define the 
relevant makes it needs only to conclude that because of existing or potential 
substitutes, countervailing buyer power or other constraints, a “monopoly” control over 
the referred supply does not constitute dominance. 
Although UK policy on monopolies and mergers remains officially neutral towards 
dominance per se as opposed to its abuse, recent authors claim to recognise a distinct 
trend towards a more structuralist approach. Among such authors are Merkin and 
Williams (1984), Fairburn (1984) and Sharpe (1985). Decisions in 1986 on references to 
the MMC by the Office of Fair Trading (affecting rival takeover bids for the Imperial 
Group and the Distillers Company) have emphasised prime concern about possible 
dominance in individual markets. With this recognition that market structure is playing 
a more critical role, especially in merger cases, has come a demand from several quarters 
that guidelines be published on the definition of the relevant market, to ensure 
consistency and transparency. 
4. France 
The terms of reference of the Commission de la Concurrence (established 1977) and the 
interpretations which it has itself introduced appear to place a greater emphasis on 
shares of the relevant market than was suggested by Waelbroeck (1977) in respect-of the 
previous arrangements in France. This may be because of the greater emphasis on 
control of concentration and of abuse of dominant positions, with which the notion of 
relevant market is more commonly linked. 
The annual report of the Commission de la Concurrence for 1983 explains that “en 
matitre de concentration Cconomique, I’action des pouvoirs publics reste modtree” (p.11) 
6 
It attributes this partly to the voluntary arrangements for notification, partly to 
reluctance to refer mergers to it for “motifs d’opportuniti” but partly also because of 
restrictions on the applicability of the control system, which are based on market share. 
For mergers of companies or groups with similar or substitutable products the threshold 
is a combined share of 40% of the national market, for other (conglomerate) mergers at 
least two of the companies concerned must have share of at least 25% of the national 
market for their own products. As the report itself makes clear (ibid., p.12) these 
criteria make the definition of the relevant market of critical importance and liable to be 
a focus of contention. 
With regard to the definition of a dominant position Glais and Laurent (1983, p-265) 
drew attention to a 1975 definition by the forerunner of the Commission de la 
Concurrence emphasising that dominance implies (a) freedom of action without 
constraints imposed by competition and (b) ability to impose conditions on customers or 
suppliers unable to turn elsewhere. Glais and Laurent argue that these two criteria, 
which they summarise as (a) “comportements independants” and (b) “partenaire 
obligatoire” are sufficient to define dominance. They express regret that the Commission 
de la Concurrence finds it necessary to resort to the “neo-classical” concept of market 
structure. 
There can be no doubt of the importance of the relevant market in the Commission’s 
definition of a dominant position. In its first report (for 1978, p.11) it stated: 
“Pour caracteriser l’existence dune position dominante la Commission se 
pose essentiellement deux grandes questions: 
- quel est le marche par rapport auquel doit etre mesurte la 
puissance Cconomique de l’entreprise en cause? 
- & quels signes reconnait-on qu’il existe our ce march6 une 
‘concentration manifeste de la puissance economique’?” 
(My own emphasis - FF) 
In every case of abuse of dominance reported by the French Commission a preliminary 
section deals with the definition of the market.. The prevalence of the structural 
approach is obvious from a remark in the Commission’s 1983 report, relating to its own 
recommendations on dominant positions: 
“11 ne s’agit pas tant de reprimer des abus que de restaurer, autant que 
possible, les conditions de la concurrence praticable.” (op.cit., p.30)* 
C. THE RELEVANT MARKET IN COMMUNITY COMPETITION POLICY 
1. A tr t r Ii I? 
There is considerable similarity (see Fishwick, 1982) between the essentials of 
Community competition policy established by Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome 
and that created by UK legislation between 1948 and 1965. Article 85 (1) prohibits 
agreements, joint decisions and concerted practices which may affect trade between 
member states and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition, unless these agreements be exempted under Article (85) (3). 
This is very similar to the effect of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956 under 
which restrictive agreements are deemed to be against the public interest, unless ruled 
otherwise by the competent executive or judicial bodies. 
Article 86 (especially in the French, German and Italian versions) also appears consistent 
with the neutral stance adopted towards monopoly in the United Kingdom. A dominant 
position per se is not prohibited (in contrast to the USA), nor indeed is the exploitation 
of a dominant position, unless that exploitation is deemed abusive. 
If Community policy had developed along the lines of that in Britain, as the wording of 
these Articles seems to imply, then the relevant market concept would be much less 
important. One could determine the degree of abuse without measuring dominance. 
One could assess whether an agreement had a restrictive effect by considering actual 
and potential substitute products, with no need to estimate precisely what percentage of 
a (nebulous) market were affected by the agreement. 
Glais and Laurent (1983) argue that, in certain cases, the Community authorities (the 
European Court of Justice and the Commission) have been mistaken in making 
definition of the relevant market an indispensable first step in the identification of a 
dominant position. Where dominance is derived from vertical relationships or 
conglomerate power, the definition of a relevant market may be an artificial construct. 
They argue that in Community policy (as well as that in France) the concepts of 
l This suggests a possible conflict with the policy of the Comiti Interministeriel pour 
Ia Restructuration Industrielle. 
r. comportements independants and partenaire obligatoire (see p.7 above) are more useful 
aids to analysis. 
-. 
Since 1965 competition policy within the Community has shown a marked trend towards 
greater emphasis on structures as a means of preserving effective competition. This is 
most evident in the emergence of a draft policy for control of mergers. Fox (1983) 
argues that the founders of the Community were, if anything, in favour of greater 
concentration: sub-optimal business size was one of the economic arguments for the 
EEC. Given the economies of scale made possible by the Common Market, European 
companies would become more competitive.* 
In terms  of case history, the most significant formal step towards a structuralist policy 
was Continental Can. In its judgement on this case, the Court of Justice ruled that if a 
company already in a dominant position reinforced that position by acquisition or 
merger, then this would constitute an abusive exploitation. This decision created some 
inconsistency in Community policy:- the possession of a dominant position is not 
prohibited (though measures to maintain it may be); the creation of a dominant position 
by amalgamation of a non-dom inant firm  is not prohibited (yet); only reinforcement of 
existing dominance is prohibited. 
This inconsistency would be elim inated on the adoption of the draft Regulation on 
Mergers. This regulation would enable the Commission to prohibit mergers where these 
would result in the aquisition or increase of power to lim it effective competition in the 
Common Market or a substantial part thereof and also affect interstate trade. The 
origins of the draft regulation demonstrate a perceptible change in the attitude of the 
Commission towards emphasis on maintenance of competitive structure. Among those 
authors who recognise this proposed change in EEC policy there is general support for 
it. Merkin and W illiams (1984, p.281) comment that any competition policy is of lim ited 
impact if “it is able merely to lim it abuses of market power rather than to prevent 
unjustified concentration from  arising in the first place.” In this structuralist approach 
market definition is important. 
There is no clear indication from  the cases so far decided whether a structuralist 
approach, using the relevant market concept, is appropriate for the assessment of the 
anti-competitive effects of state aids, the subject of A rticle 92 of the Treaty of Rome. 
l For a similar view see Joliet (1970, pp. 3-4) and Commission of the EC, Third 
Report on Competition Policy (1974, pp.28-9). 
This question, which attracted comparatively little attention in previous discussion of 
Community competition policy, is discussed in the second part of Chapter 5. 
2. Definition of the Market in Communitv Practice 
Several authors - Focsaneanu (1975). Schroter (1977). Glais and Laurent (1983) and Fox 
(1983) among them - have criticised the variable definitions of relevant market in 
Community case judgements. All may be summarised by a footnote of Fox (opcit., 
p.368):- 
“The definition of the market and the degree of power necessary for a 
dominant position seem to vary with the offense - a proposition papered 
over by the cases.” 
As Focsaneanu pointed out in detail, the definition has varied from “the products and 
area covered by the agreement” (in Article 85 cases) to all existing and potential 
substitutes (Continental Can). Glais and Laurent (1983) believe that this inconsistency of 
definition occurs because the relevant market is introduced as an artificial construct 
which is not always directly relevant to the issues of the case. They argue that 
dominance is indicated by two criteria - unrestrained conduct and dependence of 
customers or suppliers. Most EEC cases (they argue) have been determined in practice 
by these criteria; definition of the market has been irrelevant and has occasionally fitted 
awkwardly into the analysis. 
A contrary view, stated by Fox (1983) and Hay (1985) is that an explicity structural 
approach with consistent definition of the relevant market would have avoided some 1 
European decisions would appear strange to US observers. 
The views of most European authors differ from those of the apparent American 
consensus on the subject of vertical relationships and dependence. Some quotations 
from European authors emphasise the importance given to dependence in determination 
of dominant positions:- 
‘NOUS voudrious proposer de ‘relativiser’ la notion de position dominante 
par rapport aux categories de personnes qui subissent les consequences de 
l’abus. Si celui-ci cons&e dam une atteinte portee a une categoric 
limitie &operateurs - qu’il s’agisse de concurrents, d’acheteurs ou de 
fournisseurs il suffirait de prouver l’existence d’un lien de dependance 
par rapport a Pentreprise en cause” (Waelbroeck, 1977, p.126) 
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“If the relevant market has to be defined from the point of view of 
dominancy (and not the other way round) relevancy follows from the 
relationships which prevail among the market participants.” (de Jong, 
1977, p.530) 
“Nombre d’affaires de ‘position dominantes’ auraient pu beaucoup mieux 
instruites en adoptant une telle mtthodologie.” (i.e. one based upon 
dependence) “A titre d’exemple, on relira avec cette ‘nouvelle grille’ 
d’analyse les deux affaires Hugin-Liptons et Zoja.” (Glais & Laurent, 
1983, p.346). 
While Waelbroeck and Glais and Laurent argued that dependence was evidence of 
dominance, making the use of the relevant market concept superfluous, de Jong implied 
that the relevant market should be defined to reflect evident dominance (from dependent 
relationships). 
In complete contrast and also citing the Hugin-Liptons and Zoja cases, Fox (1983) 
argues that insistence on a more meaningful definition of the relevant market would 
have led to different decisions. 
In the Hugin-Lipton case*, the abuse of dominance was refusal by Hugin to supply 
spare parts to Liptons to enable them to continue to repair Hugin cash registers in the 
UK market. The Court agreed with the Commission definition that spare parts from 
Hugin constituted a relevant market. This reflected the dependence of Liptons upon 
Hugin. But, Fox stresses, Hugin held only 13% of the UK market for cash registers and 
was ranked fourth in an industry led by NCR with a 40% share. By rationalising or 
even integrating its own maintenance arrangements, Hugin was merely trying to compete 
more effectively in its own market, either by cutting costs of maintenance or by itself 
taking any surplus from this activity to compensate for intensive competition in the 
original equipment segment. Vertical integration did not affect the consumer. The 
possible demise of Liptons would be a casualty of competition. 
Fox took a similar view of the Commercial Solvents-Zoja case*. Since vertical 
integration by Commercial Solvents did not affect horizontal concentration and hence the 
range of consumer choice, why was it against the public interest? Definition of a 
market for primary materials was an artificial device to fit into a structuralist framework 
a decision based upon dependence. The European Court of Justice has tended to regard 
the elimination of an independent “horizontal” operator in a vertical chain as an abuse of 
dominance. The UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission has emphasised consumer 
* Discussed in detail in Chapter 4 below, with full references, 
welfare in considering vertical mergers and acquisitions and, in most cases referred to it, 
has generally decided that no loss of consumer choice would follow (Merkin and 
Williams, 1984, p.268). Certain American observers, e.g. Fox (1983) and Hay (1985), 
have supported this approach. Hay criticised an exception to this neutral attitude of the 
MMC towards vertical relationships - its decision that Ford should not restrict the 
distribution of spare parts to “tied” outlets. Hay’s argument is that only the total car 
market is “relevant” to consumer interests - subsidisation of new car prices by expensive 
spare parts is not necessarily unfavourable for consumer welfare*. 
A counter-argument to the “integrated-market” approach is proposed by Sharpe (1985), 
who emphasised the imperfection of consumer knowledge. Extending Sharpe’s 
arguments a little, one may consider an individual purchasing a new car. Unlike a 
commercial fleet purchaser such as a car-hire company, the individual is unlikely to 
know when he will need to purchase spare parts - he may not even think about them. 
A similar argument may be extended to the purchase of cash registers (see above). In 
such cases (original equipment versus spare parts), one might define two different 
markets, with different price-elasticities at different times. The significance of the 
survival of the independent operator might be assessed by this consumer-orientated 
approach. 
3. Some Conclusions 
(a) Although the tendency in the USA is in the other direction, the general 
movement of national policies in Europe is towards a competition policy aimed at 
preserving effective competition, rather than just dealing with abuse. 
@I Some economists and lawyers, especially in the United Kingdom where until now 
policies have been more pragmatic, have welcomed this more “structuralist” approach and 
have called for more systematic definition of the relevant market. 
(c) The trend in Community policy towards greater concern with structure is thus 
consistent with the trends in France, the United Kingdom and Germany. This last 
mentioned country has not followed the USA in so widening the definition of the 
* relevant market as to make it difficult to use. 
03 Previous definitions of the relevant market by Community institutions are 
generally criticised for lack of consistency and, by at least two American observers, for 
* Discussed further in Chapter 4, with full references 
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ambivalence about the objectives of competition policy. The significance of dependence 
relationships, particularly in the context of vertical integration, is the subject of wide 
disagreement. Some European economists believe that the link between dependence and 
dominance should be made more explicit and become part of standard Community 
methodology, obviating the need to define the relevant market. Other economists 
(mainly American) believe that dependence is almost irrelevant and that the market 
should be defined in terms of integrated products. This would emphasise the freedom 
of consumers to choose and that of suppliers to integrate vertically (provided this does 
not affect horizontal concentration). 
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C H A P T E R  2  A N  O U T L INE O F  D IFFE R E N T  A P P R O A C H E S  T O  D E F INITIO N  
A . D O M I N A N C E  A N D  T H E  R E L E V A N T  M A R K E T  
1 . T h e  C o m m u n i ty (*) 
O n  severa l  occas ions  th e  Commiss i on  a n d  th e  Cou r t o f Just ice h a v e  reaf f i rmed a  bas ic  
d e fin i t ion o f d o m i n a n c e  wh ich  u s e d  wo rds  in  th e  1 9 5 1  Treaty  o f Par i s  set t ing u p  th e  
E u r o p e a n  Coa l  a n d  S tee l  C o m m u n i ty (Art ic le 66(2)) : -  “th e  p o w e r  to  h inde r  e ffect ive 
c o m p e titio n  in  a  substant ia l  par t  o f th e  ma rke t in  q u e s tio n .” 
Seve ra l  a u tho rs  h a v e  n o te d  th a t a l t hough  A rt icle 8 5  d o e s  n o t refer  to  d o m i n a n c e , th e  
d e fin i t ion a d o p te d  fo r  A rt icle 8 6  is a lmos t i den tical to  th e  wo rd ing  o f p a r a g r a p h  3 (b )  o f 
A rt icle 8 5 . T h e  latter p rec ludes  th e  e x e m p tio n  f rom proh ib i t ion  o f a g r e e m e n ts wh ich  
“a ffo rd  th e  possib i l i ty  o f e l im ina t ing  c o m p e titio n  in  respect  o f a  substant ia l  par t  o f th e  
p roduc ts in  q u e s tio n .” P r i m a  facie,  th e  re levant  ma rke t c o n c e p t a p p e a r s  th e  s a m e  fo r  
b o th  A rt icles 8 5  a n d  8 6 . 
In  its 1 9 6 5  M e m o r a n d u m  sur  le  D r o b l e m e  d e  la  c o n c e n trat ion d a n s  le  march i  c o m m u n  
th e  Commiss i on  p rov ided  a  c lear  in terpretat ion o f d o m i n a n c e , wh ich  it s e e m s  to  h a v e  
app l i ed  consistent ly  in  its o w n  dec is ions: -  
“L a  d o m i n a tio n  d u  m a r c h e  n e  p e u t p a s  e tre u n i q u e m e n t d i f in ie a  part i r  
d e  la  par t  d u  ma rch t q u e  d e tie n t u n e  e n trepr ise o u  d ’a u tres e l e m e n ts 
q u a n tita tifs d ’u n e  structure d e  m a r c h e  d o n n e e . C ’est e n  p remie r  l ieu  u n  
pouvo i r  e c o n o m i q u e .... la  facu l td  d ’exercer  sur  le  fo n c tio n n e m e n t d u  
m a r c h e  u n e  in f luence n o tab le  e t e n  p r inc ipe  prev is ib le  pou r  l’e n trepr ise 
d o m i n a n te . . . ..U n e  e n trepr ise qu i  p e u t bv incer ,  q u a n d  e l le  le  des i re ,  les  
a u tres e n trepr ises concur ren tes  d u  m a r c h e  p e u t de j a  d i sposer  d ’u n e  
pos i t ion  d o m i n a n te .... m e m e  si sa  p rop re  par t  d u  m a r c h e  est enco re  
re la t ivement  fa ib le .” 
S o m e  fur ther  g u i d a n c e  is c o n ta i n e d  in  th e  Draft  Me rge rs  R e g u l a tio n  (Commiss ion  o f th e  
E C , 1 9 7 3 , A rt icle I (para. l )) : -  
“Th is  p o w e r  to  h inde r  e ffect ive c o m p e titio n  sha l l  b e  app ra i sed  by  
re fe rence  in  par t icu lar  to  th e  extent  to  wh ich  supp l ie rs  a n d  consumers  
h a v e  a  possib i l i ty  o f cho ice,  to  th e  econom ic  a n d  financ ia l  powe rs  o f th e  
l  This  sect ion d raws  heav i l y  o n  S c h r o te r  (1977(a ) )  a n d  a lso  o n  Merk in  a n d  W i l l iams 
(1984 )  
undertakings concerned, to the structure of the markets affected and to 
supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and services.” 
These two quotations illustrate some of the key features of dominance, in the view of 
the Commission and of the Court of Justice (on the evidence of its decisions). These 
are: 
- the ability of the dominant enterprise(s) to influence the market by its (their) 
own conduct, unimpeded by competitors; 
- other companies’ dependence for survival on the dominant enterprise(s); 
- economic and financial power which gives the dominant enterprise(s) 
advantages in any competitive battle. 
One aspect of competition policy which appears to have attracted little attention in the 
literature regarding the EEC is the question of buyer power (or monopsony/oligopsony). 
According to the two questions from the Commission set out above, collusion or 
concentration among purchasers would be subject to Articles 85 and 86 - ability to 
hinder effective competition, to compel suppliers to pursue particular policies and to use 
economic and financial power to private advantage. 
There have been no recent cases involving buyer dominance in Community 
jurisprudence but one has arisen in France, summarised by Glais (1985). In a study of 
concentration in the UK textile industry (Fishwick 1975). several small textile companies 
were found to be dependent on the major national distributors, who were able to secure 
favourable prices, dictate quality etc. Since the distributors concerned were competing 
intensively in the retail market, it was probable that the consumer benefited from the 
“squeeze” on prices of textile manufacturers by obtaining better value for money. 
However, as Glais (1985) points out, the longer term consequences for consumer welfare 
are uncertain. The buying power of major distributors (or further processors) may 
enable them to increase their share of the final market; defensive mergers by suppliers 
may be a further consequence. The emergence of bi-lateral oligopolies might well be to 
the detriment of consumers, not only in higher prices (no longer restrained by current 
competitors) but also in the stifling of innovation. 
These arguments point out the need to consider future changes in the structure of both 
the intermediate and final markets. The relevant market concept is not inappropriate for 
analysis of buyer power, provided future developments within the market(s) are taken 
into account. Although the theoretical literature includes occasional reference to buyer 
concentration, few attempts have been made to develop an analytical framework to deal 
with it. (One exception is the German Monopolkommission 1983) 
2. The Dredominant American annroach 
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Neither “monopoly” nor “monopolization” have been formally defined by the US courts 
or by government bodies concerned with anti-trust policies. The 1968 Merger 
Guidelines of the Department of Justice were based predominantly on the use of simple 
concentration ratios to measure the competitiveness of the market structure. Vertical 
and conglomerate mergers were to be evaluated mainly for their horizontal effects. 
There is no reference to dependent relationships, nothing about independence of conduct 
and very little about the possible abuse of dominance secured through sheer size (e.g. 
with conglomerate mergers). 
The market structure - conduct - performance approach to analysis of dominance is 
based on neo-classical economic theory, on perfect competition. This hypothetical 
extreme is regarded as the zero value from which dominance can be measured. The two 
basic assumptions of perfect competition are (a) the existence of a very large number of 
identical firms producing identical products, recognised as such by all of a very large 
number of customers and (b) freedom of entry and exit into the industry (which 
comprises all these companies). 
The main American criticism of anti-trust policy under the 1968 Merger Guidelines was 
that it took account mainly of (a) and paid insufficient attention to (b). There has been 
a recent upsurge of criticism of perfect competition as a starting point, following a 
tradition long associated with the Austrian school. However, most of the writings on 
measurement of market power (or dominance) over the period 1950 to the early 1980’s 
appear to have accepted perfect competition as a starting point and current US anti-trust 
policy reflects this. 
Under perfect competition, price would tend towards marginal cost and minimum 
attainable average cost. Market power, as a departure from perfect competition, can 
conveniently be defined as ability to maintain prices in excess of costs. To ‘those 
involved in the European discussion of the dominance concept, US economists’ use of 
perfect competition as a basis for analysis may seem barely credible. Some quotations 
from recognised American specialists in this area confirm the importance attached to 
perfect competition and the related price-cost margin:- 
“Since market power is the ability to act in a less than perfectly 
competitive manner, 
implies some power.” 
nearly every departure from perfect competition 
(Areeda and Turner, 1978, p.195) 
“The term ‘market power’ refers to the ability of a firm (or group of 
firms, acting jointly) to raise price above the competitive level without 
losing so many sales so rapidly that the price increase is unprofitable.” 
(Landes and Posner, 198 1, p.937) 
“The ability of one or more firms profitably to maintain prices above 
competitive levels for a significant period of time is termed ‘market 
power’.’ 
(US Merger Guidelines, 1984, p.2) 
3. Jmolications for definition of the relevant market 
As was emphasised in Chapter 1, the relevant market is most important in the context of 
the structuralist approach to competition policy. Where this policy is administered 
mainly on the basis of existing concentration in horizontally defined relevant markets, 
the definition of those relevant markets is of fundamental importance. This is why the 
relevant market was the main focus of contention in US anti-trust cases in the 1960’s 
and 1970’s. 
If competition policy is to be based on perfect competition but is to consider barriers to 
entry and potential competition as well as the existing market structure, then a question 
of principle is raised. Should the relevant market (in both its product and geographical 
dimensions) be widened to include potential competition or should potential competition 
be considered separately from market definition and existing concentration? Much of 
the controversy in US literature has focussed on this point. 
Finally it should be noted that the prevailing US definition of market power, based on 
perfect competition, is much more specific than that so far adopted by the Community. 
As suggested by the quotations from de Jong (1977) and Fox (1983) in Chapter 1, the 
definition of the relevant market in EEC cases has sometimes been made to fit the 
cirsumstances of the particular case - to confirm statistically a position of dominance 
recognisable on other criteria such as dependency or anti-competitive conduct. If the 
large volume of analysis published in the USA is to be used to develop the relevant 
market concept for the benefit of EEC jurisprudence, the more specific definition of 
dominance in the USA must be borne in mind. 
B. THE NEO-CLASSICAL APPROACH TO MARKET DEFINITION - SOME 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND CRITICISMS 
1. Introduction 
Most of the attempts in the American literature to refine the definition of the relevant 
market assume the validity of the body of theory known as “neo-classical” and associated 
particularly with Alfred Marshall. Glais and Laurent (1983) has the heading “La notion 
de ‘relevant market’: produit d’une conception nio-classique de l’etude du systeme 
productif.” The use of the neo-classical model of perfect competition as a basis for 
analysis of present-day industrial structure has been widely criticised; some of these 
criticisms are reflected in the discussion below.* 
2. b'kaSUrement Of MonoDolv Power 
Under perfect competition price is equal to marginal cost and is under constant 
downward pressure, because of freedom of entry, towards minimum average cost. A 
simple definition of market power or dominance (D), measuring divergence from perfect 
competition would be 
D = Price - Marginal Cost 
Price 
which definition is associated with Lerner (1934). In the long-run marginal cost = 
average cost at its minimum point. 
By substituting marginal revenue for marginal cost in this definition, it is easy to show 
that 
D = l/ni where ni is the absolute value of price elasticity of demand for 
the product of the individual firm. 
Landes and Posner (1981) point out that if one knew the price elasticity of demand for 
the output of the firm then its market power could be calculated without reference to 
market share. They suggest (op.cit., p.943) that most firms are “rational and well- 
informed about market conditions” and would know the price elasticity of demand 
* See Sub-Section 4 below 
facing them at profit maximising output but in practice anti-trust authorities could not 
get the figure.* This is why market shares are necessary. 
The practical value of the Lerner formula is diminished by absence of information about 
marginal costs. The figure is also distorted by differing degrees of vertical integration. 
Hart and Morgan (1977) propose the use of an equivalent formula: 
Value added - labour costs 
Value added 
The Lerner formula (also the Hart-Morgan version) may be criticisedz- 
(a) It assumes that gains from monopoly power are reflected entirely in published 
profits with no transfer to employees (in higher wages) and no additional “discretionary” 
expenditure by management this conflicts with empirical research. 
(b) It fails to distinguish between the effects of high prices (monopoly exploitation) 
and reduced costs (efficiency). Under perfect competition free entry would push prices 
down towards the lower costs but in a practical defintion of monopoly power, the 
distinction might be important. 
Landes and Posner showed l * that if one could define a market within which products 
were perfect substitutes, then 
ni’ % /Si + ej (l-Sj)/Sj 
where r) i - absolute value of price-elasticity of demand of 
firm i 
n m - absolute Value of price-elasticity of demand of 
total mket 
l One may disagree with the assertion that firms know the price-elasticity of demand 
for their own output. Under typical oligopoly conditions the concept has limited 
significance since evaluation of competitors’ reactions must replace the ceteris 
paribus assumption 
l * A more detailed derivation of this equation appears in Scheffman and Spiller (1985) 
es J = price-elasticity of combined supply of competitors 
Si = sales by i as proportion of total market sales 
From this expression one may deduce that 
P-MC = Sj/(Q m + ej (1 -si )) 
P 
Comment 
This last expression is useful in showing that ability to make monopoly profits is 
influenced not only by market share but also by (i) the degree of competition from 
products in other markets and (ii) the ease with which other firms in this relevant 
market can increase supply. 
However it assumes that a market may be defined in a form never found in the real 
world - product homogeneity within the industry with a clear demarcation from outside. 
This assumption implies a continuum from pure competition through pure oligopoly to 
absolute monopoly. Real markets rarely fall within this continuum. 
3. Statistical studies of concentration and performance 
If the definitions of industries in national statistical classifications corresponded with the 
market concept used in the last section then profits as a proportion of value added in 
each industry would be positively correlated with concentration. If collusion (overt or 
tacit) between oligopolists were also introduced into the analysis this correlation would 
be strengthened. 
Statistical studies of the relationship between profits and concentration by industry 
abounded in the 1960’s and 1970’s (Fishwick 1979). In the USA fairly weak 
correlations were found in studies of this kind, usually of statistical significance only 
when concentration was included in multiple regression with a variable representing 
barriers to entry. In the UK no significant correlation between concentration and profit 
margins was found. 
These statistical results are not surprising. First, as already suggested above, the 
assumption that monopoly gains would be reflected in reported profits is unrealistic. 
Secondly, classifications of industry adopted for administrative or statistical purposes do 
not even vaguely approximate to the market forms assumed in the equations above. 
Finally, the intensity of competition varies between industries with similar levels of 
concentration 
4. Alternatives to the neo-classical aDDrOaCh 
Perfect competition, with its emphasis on atomistic structure and product homogeneity, 
is not only an unrealistic model but, in the view of many economists, it not even a 
desirable ideal. In a synopsis of attacks on the concept published before 1973, Kirzner 
(1973) states:- 
“Perfect competition denotes for the price theorist the situation in which 
every market participant does exactly what everyone else is doing, in ’ 
which it is utterly pointless to try to achieve something in any way better 
than what is already being done by others...” (op.cit., p.90) 
This is equivalent to stating (as Hayek, 1949) that perfect competition symbolises 
complete absence of competition! 
Howe (1978) quoted the judgements of other economists that, at a practical level, 
perfectly competitive industries perform less well in a social sense than more 
concentrated industries. For example:- 
“...Industries which approach the conditions required for perfect 
competition characteristically do not give good market performance. By 
contrast, although industries characterised by a high degree of 
concentration of production may in theory lead to restricted output, 
excess monopoly profits, tardy innovation and exploited returns to factors 
of production, in practice they may be noted for low profits and prices 
and a high degree of technological progressiveness.” (Maunder, 1969) 
“Industries which are distinguished by a close approach to the competitive 
model are also distinguished, one can say almost without exception, by a 
near absence of research and technical development.” (Galbraith, 1957) 
The emphasis on research and innovation recalls the arguments of Schumpeter (1947) 
who regarded short-term monopolies as necessary for innovation and part of a process of 
destructive competition. This emphasis on competition as a dynamic process rather than 
a kind of structure is re-echoed by most writers from the Chicago school and from the 
Austrian tradition. Changes in competition policy to accommodate this interpretation of 
competition imply less concern about the existing structure of the relevant market. 
(a) Workable Comoetition 
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This concept replaces emphasis on departures from perfect competition, with 
examination of “performance norms” (Sosnick, 1958) some of which are based on the 
theoretical ideals of perfect competition, such as low entry barriers and normal profits, 
but which also extend to economies of scale and risk-taking and innovation. 
The practical implications of this approach for competition policy amount to a 
compromise between analysis of structure and observation of conduct. Almost since its 
origin (J.M. Clark, 1940) workable competition has been criticised as lacking theoretical 
foundation. One of the early protagonists (Bain, 1968) subsequently admitted that it 
involved “horseback judgements;” Howe (1978), in providing a useful summary of the 
concept, described it as “essentially pragmatic”; Glais and Laurent (1983, p.10) are 
particularly critical - “Le courant de la ‘concurrence praticable’ . ..c*est le plus ambigu. 11 
se complalt dans le flou...” 
The practical use of the workable competition approach does not appear to extend 
beyond a check-list of desirable features in the supply of a product. Even for this 
purpose, it may be insufficiently flexible to fit a wide range of cases but insufficiently 
rigorous to ensure consistency 
(b) Contestable markets 
W.J. Baumol, one of the main protagonists of contestability theory, entitled his 1982 
Presidential address to the American Economics Association “Contestable Markets: an ’ 
Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure.” In the first paragraph he claimed that the 
theory “enables us to look at industry structure and behaviour in a way that is novel in a 
number of respects....” However, he subsequently acknowledged that certain of the ideas 
could be found in the works of previous authors - “from Bertrand to Bain, from Cournot 
to Demsetz.” 
Contestability relates to freedom of entry. Conventional, structuralist theorists would 
admit that with freedom of entry super-normal profits could not be earned. They would 
also argue (e.g. Bain, 1956) that existing monopolists enjoyed absolute advantages over 
entrants including economies of scale (natural monopolies), accumulated brand loyalties 
(product differentiation), vertical tie-ins and the ability to indulge in price 
discrimination and predatory pricing. Large enterprises outside an industry may be able 
to overcome these barriers by high initial expenditures but, because these expenditures 
cannot be recovered on subsequent exit from an industry or market, “hit and run entry” 
is uneconomic. Firms outside an industry will be deterred from entering a contest with 
existing companies, especially as the new firms must bear an initial handicap. 
Contestability theorists reject this argument. They argue that the inescapable initial 
expenditures will be a barrier to entry only when they are not recoverable - that is when 
they are sunk. The inevitability of sunk costs is the only effective barrier to entry; 
provided there are no sunk costs then entry will be free ensuring only normal profits, 
maximum efficiency in production, price tending to marginal cost and no cross- 
subsidisation. The theory leads to the conclusion that, provided markets are contestable 
(i.e. not protected by significant and inescapable sunk costs - or by legal institutional 
barriers), there are no grounds for concern about their present structure. 
Although contestability has also been questioned on theoretical grounds (e.g. Weitzman, 
1983) the main criticism has been directed at its unrealistic assumptions. Shepherd 
(1984) argued that contestability theory added little new to conventional theory, that it 
merely postulates the consequences (long recognised) of a theoretical extreme - zero 
entry barriers (“ultra-free entry”). Shepherd acknowledged the importance of sunk costs 
but disputed the assumption that these can approximate to zero over a substantial range 
of activities. He also pointed out that faced with the prospect of new competitors, 
existing companies could reduce prices (or otherwise offer better value for money), 
sacrificing super-normal profits and thus removing the incentive for hit-and-run entry. 
This latter argument appears to accept that potential competition ViahI well impose some 
restraint on the ability of existing companies to exploit current dominance. 
In a comprehensive summary of recent developments in the economics of industry, 
Vickers (1985) concludes that contestability theory underlines measures to libkralise 
markets by reducing barriers to entry and exit. * Although it may be logically correct 
that a dominant position cannot be abused if the relevant market is perfectly contestable, 
this condition may be very rare. In the past, anti-trust authorities may have paid 
insufficient attention to potential competition; contestability theory with its (apparently 
undisputed) emphasis on sunk costs provides a useful analytical framework for this. 
l Waterson (1984) points out that it is barriers to exit which are crucial in determining 
contestability 
However, because zero sunk costs are so unlikely, the claim (e.g. Baumol, 1982) that the 
contestability approach obviates the need for anti-trust authorities to analyse market 
structure seems hard to justify. 
(cl Conclusion 
Neo-classical theory based on perfect competition (atomistic structure with homogeneous 
products) has been criticised not only as unrealistic but also misdirected, since the 
theoretical ideal is undesirable. This means that none of the analytical tools based on 
this theory can be used as a single universal yardstick. Two alternatives have been 
discussed above - workable competition and contestability. While both are of some 
value in competition policy, neither provides a satisfactory general approach to the 
problem of abuse of dominance. 
Concepts based on the neo-classical model, discussed in Section C, are of greatest value 
in showing the pitfalls of “commonsense” approaches to market definition. They provide 
a variety of tools which may be used to refine, to make more rigorous and consistent, 
the market definitions which must be made if Community competition policy is to be 
effected in a transparent, even-handed way. The use of these tools must be combined 
with considerations drawn from models other than perfect competition - this does not 
itself destroy the value of the tools. 
While neo-classical theory does not provide a basis for a universally applicable system of 
market definition, it does help one to recognise what one must not do. 
C. AN OUTLINE OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES WITHIN THE NEO- 
CLASSICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
All of the approaches examined in this section start from a similar neo-classical base of 
perfect competition. They attempt implicity to answer the question: “How do we 
measure a market in such a way that difference from perfect competition can be 
encapsulated in a single index - market share?” 
There is general agreement that the relevant market has three dimensions - product 
range, geographical location and time. Substitution (by consumers or producers) takes 
time: market power is therefore time-related in the same analytical way. Reference to 
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the product and geographical dimensions will be made throughout this section. In 
section D below the particular problems of geographical definition will be reiterated. 
A short synthesis (in German) of the different approaches presented here appears in 
Chapter 3 of Schmidt (1981). The following diagram summarises them very neatly:- 
Abb,. 2: Andtze zur Bestimmung des relevanten Marktes 
Industrickonzept Substitutionskonzept 
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Each of these concepts will now be discussed in turn. 
Source: Schmidt (op.cit., p.33) 
1. The Industry 
In Marshall’s usage, the industry was (implicitly) assumed to consist of companies 
making a homogeneous product. This is clearly not true of industries as defined by 
statistical classifications such as the NICE or the British Standard Industrial 
Classification. The bases of industry definition are not only substitution in end-use but 
also similarity in material contents, methods of production or some other commercial or 
social affinity. In the textile machinery industry, for example, imports and exports of 
most EEC countries exceed 75% of national output. Product markets may be said to 
consist of international oligopolies within specialist ranges of machinery. 
Again an NICE classification is “Paper conversion* which includes companies producing 
paper bags and others making paper tissue handkerchiefs. These two products do not 
compete but each competes with non-paper products assigned to different industries. 
I .  
C  
T h e  d e fects o f th e  c o n v e n tiona l  indust r ia l  c lassi f icat ion fo r  th e  p u r p o s e  o f c o n c e n trat ion 
ind ices  a re  obv ious .  In  1 9 3 3 , J o a n  R o b i n s o n  a r g u e d  th a t fo r  th e  pu rposes  o f par t ia l  
equ i l i b r ium ana lys is  a n  indust ry  h a d  to  b e  d e fin e d  as  a n y  g r o u p  o f firm s  p roduc ing  a  
s ing le  c o m m o d i ty a n d  th a t th e  d i f ference b e tween  th is  d e fin i t ion a n d  th e  rea l  wor ld  
m ight  n o t b e  so  g rea t. (Rob inson  1 9 3 3 , p a g e  17) .  W ri t ing a g a i n  in  1 9 5 3  th e  s a m e  a u tho r  
a c k n o w l e d g e d  th a t he r  1 9 3 3  a s s u m p tio n  c o n fu s e d  “indust ry” wi th “ma rke t” a n d  th a t 
c o n c e n trat ion in  indust ry  h a d  little re la t ion to  th e  d e g r e e  o f m o n o p o l y  in  th e  ma rke ts 
served.  Howeve r , s h e  a lso  r emarked : 
“T h e  c o n c e p t o f a n  industry,  th o u g h  ex t remely  a m o r p h o u s  a n d  imposs ib le  
to  d e m a r c a te  sharp ly  a t th e  e d g e s , is o f impor tance  fo r  th e  theo ry  o f 
c o m p e titio n . It represents  th e  a rea  wi th in  wh ich  th e  firm  fin d s  it 
re lat ively easy  to  e x p a n d ....” (Rob inson  1 9 6 9 , p .x) 
In  o the r  words,  th e  indust ry  c o n c e p t, wh i le  it m a y  n o t ref lect ex is t ing c o m p e titio n  is 
re levant  to  p o te n tia l  c o m p e titio n . If th e  pr ices  o f weav i ng  mach ine ry  we re  to  r ise 
sharp ly  it w o u l d  b e  eas ie r  fo r  a  p roduce r  o f sp inn ing  mach ine ry  to  a d d  l ooms  to  h is  
r a n g e  th a n  it w o u l d  fo r  a  p roduce r  o f choco la te  bars.  S ince  p o te n tia l  c o m p e titio n  (cross-  
elast ici ty o f supp ly )  a ffects ma rke t p o w e r , indust ry  c o n c e n trat ion is n o t i r re levant.  
Fur ther  suppo r t fo r  th e  v iew th a t c o m b i n a tio n s  b a s e d  o n  phys ica l  o r  techn ica l  
s imi lar i t ies ra ther  th a n  e n d - u s e  subst i tutabi l i ty a re  o f pract ica l  va lue  in  assessmen t o f 
ma rke t p o w e r  m a y  b e  fo u n d  in  Chambe r l i n  (1937) ,  Triff in ( 1940 )  a n d , m o r e  recent ly  d e  
J o n g  ( 1 9 7 7 , p .529 ) . Howeve r , a l l  th e s e  a u tho rs  rega rd  g roup ing  into indust r ies  b a s e d  o n  
supp ly  character is t ics as  c o m p l e m e n tary  to  g roup ings  by  d e m a n d  character is t ics 
(subst i tutabi l i ty in  use) .  
B e fo re  leav ing  th e  c o n c e p t o f industry,  it is u s e fu l  to  po i n t o u t th a t indust r ia l  
c o n c e n trat ion d o e s  n o t a lways  inc rease  as  th e  p roduc t r a n g e  is na r r owed . T h e  
m a th e m a tical log ic  o f th is  is s h o w n  by  d e  B a n d t ( 1 9 7 0 , p .42) .  T h e  indust ry  sha re  o f 
Cou r tau lds  in  th e  U K  text i les indust ry  as  a  w h o l e  is g rea te r  th a n  in  a n y  o f th e  
ind iv idua l  sectors (except  in  fib re  extrus ion) ;  th e  s a m e  is t rue o f th e  ma jo r  c o m p a n i e s  in  
th e  U K  p a p e r  indust ry  ( w h e n  p a p e r  m a n u fac ture  a n d  convers ion  a re  comb ined ) . 
M o n o p o l y  o r  nea r -monopo l y  o f o n e  par t  o f a n  indust ry  m a y  c o n fe r  d o m i n a n c e  o f th e  
indust ry  as  a  w h o l e , as  is i l lustrated by  th e  pos i t ion  o f E a s tm a n  K o d a k  in  th e  U S  
a m a teu r  p h o to g r a p h y  industry.  B rock (1984 )  po i n ts o u t th a t ana lys is  o f th is  indust ry  as  
a n  in tegra ted e n tity g ives  g rea te r  ind ica t ion  o f d o m i n a n c e  th a n  ana lys is  o f th r ee  sepa ra te  
ma rke ts - film , cameras  a n d  film -process ing.  K o d a k ’s nea r -monopo l y  in  th e  p roduc tio n  
of film gives it substantial advantages over competitors in the other two markets, since 
they have to make their own products compatible with Kodak film. A similar situation 
applies in computing. IBM’s shares of the micro-computer and peripherals markets are 
fairly modest, but its dominance in main-frame computers and the widespread 
requirement on the part of customers for linking to IBM main-frames give it a distinct 
advantage. Even when relevant markets are defined on a different basis, industry 
relationships should also be considered. 
2. Substitutabilitv in end-use 
Schmidt (1981) pointed out that the five apparently different approaches to market 
definition which he grouped under “Substitutionskonzept” have the same basic roots:- 
“Bei einem Vergleich der Substitionskonzepte zeigt sich, dal3 allen 
Konzepten als gemeinsame Wurzel die Substitutions-zugrunde liegt, so 
da13 sich die verschiedenen Ansatze miteinander vereinbaren lassen.” 
This statement is quite significant in view of the polemical tone of some of the 
arguments in favour of particular approaches. 
In all the discussions of substitutability in demand, consumer psychology is included as 
well as physical or technical factors. The Columbia Law Notes (1954) explain that 
“reasonable interchangeability” (a term used in the US courts to determine the relevant 
market) of products comprises two elements: (i) “functional interchangeability,” meaning 
that products are physically capable of serving the same function and (ii) “reactive 
interchangeability,” which describes the degree to which customers would react to a 
relative price change by substitution. This “reactive” element depends upon consumers* 
loyalties, preferences etc., which may not be perfectly informed but remain important. 
Another dimension of substitutability is time. Psychological barriers to substitution may 
be expected to break down over time if two functionally substitutable products have 
widely different prices, unless artificial product differentiation is maintained by 
advertising. An interesting element of delay in .substitution is fully analysed by the 
Monopolkommission (1983): the effects of complementary fixed investments which 
commit consumers to one product. For example oil and gas may appear substitutes for 
central heating purposes. At the time of system installation the products may be indeed 
interchangeable. Once a system has been installed for either product, the consumer faces 
a major expense in attempting to substitute. 
Substitutability must therefore be defined as the degree to which the customer is able 
(taking into account both functional and psychological factors) to transfer between 
products within a specified period of time. 
. . 
(a) Discrete aans in substitutabilitv between goods? 
In introducing imperfect competition, with its explicit assumption of product 
differentiation (= heterogeneity) Joan Robinson had some major problems in trying to 
define an industry or group. Some quotations from Economics of Imoerfect Comoetition 
(Robinson, 1933) make these difficulties obvious (op.cit., p.l7):- 
“A COMMODITY is a consumable good, arbitrarily demarcated from 
other kinds of goods but which may be regarded for practical purposes as 
homogeneous witin itself.” (My emphasis - FF. On an earlier page, 
Robinson admitted that this practical definition would be “rough and 
ready.“) 
“An INDUSTRY is any group of firms producing a single commodity. In 
some cases where a commodity in the real world is bounded on all sides 
by a marked gap between itself and its closest substitutes, the real-world 
firms producing this real world commodity will conform to the definition 
of an industry sufficiently closely to make the discussion of industries in 
this technical sense of some interest.” (My emphasis - FF) 
“In some cases” this may well be true but consideration of most product ranges 
demonstrates the difficulty in defining a single gap. In practice substitutes often form a 
continuum. For example (i) fruit juices and beer may be regarded as substitutes, 
likewise (ii) beer and wine and (iii) wine and whisky; but whisky is not a substitute for 
fruit juice. Once the perfectly competitive model is abandoned with the introduction of 
product heterogeneity then the concept of “industry”, “group” or “market” must depend 
on gaps in a continuum of substitution. Such gaps may not always exist. 
Both Joan Robinson herself and E.H. Chamberlin, (1933) who proposed a similar logic 
for definition of groups, subsequently criticised their own attempts to accommodate 
partial equilibrium analysis in the imperfect competition model (see Robinson’s preface 
to second edition, 1969). 
@I Triffin’s ConceDt of external interdebendence (cross-elasticitv of demand) 
Triffin (1940) was one of the strongest early critics of the Robinson “gap” concept, 
suggesting that product heterogeneity and classification into sectors, industries, markets, 
etc. were incompatible in a strictly scientific sense. He suggested that the comperitive 
position of any single company’s product in the narrowest sense would ideally be 
assessed according to substitutability with other products, measured by cross-(price) 
elasticity of demand. 
Unlike Triffin and his contemporaries, very few present-day authors define cross-price 
elasticity in a way which makes obvious one of its major limitations. It is important 
that a partial derivative should be used to emphasise the ceferis paribus assumption. 
Cross elasticity of demand for 
X with respect to the price of Y - 6Q, P, 
Cross-elasticity is of obvious potential value in providing an objective measure of 
substitution but there are some major difficulties in applying it. 
(i) Ambiguity may occur unless the cross-elasticity of demand for X with respect to 
the price of Y is the same as that for Y with respect to the price of X. Suppose that Y 
is a non-drip form of paint for amateurs to use in painting ceilings. If the price of 
ordinary paint (X) falls and that of Y remains unchanged, then many former buyers of 
Y may be induced by the greater price difference to cover their surroundings more 
carefully and use ordinary paint. The cross-elasticity of demand for Y may be quite 
high with respect to the price of X. 
A cut in the price of Y might cause a proportionately large increase in its own sales but 
because these are small in relation to sales of X, the cross-elasticity of demand for X 
with respect to the price of Y may be very low. The Monopolkommission (1983, 
Abhang) argues that for definition of the market for X, only the cross-elasticity of 
demand for X with respect to the price of Y is relevant. Some US authors argue that 
the test should be reversible - the two cross-elasticities should be similar. If they are 
not, then the asymmetrical relationship needs careful evaluation. (Bishop, 1952) 
(ii) There will inevitably be diffuculties in fulfilling the ceferis paribus condition. 
Using time-series data, it will be hard to isolate the effect of relative changes in the 
prices of X and Y (their prices may be positvely correlated because of common cost 
elements, e.g. material contents). If cross-elasticity is high then price changes will tend 
to occur simultaneously. To take our previous example, if the price of ordinary paint 
(X) rises, then producers of Y may feel able to raise their prices also, maintaining a 
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differential. If the price of X falls, the producers of Y may be forced into a defensive 
price reduction. How can one get figures to measure cross-elasticity? 
(iii) Cross-elasticity calculations are possible only when possible substitutes have been 
identified. If one is using the concept to determine substitutes, then some other method 
of detection must be used to select data for the test. 
(iv) Another difficulty with cross-elasticity is discussed by Landes and Posner 
(1981). If the producer(s) of product X were exploiting a dominant position they would 
raise prices as far as possible, until some product (Y) not regarded as a close substitute 
became better value for money. The cross-elasticity of demand for X with respect to 
the price of Y may depend on the price difference between them. This particular 
difficulty appears to be avoided if the use of cross-elasticity of demand is confined to 
reversible effects. For example, a 20% change in the price of brand-name aspirin 
(selling at about 5 pence per tablet) might lead to substantial change in sales of 
unbranded aspirin (price about 1 penny per tablet) but a 20% change in the price of the 
cheaper unbranded product would have negligible effect on the branded version. Hence 
the two products are not substitutes. (See Footnote*) 
Triffin’s theoretical conclusion that partial equilibrium analysis was incompatible with 
general product differentiation would appear to damn the relevant market concept. 
However, he was prepared to accept that demarcation of groups or industries might be 
necessary for practical purposes:- 
“Is anything gained by limiting the investigation to a group of close 
competitors which we call a group or industry? In an empirical study, 
yes: we can, in this way, reduce to a manageable size the research work 
involved, without any serious loss of exhaustiveness. 
statement of value theory, no.” (op.cit., p.88) 
In the general 
So, despite his attack on Robinson’s “gap”, Triffin’s practical advice was to use the 
method which she admitted to be “rough and ready,” because how otherwise can one 
,* 
* A modification of Triffin’s cross-elasticity measure avoids some of these 
difficulties. This is the substitution-elasticity of demand (s) suggested by the 
Monopolkommission (1983): s is defined by the equation 
qx = 
9y 
a’Px ’ 
i) FY 
It is discussed further in Chapters 3 and 4. 
define close competitors? To measure substitutability he urged use of cross-elasticity of 
demand but also technological similarity - the two criteria were “appropriate and 
complementary for delineating practical boundaries for any given inquiry.” (op.cit., 
~35) 
And how does one select the companies and products to be included in the group? 
“Which firms shall be included in any one group will have to be decided, 
not on an a priori basis but after an empirical survey of market realities.” 
(op.cit., p.90) (A comment which he did not extend - how do we choose 
what to survey?) 
(cl Jvlarket relationshiDs - Drice teStS 
In a perfectly competitive market prices would tend to equality. Since the neo-classical 
approach to market definition starts from the base of perfect competition, a number of 
writers have urged the study of prices to determine markets. If products are reasonably 
close substitutes their prices will not be widely different. 
Those who favour this approach often quote Marshall’s (1920, p.270) approval of 
Cournot’s definition of a market as a place where “the prices of the same goods tend to 
equality quickly and easily.” Marshall himself stated (ibid.):- 
“The more nearly perfect a market is, the stronger is the tendency for the 
same price to be paid for the same thing at the same time in all parts of 
the market: but of course if the market is large, allowance must be made 
for the expense of delivering the goods to different purchasers.” 
When quoted at this length and more especially when put into their context, Marshall’s 
words clearly refer to the geographical market but the principle can be extended to 
products. If X and Y are good substitutes, both in a technical or functional sense and in 
the perceptions of customers, then their prices might be expected to tend to equality. 
Adelman (1951) claimed that emphasis on this simple conclusion had rescued economists 
from the ‘fatuous over-elaboration” of the market concept (Marshall’s “industry”). One 
of those praised by Adelman for this rescue was G.J. Stigler who right from his original 
Theorv of Price in 1946 to a very recent article on market definition (Stigler and 
Sherwin 1985) has held that price equality provides an objective test of market 
defintion. 
I- 
In practice, Stigler and Sherwin suggest s tatis tica l analy s is  not of absolute pr&e\levels 
but of firs t differences  in prices.  This  is  because it will be necessary to compare p&es -.. . ““” 
not at a point in time but over time. Because of common time trends, such as 
technologica l change or inflation, ser ial correlation may occur. Stigler and Sherwin 
therefore propose the hypothesis that the tes t for grouping either geographical areas or 
product ranges into the same markets should be the correlation between percentage 
changes in their prices  (firs t difference of logarithms). If P, and Py represented the 
prices  of X and Y the equation used by Stigler and Sherwin would be 
Alog P, = a + b ( Alog Py) 
but the authors quote only  the resulting correlation coefficients. Their tes t would appear 
to imply  expected va lues  of a = 0 and b = 1; the correlation coefficients confirm only  
that b f 0. 
The authors assert that this  approach offers more hope than attempts to measure c ross-  
elas tic ity  of demand to determine subst itution. The following pitfalls  should be noted, 
the firs t three of which were mentioned by the authors:- 
- common influences  (2) on prices  from costs  of imputs  which cannot 
necessar ily  be removed by the use of multiple regression because of 
co llinearity  between Z and (Alog Py) - this  problem is  not insuperable; 
- if both a and b are s ignificantly different from zero, then how does one 
interpret the result? At what level of correlation can we segment the two 
markets? 
- what does it mean if changes in P, and P Y are correlated but their va lues  are 
different - if Y is  a premium var iety  of X? 
- the use, in particu lar, of changes in prices  between consecutive periods 
assumes no changes in price s trategy by producers of X and Y. If, for 
example, producers of X decided not to follow an increase in the price of Y, 
in order to gain market share at Y’s  expense, then the two products might be 
put into separate markets. This  objec tion is  taken from de Jong (1977). 
- positive correlation between changes in prices  of X and Y may reflec t either 
subst itutability  of complementarity ; it is  not always ev ident a priori which 
condition applies  (see the case s tudy Ice Cream in Chapter 4). 
Horowitz (1981) also urged the use of price equality as the basis for market definition, 
pointing out the near-impossbility of direct assessment of substitutability via attempts to 
measure cross-elasticity. 
He suggested that geographical areas could be grouped into the same market if any 
differences in price between the same products were tending to zero over time. If D, 
represents the difference between the prices of the same product in two areas then 
Horowitz’s basic hypothesis may be presented simply as 
Dt L: bD,-, where b lies between 0 and +1 
The size of b describes the rapidity with which prices tend to equality. Given the 
effects of inflation and common time trends, it may be better to redefine Horowitz’s 
hypothesis in terms of differences in logarithms (i.e. the ratio of the price of X to that 
of Y). 
wg px - Log Py)t - a + b(Log P, - Log Py)t-l + W, 
Estimation of this equation by regression analysis should produce a = 0 (with random 
variation Wt) if X and Y are in the same market. If, in addition, b lies between 0 and 1 
then this implies a delay in substitution. 
The approach set out by Horowitz is subject to the same pitfalls as that of Stigler and 
Sherwin, to which it is related. It is obvious that some a priori knowledge of possible 
substitutes is necessary before either of the tests can be applied. The study of previous 
price relationships to identify substitutability is supported (among others) by the 
Monopolkommission (1983) and the US Department of Justice (1984). It merits further 
research. 
Market relationships, as described philosophically by Von Stackelberg (see Schmidt, 
1981, p.28). are not confined to price. If two products are close substitutes then any 
improvement in quality or marketing of one may be expected to lead to a corresponding 
change in the other. Economists tend to emphasise only prices: it would be quite 
possible to modify the Stigler and Sherwin and Horowitz approaches to include other 
variables, such as advertising expenditure or product quality. The assessment may be 
less quantitative (econometric) but the basic notion would be the same. 
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(d) The Basic Need Concent 
The German term  “Bedarfsmarkt” does not appear to have any English language 
equivalent in common use but is based on the work of a US author, Lawrence Abbot. It 
groups together products which serve the same basic needs (Grundbedtirfnisse):- 
“Eine Gruppe heterogener Gtiter kann als eine Garnitur variabler M ittele 
zur Befriedung einer Reihe von Bedurfnissen angesehen werden, die in 
bestim m ten Konstellation von Grundbediirfnissen m iteinander verbunden 
sind” (Schmidt, 1981, p.28). 
A  similar notion is implied in the Commission of the European Communities’ Regulation 
1983/83 regarding certain block exemptions under Article 85 (3(b)). This effectively 
defined a product market as consisting of 
“goods which are considered by users as equivalent in view of their 
characteristics, prices and intended use” (Reg. 1983/83, A rticle 3). 
The “Bedarfsmarkt” concept seems to have become enshrined in German anti-trust policy 
along with the concept of the “rational consumer” (verstandiger Verbraucher). In 
practice, as the Monopolkommission admits (op.cit., para.619) the use of these concepts 
has been based on experiences and rules of thumb (Erfahrungssatze und Faustregeln). 
A re the concepts themselves of any value? 
Waelbroeck (1977, p.128) pointed out that, rather than ask what the rational consumer 
would do, it is better to estimate how many consumers would regard products as 
substitutes. Focsaneanu (1975) criticised the “Bedarfsmark” concept (as postulated in 
Regulation 1967/67, an earlier version of 1983/83):- 
“Une telle conception, correcte en thtorie, paratt pratiquement 
inutilisable. En effet, comment connaltre l’appreciation des utilisateurs, 
sinon par un sondage d’opinion, difficile a realiser dans chaque cas 
d’espbce.” (Focsaneanu 1975, p.585) 
The “Bedarfsmarkt” concept seems to have more significance in a negative sense. It has 
prevented German authorities from  accepting as within the same market products which 
are not interchangeable in end-use but between which producers m ight easily switch(e.g. 
men’s and boys’ shoes). This is discussed further in sub-section 3 below, which deals 
with substitution on the supply-side. 
This concept seems to impose unnecessary formality on commonsense and to be of little 
aid in the practical definition of the reIevant market. 
W me Wirtschaftsdfine COnCeDt 
Whereas the “Bedardfsmarkt” concept groups substitutes according to the consumers* 
perceptions (though these usually have to be presumed), the “Wirtschaftsplane” notion 
starts from the position of the enterprise. The English language equivalent, literally 
“economic plains” (of battle), is usually “economic arenas”, also conveying the idea of 
contest. 
Schneider’s (1972) concept draws mainly on German economists and finds little parallel 
in the English or French language literature. It is based on the principle that a decision 
maker in one firm either “reckons or knows” which other firms are competing for the 
same part of the consumers’ expenditure. This implies that the best definition of 
substitutes for X comes from suppliers of X. 
Schmidt (1981) puts this “economic arena” concept as a sub-heading of substitutability. 
However, the concept goes beyond this one element - the producer of X will have some 
knowledge about how easily other companies could enter his market and about the 
relative financial power of these companies. He will group potential competitors in the 
“economic arena”, which seems to correspond to the “industry”. 
Secondly, it is known that companies attempt themselves to assess substitutability, to 
improve on their intuitive “Rechnung”, by using some of the (imperfect) quantitative 
tests examined earlier, e.g. cross-elasticities and pricing patterns. 
Thirdly, competition authorities cannot depend for their definition of the relevant 
market upon those accused of market dominance! . 
This last objection leads to a more constructive view. Those eager to prove that they are 
not dominant may be expected to offer the widest possible definition of the relevant 
market, using their knowledge of competition but also needing to maintain credibility. 
This does provide a range of products and width of geographical area to which the 
quantitative tests outlined in previous sections may tentatively be applied. 
m Conclusions on Substitutabilitv in Demand 
As was indicated in the quotation from Schmidt at the beginning of this section, the 
various approaches to identification of substitutes are all based on the same roots. The 
US Department of Justice Merger Guidelines (1984) recommend the use of all these 
methods: evidence of demand switching (cross-elasticity), similarity in price changes, 
consideration of end usage and physical characteristics (Bedarfsmarkt) and the views of 
sellers. Despite the claims of some individual authors, there is no one method which 
should be used to the exclusion of the others. 
3. Combination of Demand-substitution and Sunplv-elasticitv 
We have considered the advice of several authors on measurement of demand 
substitutability for the purpose of market definition. All of these authors have 
emphasised that the elasticity of supply of existing and potential competitors will also 
influence the power over the market. This power cannot be determined solely by the 
share of current sales of the relevant product obtained by the enterprise in question, or 
by the share obtained in the geographical market. 
This is obvious mathematically from the Landes and Posner development of the Lerner 
formula on p.18 above, which showed that elasticity of supply of competitors influenced 
the price-elasticity of demand faced by the individual firm. It is also clear from 
consideration of two extreme cases. Firm A may have 70% of a national market but 
may be forced to sell at moderate price because competitors have excess capacity and 
because there is little barrier to the expansion of imports (UK producers of man-made 
fibres now face this kind of situation). If A put prices up, it might encounter very high 
price elasticity. Conversely Firm B may have 30% of a different national market, but 
because competitors were operating at capacity (perhaps because of some artificial 
constraint) and imports were restricted, B could raise prices above the competitive level 
without much loss of sales. Firm B might be in a more dominant position than A. 
In most countries potential competition is treated separately from definition of the 
relevant market. This approach is taken by the Bundeskartellamt in Germany and the 
French Commission de la Concurrence. The German Monopolkommission (1983) 
concluded that it was correct procedure to define the relevant market (in the narrower 
sense - “in engeren Sinn”) as the current sales of those products which consumers will 
regard as short-term substitutes. It does not favour the inclusion in the relevant market 
of capacity currently used for other products, except under exceptional circumstances 
because this would mean a breach of the “Bedarfsmarkt” concept and would be difficult 
to interpret. It does not believe that excess capacity of current producers should be 
included, because there are likely to be costs and delays in its application to production. 
Instead of widening the relevant market to include these elements, it recommends that 
alter consideration of the relevant market, anti-trust authorities should consider the 
“Marktnahebereich” (the area adjacent to the market) in which would be included:- 
- internal consumption volume of the relevant product of vertically integrated 
competitors; 
- excess capacity of competitors; 
- capacity of other producers now used for other products which could easily be 
transferred to the relevent product; 
- sales of products which the consumer might substitute in the longer term: 
- sales of products which it is advantageous to supply jointly with the relevant 
product. 
Support for the Monopolkommission view came two years earlier from Schmidt (1981). 
who urged that entry criteria be assessed after market definition and before conclusions 
about dominance. George (1985) urged that guidelines on mergers for the UK 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission should be based on concentration of current UK 
sales of the relevant product (including imports), supplemented by consideration of “key 
factors which affect the significance of the concentration data.” 
The opposite view - that “market shares” should reflect potential competition arose from 
the writings of such well-known American specialists in this field as Areeda, Turner, 
Landes and Posner. D F. Turner has long advocated that supply substitution should be 
integrated into market definition:- 
“Competition is defined to include both competition among different 
products and among alternative actual or potential sources of supply. The 
market is then defined in terms of the buyers’ substitution of one product 
for another and in terms of producers* substitution of one product for 
another. In order to define a market we attempt to obtain information on 
cross-elasticities of both demand and supply.” (Kaysen and Turner, 1959, 
p-295) 
The main argument in favour of this approach is that otherwise supply substitution may 
be overlooked. Shares of current sales are much easier to understand than the complex 
list of elements in the Monopolkommission’s “Marktnahebereich”. Summaries of 
decisions in both the USA and Europe (e.g. Holley,Waelbroeck and Markert at the 
Bruges Seminar in 1977) have reported that, despite lip-service to potential competition, 
shares of current sales have been generally decisive. Sometimes the effects of exclusion 
of supply substitution have been evident - as in the separation of men’s and boys’ shoes 
in the Brown Shoe case in the USA. 
The complete integration of demand- and supply-substitution into the relevant market 
concept is found in the US Department of Justice’s Merger Guidelines in the 1982 and 
1984 revisions:- 
“Formally, a market is defined as a product or group of products and a 
geographic area in which it is sold such that a hypothetical, profit- 
maximizing firm.... that was the only present and future seller of those 
products would impose a small but significant and non-transitory 
increase in price” (defined in the 1982 version as 5% for one year) “above 
prevailing or likely future levels.” (1984 Merger Guidelines) 
In simple English, a relevant market is the smallest combination of product range and 
geographical area in which a monopolist would raise prices. This concept avoids the 
need for a Robinson-style gap or its supply-side equivalent. The Department suggests 
that for both product and geographical market definition one should start with the 
narrowest possible definition and gradually widen it until a monopolist controlling the 
market would profitably raise prices by (typically) 5 per cent for at least a year. 
Theoretically indisputable and a nice prtcis of the complete concept of the relevant 
market. But is this approach practical and how can the results be interpreted? 
“The global issue raised by these efforts to accommodate considerations of 
entry, while simultaneously retaining the overall numerically-orientated 
structure of the Guidelines, is whether the end result of the process is to 
introduce so much flexibility and unpredictability that the fundamental 
purpose of numerical guidelines has been fatally compromised”. (Hay, 
1985, p.70) 
The problems are most obvious when it comes to foreign imports. Consistent with the 
recommendations of Landes and Posner (198 1). the 1984 version of the Merger 
Guidelines specifies that if a foreign company has significant exports to the USA then 
its total world sales (or even capacity) together with the total output (or capacity) of US 
companies should be included in the relevant market. The justification for this is that 
the existence of exports to the USA proves that even at current prices, supply is 
economic - if prices rose then elasticity of supply would be high. 
Hay (1985) went on to argue that the USA should 
“either revert to an approach based on historic market shares (largely 
ignoring entry considerations except in polar cases of very easy entry) or 
abandon the pretence of numerical guidelines and move to an ad hoc 
approach....” (ibid) 
D. SPE IAL P C (*) BLEM IN 
1. Introduction 
The mainly theoretical discussion in Section C applied in principle both to product range 
and geographical area. The market power within a geographical area of a producer or 
groups of producers depends upon (a) the customers’ ability and willingness to substitute 
other products available within the area and (b) ability and willingness of other suppliers 
to expand the supply of these substitutable products. In this case (b), supply-side 
substitution, may be of greater significance in the assessment of dominance. 
2. Shioments data and elasticitv of SUDDIY 
One of the simplest criteria for geographical market delineation is the degree of trade 
with other areas. Elzinga and Hogarty (1973 and 1978) have proposed a test based on 
“Little Inside from Outside” (LIFO) and “Little Outside from Inside” (LOFI). 
If a geographical area supplied all but 10% of its own consumption (LIFO) and 
consumed all but 10% of its output (LOFI) then it would constitute a market for anti- 
trust purposes. 
This principle has been criticised widely. Werden (198 1) put forward the two main 
criticismx- 
(4 If a product is fairly homogeneous and accepted as such by consumers and 
transport costs are small but not negligible, then prices may be held down by the threat 
l The discussion of the element of Schmidt’s diagram not yet explained appears in 
Section E, since this topic is less closely related to Section C 
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o f impor ts  in to th e  a rea . S ince  th is  th r ea t a ffects th e  pr ice  o f th e  d o m e s tic p roduc t, 
th e n  th e  sa les  (or  capaci ty)  o f p roduce rs  in  th e  p o te n tia l  sou rce  o f impor ts  shou ld  b e  
i nc luded  in  th e  re levant  geog raph i ca l  ma rke t. T h e  a b s e n c e  o f s h i p m e n ts d o e s  n o t m e a n  
isolat ion.  
(b)  T h e  ex is tence o f s h i p m e n ts d o e s  n o t m e a n  th a t a  dist inct geog raph i ca l  ma rke t 
d o e s  n o t exist. P r ice d iscr iminat ion b e tween  di f ferent geog raph i ca l  a reas  imp l ies  th a t 
the re  a re  dist inct ma rke ts b u t a l so  th a t s h i p m e n ts m a y  b e  substant ia l  (“d u m p i n g ” in  
cer ta in  areas) .  
L a n d e s  a n d  P o s n e r  ( 1981 )  s u g g e s te d  th a t th e  to ta l  wo r ldw ide  capac i ty  o f fo re ign  
p roduce rs  o f th e  re levant  p roduc t shou ld  b e  i nc luded  in  th e  U S  ma rke t, p rov ided  th a t 
the i r  p roduc ts we re  subst i tu table by  consumers  a n d  th a t th e y  h a d  “non-neg l i g ib le” sa les  
in  th e  U S A  fo r  severa l  years.  E v e n  th is  a p p r o a c h , th e  a u tho rs  c la im, w o u l d  unde rs ta te  
th e  in f luence o f p o te n tia l  imports,  fo r  th e  r eason  g i ven  by  W e rden  u n d e r  (a)  a b o v e . 
These  a r g u m e n ts a s s u m e  n o  lega l  o r  quas i - lega l  bar r ie rs  to  t rade.  W h e n  o n e  is 
cons ide r ing  in ternat iona l  c o m p e titio n  (even  wi th in  th e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m o n  Ma rke t) 
t ranspor t  costs m a y  b e  less impor tant  th a n  n a tiona l  non - tariff t rade barr iers.  
If th e  g o o d s  we re  perfect  subst i tutes, wi th n o  di f ferent iat ion, th e n  little in ternat iona l  
t rade w o u l d  ta k e  p lace  un less  t ranspor t  a n d  t ransact ions costs assoc ia ted  wi th such  t rade 
we re  ze ro  (not  poss ib le) .  Th is  l eads  to  th e  ( rather  a n o m a l o u s )  conc lus ion  th a t if 
in ternat iona l  t rade is h i gh  b e tween  (say)  B r i tain a n d  F rance  in  a  p roduc t such  as  
a lcoho l ic  dr inks,  th e n  th e  p roduc t h a s  b e e n  to o  b road ly  d e fin e d . 
3 . P r ices ev idence  
F rom th e  or ig ina l  d e fin i t ions o f geog raph i ca l  ma rke ts by  C o u r n o t a n d  Marsha l l ,  severa l  
a u tho rs  h a v e  a r g u e d  th a t p r ice  equa l i ty  m a y  b e  ta k e n  as  ev idence  o f geog raph i ca l  ma rke t 
e n tity. S e c tio n  C  e x a m i n e d  th e  work  o f S tig le r  a n d  S h e r w i n  (1983 )  a n d  Horowi tz  
(1981) .  
For  th e  reasons  g i ven  by  W e rden , pr ices  in  di f ferent geog raph i ca l  a reas  m a y  p rov ide  
b e tte r  g u i d a n c e  o n  w h e the r  th e s e  fo r m  par ts  o f th e  s a m e  ma rke t th a n  d a ta  o n  s h i p m e n ts 
b e tween  th e m . Howeve r , in  pract ica l  app l i ca t ion  o f p r ice  tests to  di f ferent E E C  
c o u n tries, compl ica t ions  occur  b e c a u s e  o f l a g g e d  responses  to  c h a n g e s  in  e x c h a n g e  rates 
a n d  a lso  d i f ferences in  rates o f va lue  a d d e d  o r  o the r  taxes  lev ied  o n  sales.  
4. The effects of national differences 
The complication of price tests by different VAT rates is only one example of the 
problems encountered in applying methods based on US evidence to the situation of the 
Economic Community. Although the USA is much larger spatially than the EEC it is 
more homogeneous in terms of culture. The universal use of the English language in the 
USA, together with national identity, makes communication much easier. In the 
Community there are elements of product differentiation not present in the USA - 
marketing methods vary between EEC countries; products are sometimes tailored to meet 
national demands; there are inconveniences in dealing in different currencies, in 
communicating in foreign languages. These factors are likely to reduce the cross- 
elasticities of demand and supply between products from different EEC countries, or 
perhaps extend the time taken for these substitutions to take effect. 
Because the Community is in the process of integration, geographical market definition 
is going to create problems. To take a simple example - motor cars. From a production 
point of view, major companies such as Ford, General Motors, Peugeot-Talbot-Citroen 
and even combinations of independent companies such as Volkswagen-BL have 
integrated European activities. One may talk of European motor industry. However, 
price differences between countries suggest separate markets. 
E. CN 1s 
The theoretical discussion in Section C (and to some extent the comments on the 
geographical market in Section D) was based on neo-classical economics, on attempts to 
apply concepts derived from perfect competition. Economic power is derived not only 
from dominance of one particular market but also from absolute size and, under certain 
conditions, from diversity of economic activities - the conglomerate advantages. 
“L’independance de comportement dont sont dottes de nos jours, certaines 
‘entreprises’ tient moins & une implantation solide sur un marche donne 
qu ‘a une extension verticale et horizontale lem permettant de contr6ler 
une filibre de production et d’amortir certaines fluctuations de l’activite 
Cconomique. En augmentant leur puissance Cconomique et financitre, 
elles tissent Cgalement, avec d’autres firmes, tout un reseau d’affiliation et 
de cooperation qui ne peut tchapper 8 l’attention de ceux dont la mission 
consiste & mettre en lumibre Pexistence de positions dominantes.” (Glais 
and Laurent, 1983, p.333) 
This is an excellent summary of the case for considering conglomerate companies in 
competition policy. Glais and Laurent go on to analyse why companies integrate 
vertically and diversify horizontally, perhaps with possible loss of economies of scale 
and with extra costs of coordination. These reasons are reduced variation in profitability 
(horizontal diversification) and savings in transactions costs plus greater independence 
and control (vertical integration). 
This analysis is not new. Adelman (1961) discussed the same issues, though with 
different conclusions. The anonymous author of the Columbia Law Review Notes (1954) 
stated that “the aggregate of power resulting from substantial participation in many 
markets, without a showing of monopoly may be enough to give the possessor of that 
power undue control over competition.” This author went on to state that such 
conglomerate power “may be unlawful” - this was before the general move towards 
structuralism in the USA. 
Glais and Laurent (1983, p.287) suggested that in certain cases the definition of the 
relevant market in Community law obviously reflected clear reservations about large 
enterprises - that the institutions of the Community tended to stand up for the little 
firm against the big. The need to define the relevant market was thus an unnecessary 
impediment to a correct policy. 
For a similar view see Fishwick (1979, p.22):- 
“Without evaluation of aggregate concentration, the Commission can 
obtain neither a complete understanding of competitive strengths in 
individual industries nor a comprehensive picture of the economic power 
of major international groups within the Community.” (original emphasis) 
It should be noted that, at least in the UK, for which data are available, aggregate 
concentration has declined since the early 1960’s. With disinvestment by US 
multinationals in particular, aggregate concentration in the Community as a whole may 
also have decreased. 
Putting this last comment aside, one may ask if and’how conglomerate power could be 
built into the relevant market concept. Glais and Laurent do not think that it can: that 
is why they criticise the relevant market notion. The US Department of Justice (Merger 
Guidelines 1984) regards “non-horizontal” (vertical or conglomerate) mergers as 
significant only when they affect the relevant market. (This was also the view of 
Adelman in 196 1). 
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Schmidt (1981) discussed under the heading “Supply-Space Concept” attempts by a 
number of authors (among them Narver and Penrose) to reconcile conglomerate power 
with the division of economic activity into sectors. Each company’s pool of productive 
resources can be used for the production of a range of very different goods which 
defines its supply space. One is discouraged from reading this material by Schmidt’s 
rather dismissive comment that the search for a concept based on resource application 
which would be useful for competition policy has so far been unsuccessful. 
It seems unlikely that a method based on the resources of individual firms could 
overcome the problem of overlaps, making grouping difficult. This amounts to a need 
for gaps in supply-side substitution equivalent to those deemed necessary on the demand 
side by Mrs Robinson as long ago as 1933! 
This survey of theoretical discussion on definition of the relevant market demonstrates 
that the concept remains nebulous and that four major issues remain unresoIved:- 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
definition of product markets on the basis of demand-substitution when there is 
no obvious discontinuity (“gap”) in substitutability; 
whether or not potential competition (supply-substitution) should be included 
within the definition of the relevant market in both its product-range and 
geographical dimensions; 
whether vertical or other interdependence between products should be explicitly 
taken into account, making it inappropriate to define a “market” at any one 
horizontal stage; 
how to deal with the effects of the presence within .individual sectors of 
conglomerate companies which derive power from the diversity of their 
operations. 
, 
Although the European Court of Justice has described definition of the relevant market 
as the “indispensable first stage” in assessment of a dominant position (Continental Can 
case) and the anti-trust authorities of Fr8nce and Germany have pronounced similarly, 
the concept is not explicitly required in UK competition policy. In the USA the 
incorporation of supply-side substitution has, in the view of some analysts, made 
quantification very difficult and has led effectively to reliance on ‘economic intuition’. 
In the light of the four problems listed above, should the definition of the relevant 
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marke t b e  o m i tte d  f rom th e  gene ra l  ana lys is  o f d o m i n a n c e  o r  o f th e  a n t i -compet i t ive 
e ffects o f restr ict ive a g r e e m e n ts o r  state a ids?  
T h e  Commiss i on  o f th e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i ties  ( 1 9 6 5  a n d  1 9 7 3 , q u o te d  o n  p p . 1 4  a n d  1 5  
above )  h a s  expl ic i t ly r ecogn i sed  th a t pos i t ions o f d o m i n a n c e  a n d  th e  p o w e r  to  h inde r  
c o m p e titio n  c a n n o t b e  d e fin e d  exc lus ive ly  by  ma rke t shares.  Its v iews exp ressed  in  th e  
1 9 6 5  M e m o r a n d u m  a n d  th e  1 9 7 3  Draft  R e g u l a tio n  o n  Merge rs  a re  consis tent  wi th th o s e  
o f G lais a n d  L a u r e n t (1983) ,  th a t ma rke t p o w e r  is d e m o n s trated by  c o m p o r te m e n ts 
i n d i p e n d a n ts (conduc t  un res t ra ined  by  c o m p e tition )  a n d  occurs  w h e n  c o m p a n i e s  a re  in  a  
pos i t ion  o f p a r tena i r e  ob l iga to i re  (ob l igatory  t rad ing-par tners  o f cus tomers  o r  suppl iers) .  
L a r g e  e n terpr ises  o r  g roups  w h o s e  act ivi t ies a re  d ivers i f ied e i ther  in  p roduc t r a n g e  o r  
geograph ica l l y  a re  ab l e  to  m a i n ta in  the i r  pos i t ion  o f p a r tena i te  ob l iga to i re  by  restr ict ing 
ac tua l  a n d /o r  p o te n tia l  c o m p e titio n . 
G lais ( 1 9 8 3  a n d  1 9 8 5 )  h a s  g o n e  o n  to  a r g u e  th a t in  cases  w h e r e  econom ic  p o w e r  is 
de r i ved  f rom d e p e n d e n t re la t ionsh ips  ( pa r tena i r e  ob l iga to i re )  a n d  is m a n i fes ted  in  
un res t ra ined  c o n d u c t, th e  re levant  ma rke t is a n  “art i f icial construct” wh ich  m a y  h inde r  
ra ther  th a n  assist  th e  analys is .  O n  th e  o the r  h a n d , recent  c o m m e n t o n  c o m p e titio n  po l icy  
in  th e  Un i ted  K i n g d o m , e g  by  S h a r p e  (1985 )  a n d  Merk in  a n d  W i l l iams (1984 )  h a s  ca l led  
fo r  th e  in t roduct ion o f gu ide l i nes  b a s e d  o n  sha res  o f th e  re levant  ma rke t. Hay  (1985 )  
h a s  u r g e d  a  re turn  to  a  s imp le r  d e fin i t ion o f th e  re levant  ma rke t in  U S  ju r isprudence,  to  
b e  b a s e d  o n  d e m a n d - s i d e  subst i tut ion. T h e  v iew o f th e s e  a u tho rs  is th a t th e  re levant  
ma rke t c o n c e p t, wh i le  imperfect ,  is m o r e  ob jec t ive  a n d  consis tent  th a n  eva lua t ion  o f 
d o m i n a n c e  in  e a c h  ind iv idua l  case.  
The re  is n o th i ng  in  th e  l i terature to  s u g g e s t c o n tradict ion b e tween  assessmen ts o f 
d o m i n a n c e  b a s e d  o n  unres t ra ined  c o n d u c t a n d  d e p e n d e n t re la t ionsh ips  a n d  th o s e  b a s e d  
o n  th e  re levant  ma rke t, p rov ided  th a t th e  latter ta k e  fu l l  a c c o u n t o f p o te n tia l  
c o m p e titio n  a n d  p roduc t i n te rdependence .  In  s o m e  cases,  it m a y  n o t b e  poss ib le  to  
d e te rm ine  w h e the r  a n  e n terpr ise  ho lds  a  pos i t ion  o f p a r tena i r e  ob l iga to i re  without  
d e fin i ng  8  re levant  ma rke t a n d  exam in i ng  p o te n tia l  c o m p e titio n  a n d  (if appropr ia te )  
vert ical  i n te rdependence .  
In  th e  rema in ing  c h a p ters  o f th is  report ,  analy t ica l  f rameworks  a re  d e v e l o p e d  a n d  tes ted  
fo r  app l i ca t ion  to  cases  invo lv ing  a b u s e  o f d o m i n a n c e  (Art ic le 86) ,  restr ict ive a g r e e m e n ts 
(Art ic le 85 )  a n d  state a ids  (Art ic le 92) .  These  d raw  o n  th e  di f ferent th e o r e tical 
c o n tr ibut ions to  th e  re levant  ma rke t c o n c e p t wh ich  h a v e  b e e n  summar i sed  in  th is  
c h a p ter. In  cer ta in  excep tiona l  cases,  u s e  o f th e  f ramework  a p p e a r s  to  i m p o s e  
A  n  
unnecessary complexity whereas dependent relationships are obvious; in others, 
adherence to the framework reveals aspects which the more direct approach suggested by 
Glais might have overlooked. 
In design of an analytical framework based on the concept of the relevant market the 
key objective is consistency. It is ironic that Alfred Marshall, whose writings are 
regarded as scriptural by many of the staunchest advocates of 8 relevant market concept 
based on neo-classical principles, should himself have stated: 
“The question where the lines of division between different 
commodities should be drawn must be settled by the 
convenience of the particular discussion” 
(Marshall, 1920, p.85 footnote) 
To accept this conclusion would be defeatist! 
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J ~ N A L Y T ICAL  F R A M E W O R K  F O R  D E F INITIO N  O F  T H E  M A R K E T  R E L E V A N T  
T O  D O M INANT P O S ITIO N S  
INTRODUCTIO N  
A  d o m i n a n t pos i t ion  m a y  b e  eas ie r  to  recogn ise  th a n  to  d e fin e . A s  stated o n  p a g e  1 5  
a b o v e , th e  fe a tu res  o f a  d o m i n a n t pos i t ion  inc lude  (i) f r eedom o f c o n d u c t, un res t ra ined  
by  c o m p e titio n ; (i i) d e p e n d e n c e  o f cus tomers  o r  o f o the r  c o m p a n i e s  o n  th e  d o m i n a n t 
e n terpr ise  a n d  (i i i) e conom ic  a n d  financ ia l  p o w e r  de r i ved  f rom o the r  a d v a n ta g e s , such  as  
diversi ty o f p roduc t r a n g e  o r  geog raph i ca l  locat ion o f activit ies. 
A lth o u g h  s o m e  o f th e  a u tho rs  c i ted in  C h a p te r  1  c l a imed  th a t un res t ra ined  c o n d u c t 
(abuse )  m ight  b e  suff ic ient ev i dence  o f a  d o m i n a n t posi t ion,  ana lys is  o f d o m i n a n c e  
requ i res  th a t th e  sou rce  o f p o w e r  b e  i den tifie d . In  add i tio n , a n ti-trust po l icy  b a s e d  
e n tirely o n  obse rved  c o n d u c t cou ld  n o t dea l  wi th th e  c o n trol o f mergers ,  th e  a i m  o f 
wh ich  is to  p reven t c o n c e n trat ion o f econom ic  p o w e r . A lth o u g h  in  s o m e  cases  th e  
c o n c e p t o f d e p e n d e n t re la t ionsh ips  ( the p a r tena i r e  ob l igato i re ,  e m p h a s i s e d  by  G lais)  m a y  
b e  m o r e  conven ien t th a n  cons idera t ion  o f th e  re levant  ma rke t, in  o the rs  th e  ma rke t 
m u s t b e  cons ide red  b e fo re  such  re la t ionsh ips  c a n  b e  i den tifie d . 
If d o m i n a n c e  is to  b e  m e a s u r e d  in  th e  c o n text o f a  re levant  ma rke t, it is necessary  to  
d e fin e  th a t ma rke t in  te rms  o f subst i tutes ava i lab le  a n d  accep tab le  to  cus tomers  a n d  to  
ta k e  into a c c o u n t p o te n tia l  c o m p e titio n  (“supp ly -s ide  subst i tut ion”) a n d  th e  in f luence o f 
p roduc t i n te rdependence ,  wh ich  m a y  reduce  o r  i nc rease  p o w e r  de r i ved  f rom hor izonta l  
d o m i n a n c e . T h e  l i terature survey  in  C h a p te r  2  s h o w e d  th a t the re  8 re  s igni f icant  
d i f ferences o f op in i on  a b o u t w h e the r  supp ly -s ide  subst i tut ion a n d  vert ical  o r  o the r  
i n t e rdependence  shou ld  b e  i nc luded  in  th e  d e fin i t ion o f th e  re levant  ma rke t o r  w h e the r  
th e y  shou ld  b e  cons ide red  sepa ra tely. 
S e c tio n  C .3  o f C h a p te r  2  desc r ibed  th e  a r g u m e n ts fo r  a n d  aga ins t  th e  inc lus ion  o f 
supp ly -s ide  subst i tut ion in  th e  statist ical d e fin i t ion o f th e  re levant  ma rke t. It c o n trasted 
th e  r e c o m m e n d a tio n s  o f m o s t U S  a u tho rs  a n d  th e  D e p a r tm e n t o f Just ice o n  th e  o n e  h a n d  
wi th th o s e  o f E u r o p e a n  a u tho rs  a n d  n a tiona l  c o m p e titio n  po l ic ies  o f France,  G e r m a n y  
a n d  th e  Un i ted  K i n g d o m  o n  th e  o ther .  In  part icular ,  th e  U S  D e p a r tm e n t o f Just ice a n d  
th e  G e r m a n  M o n o p o l k o m m i s s i o n  h a v e  e x a m i n e d  a n d  p resen te d  a lmos t i den tical ana lys is  
a n d  h 8 V e  r e a c h e d  oppos i te  conc lus ions .  
Product interdependence was first discussed in Section C.2 of Chapter 1 and again in 
Chapter 2, Section C.1 . Both at Community and national levels, bodies responsible for 
competition policies in Europe have tended to define markets at horizontal stages of 
vertical chains of production and distribution and have been criticised by some US 
observers. The latter have argued that dominance of supply of 8 component of a wider 
product cannot be abused to the detriment of the consumer if there exists substitutes for 
the final product which do not include that component. 
Failure to resolve these issues may partly result from ambiguous use of the word 
“relevant”. If the word is used simply to refer to the market relevant to the calculation 
of concentration ratios then, 8s the Monopolkommission concluded, it is very difficult 
conceptually to include supply-side substitution. If there were no significant barriers to 
entry to 8 market one could argue that potential competition would be virtually infinite 
and market shares of existing companies would be zero. Hay (1985) has pointed out 
that a conclusion approaching this theoretical limit may result in some cases from the US 
Department of Justice’s 1984 recommendation that US relevant market sales should 
include world-wide capacity of any company with “non-negligible” sales in the country. 
The word “relevant” is also used in the wider sense of relevance to competition policy, 
and in particular to 8buse of 8 dominant position. An enterprise, or group of 
enterprises, may currently hold a dominant share of 8 market defined in terms of 
demand substitution but that position may not confer any appreciable power, because of 
potential competition from additional supply. This potential competition may result 
from transfer or creation of production capacity and/or from geographical transfer. 
Product interdependence may either weaken or strengthen the power derived from 
dominance of 8 narrowly defined product market. 
The US Department of Justice (1982 and 1984) in defining a “relevant” market used the 
word in this second, wider sense, 8s a group of products for which 8 monopoly supplier 
would find it possible and profitable to impose 8 “small but significant and- non- 
transitory price increase”. This defined 8 market 8s 8n area (in terms both of product 
range and geographic81 space) in which 8 dominant position would confer the power to 
abuse. 
This approach is complex and tortuous. * Any indications of concentration in a market 
so defined would be very difficult to interpret. The framework set out in this chapter is 
intended to provide guidance on two questions: 
(9 What is the market relevant to the calculation of market shares? 
(ii) Does dominance (actual or potential) over the market so defined confer 
power which may be abused? This second question is equivalent to 
asking whether the market relevant to the calculation of market shares is 
also relevant to the concept of monopoly power. 
The framework for analysis of dominant selling power comprises five sections:- 
(A) 
09 
(C) 
(D) 
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definition of the relevant product, based on demand substitution, at the 
specific horizontal stage; 
definition of the relevant geographical market, based on whether suppliers 
are able to discriminate in pricing or other conditions of sale; 
actual measurement of sales or other variable for use in calculation of 
market shares (a short section); 
potential competition, covering potential elasticity of supply to the 
relevant market defined in (1) and (2); 
product interdependence. 
The sixth section of the chapter (Section F) is a framework for assessment of the market 
relevant to buyer dominance. In principle, this is the obverse (mirror-image) of the 
methodology set out for analysis of seller power in Sections A to E. 
A final section (Section G) considers the use of the concept of trading dependency 
(partenaire obligatoire) 8s a method of identifying dominance, either alternative or 
complementary to a framework based on definition of the relevant market. 
*Stigler and Sherwin (1975) pointed out that in merger cases it would be easier to go 
straight to the question - would the merger lead to significant price increases? 
A. DEFINITION OF THE RELEVANT PRODUCT 
1. Starting-ooinf 
The procedure should start with the most narrow definition of the product (x) which is 
alleged to be dominated. In some cases this may even be 8n individual brand. Any 
vertical interdependence may be ignored at this stage - intermediate and final products 
may be analysed similarly, since interdependence is covered in Section E. 
The initial narrow definition of x will normally encompass products which are perfectly 
substitutable but in some c8ses it will be reasonable to combine (treat as one product) 
groups of items supplied with 8 variety of specifications but with very similar demand 
and supply conditions. For example, men’s shoes might be regarded as a single product 
even though shoes of different sizes 8re not substitutes. The UK Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission defined replacement body panels for Ford cars 8s a product, even 
though there are 4,000 individual and non-substitutable panels within this group; the 
Commission of the European Communities similarly defined 8 market in spare parts for 
Hugin cash registers. The criterion for such “commonsense” grouping must be similarity 
in price-elasticity of demand and supply - if, for example, there were one sub-group in 
which price-elasticity of demand might be significantly different then this would 
constitute 8 separate product. 
2. Choice of products for consideration as substitutes 
The companies against whom 8 charge of abuse of dominance is made will generally be 
eager to emphasise any competition which they may face: this means that they will tend 
to suggest 8 broad range of substitute products. 
Surveys of customers may also be possible and desirable, especially when an individual 
case originates from 8 customer complaint. 
3. Criteria of substitutability 
As 8 general principle, subject to modification in the individual case if it is 
inappropriate, it is recommended that use be made of the basic criterion of demand 
substitutability proposed by the US Department of Justice and approved by the German 
Monopolkommission. This states that y is 8 substitute for x if its existeqce would 
prevent 8 5% rise in the relative price of x, because within one year of such 8 price rise 
L 
8 substantial proportion of demand would transfer from  x to y. This criterion is 
hypothetical but conceptually necessary - substitutability is a matter of degree. 
The following factual criteria should be applied to each possible substitute (y) for the 
narrowly defined product (x) 
(a) Functional interchangeability: does y have physical or technical properties 
enabling it to fulfil the same function(s) as x? If NOT then y cannot be a 
substitute - if it can serve some of the functions of x but not others, then this 
should be noted - sub-markets for x based on different functions may be 
necessary. 
(b) Reactive interchangeability: if the answer to (a) is positive, do consumers/users 
recognise the functional interchangeability, so that they would react to modest 
changes in relative prices. 7 If y is not perceived as a substitute for x, it should 
not be included in the relevant market. (Customer perceptions may also vary 
between market segments, leading to sub-markets). 
(cl Barriers to substitution (assum ing “yes” to (a) and (b)) 
(9 does x have better distribution than y, so that transfer to y would be 
impeded? 
(ii) is either x or y generally sold with complementary products so that any 
switch would involve extra transaction costs for customers? 
(iii) do x and y require investment in different, specific “systems” (eg fuel for 
heating)? 
Not all customers may be equally affected by such barriers and their significance may 
decline with time. This again may lead to definition of sub-markets. 
4. Direct tests of substitutabilitv 
Functional interchangeability can be assessed only by consideration of the physical and 
technical characteristics of x and y. Reactive interchangeability may be assessed through 
discussions with consumers of the two products. Barriers to substitution may be 
identified by the Same means. Such direct measurement may be expensive, especially in 
the case of mass-market products, but in such cases associations of trade purchasers or 
consumers may be able to contribute. Two direct statistical measures of substitution may 
be applied in those cases where appropriate data are available. (The research for this 
project suggests that such cases 8re rare). These are 
(8) Cross-price-elasticity , which is very difficult to derive from time-series because 
of the need to hold other variables constant. Multiple regression will normally be 
necessary, with transformation to first-differences of logarithms. The 
mathematics are set out in Appendix 1. 
(b) Substitution-elasticity, which is based on comparison of the relative volumes sold 
of x and y with their relative prices. This has also proved of limited practical 
value, though it is much less complex statistically than cross-elasticity; the 
mathematics 8re again presented in Appendix 1. 
5. Jndirect tests of substitutability 
Chapter 2 included two other tests based on price comparisons 8nd specifically on the 
principle that if two products are close substitutes their prices should be equal. These 
were the Horowitz and Stigier-Sherwin tests. The first examines whether price 
differences between products tend to zero over time, the second whether there is 
coincidence between price changes. 
Either of these tests may produce misleading results unless modified to deal with 
inflation; Appendix 1 shows the modifications necessary and provides guidance on the 
interpretation of the results. In only two of 20 cases (EEC or national) examined would 
use of these price tests have been possible. In some cases the tests are inappropriate (eg 
because there were no quoted prices applicable to all customers), in others data were not 
available or were complicated by product changes. 
Although the mathematical formulae involved in the tests described in Appendix 1 may 
be only rarely applicable, the underlying logic is useful in assessment and discussion of 
substitutability. If price changes do tend to coincide then this is a positive indication 
that x and y may be substitutes. 
Similarity in elements of marketing other than price should also be considered. The 
emphasis placed on price by many economists is derived from perfect competition with 
its assumptions of perfect consumer knowledge, product homogeneity and a large 
number of firms. Oligopolistic interdependence relates not only to pricing policies but 
also to 8 wide range of other elements in the “marketing mix”. In determining whether 
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another product (y) is 8 substitute for x, the following questions should also be 
considered:- 
is the advertising of x and y aimed at similar groups? 
do changes in the scale or form of advertising of x and y coincide or follow each 
other within short time-periods? 
is there similarity in product modification to meet particular market segments? 
do modifications in product specifications coincide or follow each other within 
short time-periods? 
Other, less general, factors may be considered, such as distribution channels, distributors’ 
margins and warranties offered to consumers. In each case, one should consider as 
evidence of substitutability similarity between x and y and, more particularly, 
coincidence (or close relationship) between changes in arrangements applicable to x and 
Y- 
6. pi c n inui i substitution (substitution “aao”) s o t t es in 
Substitutability is 8 matter of degree and this is not always time-related, so that the use 
of a “cut-off” of one year (for example) does not avoid the problem. A satisfactory 
definition of the relevant product requires 8 discrete gap in the range of substitutes. In 
many cases this gap may be obvious, in some it may be a matter of judgement. 
Where 8 gap is defined, it is important that the criteria for this definition should be 
specified. Where no discontinuity can be found, definition of the relevant market 
should not revert to the narrowest group (x), which appears to have occurred in some of 
the cases described in Chapter 4.’ 
B. GEOGRAPHICAL MARKET DEFINITION 
1. General Princibles 
It was pointed out in Chapter 2 that little has been written in terms of general principles 
about definition of geographical markets, except with specific regard to the United 
States of America. The US analysis provides only limited guidance for definition in 
Europe, because geographical subdivision of the US market is based much more on 
physical distances and sssociated transport costs. Within the European Economic 
*eg Continental Can (EEC) and Roadside Advertising (UK) 
Community, a much smaller physical area, demand is much less homogeneous than in the 
USA, because of cultural and institutional diversity. Supply is impeded much less by 
physical distances but much more by legal, institutional and cultural barriers. 
Because the literature search has revealed no previous relevant theoretical framework for 
analysis of European geographical markets, it is necessary to start from first principles. 
Two places A and B may be defined as within the same geographical market if 
suppliers cannot discriminate between them, which means that prices of the same 
product will be equal. That requires 8t least one of the following conditions to be 
fulfilled. 
(a) 
(b) 
There are no barriers to (or costs involved in) transfer of demand between A and 
B, so that for any one product the cross-price-elasticity of demand between them 
would be infinite. 
Each of 8 large number of suppliers (perfect competition) has equal access to 
both A and B, with no cost differences. Thus if the price in A exceeds that in 
B, the supply to A will rise relatively to the supply to B, causing price equality. 
On the assumption of product differentiation, so that each seller has some choice 
over the prices which he charges in A and B, the two areas would be in the same 
market only if the price-elasticity of demand at any single price were the same 
in each. 
For the United States, economists such 8s Horowitz and Stigler and Sherwin have argued 
that it is superfluous to attempt to evaluate (a), (b) and (c): relevant geographical 
markets may be identified by equality of prices or (Stigler and Sherwin) correspondence 
of price changes. The presumption in the analytical framework proposed here is that in 
most cases where A and B 8re in separate countries, none of conditions (a), (b) or (c) 
will be met sufficiently to produce price equality. The Stigler-Sherwin test, based on 
positive correlation between price changes in different 8reas, could be misleading. In 
international comparisons, such correlation may reflect changes in world prices of 
component materials rather than interaction between demand and/or supply in the two 
countries. 
As in the c8se of relevant product definition, it is proposed that potential competition 
from supply diverted to 8 geographical market in the event of any attempted abuse of 
monopoly power be considered separately from definition of the market. Definition is 
therefore based on current deliveries to the market. 
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2. B road factual evidence 
(1) As the first stage in determ ining whether two geographical areas may be 
regarded as within the same geographical market, one may look at market shares. If 
integration into a single market were complete, the shares of leading companies should 
be similar. If the two areas are different countries, then differences in the shares of 
national producers suggest distinct markets (unless products are completely 
homogeneous). A  useful starting point for the analysis of geographical markets is 
consideration of the reasons for any differences in shares, of major companies and, 
perhaps more generally, of producers located in different countries. 
(ii) A  second factual element to be considered is price differences. There are some 
practical problems in applying to the EEC some of the more precise statistical tests 
advocated in the USA, eg by Horowitz or Stigler and Sherwin. One problem  is 
instability of exchange rates, which affects both the prices paid by consumers and those 
received by suppliers. Time-lags in adjustment of prices to exchange rate changes make 
short-term  comparisons very difficult. However, if there is a significant difference, 
over a period of at least two years, between the prices of the same product in countries 
A  and B  (corrected by the average exchange rate over the period) then A  and B  cannot 
be regarded as being within the same geographical market. Reasons for the price 
differences may then be considered. 
(iii) The Stigler-Sherwin test (correlation of proportionate changes in corresponding 
time-periods in different areas) may be applied if data are available. However, when 
the areas are different countries with variable exchange rates, great care is required in 
interpretation: time-lags in responses either by purchasers or suppliers may reduce 
correlation and obscure interdependence in the market. Conversely, simultaneous 
changes in the prices of a common input (perhaps denominated in a third currency, such 
as the US dollar) may produce spuriously high correlation. 
For any product, similarity of market shares and of the long-term  average prices in two 
countries provides strong initial evidence that these countries are within the same 
geographical market. In this case, the following sub-section should be used to confirm  
this prima facie conclusion - so that the reasons why there is a single market are 
understood. If the conclusion is confirmed, the tests for similarity can be applied to 
other countries iteratively until differences are found. 
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3. Further examination of the snecific conditions 
The reasons why different areas (including countries) form separate markets may be 
found by reference to the three conditions for integration into a single market, presented 
in Section l:- 
(a) 
@I 
w 
transferability of demand between areas 
transferability of supply combined with perfect competition in supply 
transferability of supply combined with identical demand-price 
relationships in each area. 
Any one of these conditions is sufficient to integrate two areas into a single market. If 
analysis demonstrates that all three conditions are substantially contravened, then one 
may conclude that the two areas form separate markets. If one or more are partly valid, 
the drawing of geographical market boundaries may require a degree of judgement. 
(a) Transferabilitv of demand 
Even if demand characteristics differ between countries and the pattern of supply is also 
different, prices will be identical if there are no barriers to transfer by final customers. 
Such barriers might include the following: 
(3 costs of physical transportation (including travel for purchase) - their importance 
will diminish with the ratio of value to weight (or bulk); 
(ii) lack of knowledge about availability or prices of the relevant product in the 
other area; 
(iii) brand loyalties, goodwill or any long-term contracts, fidelity rebates, etc. 
and when A and B are in different countries 
(iv) any nationalist sentiment, linguistic or cultural obstacles; 
w transactions costs/risks associated with use of foreign exchange or possible trade 
barriers; 
(vi) legal or institutional barriers, including tariffs or non-tariff barriers to trade and 
the administrative procedures necessary to overcome them. 
Barriers to demand transfer are least significant in the case of large undertakings 
purchasing unbranded intermediate products, such as basic materials. These 
undertakings may purchase in sufficient quantities to outweigh incremental transactions 
costs, they can afford to employ multilingual staff and are familiar with international 
-. 
transactions. Many larger companies hold accounts in different currencies (including the 
ecu to an increasing extent) and are therefore less deterred by foreign exchange 
processes and risks. The capability to transfer purchases between countries is likely to 
be greatest in the case of multinational companies. 
Where large companies are wholly or partly in public ownership or where they are under 
any political pressure, they may feel obliged to submit to nationalist sentiment, for 
example in the purchase of large items of plant and machinery. For example, both UK 
and French “giants” may at times have been under pressure to buy their computing 
equipment from domestic sources. The effects of nationalist preferences may not be 
confined to consumer markets. 
@I Transferabilitv of SUDDIY 
Although within the EEC final customers may be unable or unwilling to transfer their 
purchases between countries, producers may have access to different national markets 
quite openly. Importing wholesalers facilitate this process. However, conventional 
theory shows that unless demand conditions are the same - ie the same aggregate price- 
elasticity at any single price, there will be a tendency towards differentiation in prices. 
In the absence of transferability of demand, transferability of supply is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for price equalisation, one element of market integration. 
If actual and potential suppliers were very numerous and unable individually to 
influence market prices, then in the absence of supply barriers - transport costs, tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers, nationalistic and other established brand preferences etc - prices 
would tend to be the same in all countries. The international market price (in a common 
market free from all such barriers) would approximate to aggregate marginal cost. 
The assumption of ubiquitous perfect competition is obviously extreme. It is useful as a 
starting point. The restraining influence of competition on a local “monopolist” depends 
not only on the ease with which outside producers can supply the market concerned but 
also on their willingness to supply. If they are not willing to supply on the same 
conditions as in their own local markets (here we abandon the assumption of perfect 
competition) then prices may remain different and the markets separate. 
The European motor industry demonstrates these principles very clearly. In the 
organisation of its production the industry is highly integrated - one car may include 
output from several EEC countries. However, demand conditions vary - the United 
Kingdom in particular because of right-hand driving is also separated by non- 
transferability of demand. The oligopolistic nature of the industry appears to permit 
discriminatory pricing of passenger cars, a response to differing demand conditions. 
Since oligopoly is fairly general and since transferability of demand by final customers is 
likely to be exceptional, attention must focus on differences in demand - elasticities 
between countries. In some cases, it may be possible to establish such differences by 
econometric analysis but more generally it will be a matter of structured qualitative 
assessment. 
Some guidelines may assist- 
(i) For price-elasticity to be similar, in two countries there must be corresponding 
similarity not only in the “demand function” in each country but also in the current 
values of the variables other than price. In particular, variations in income levels and in 
the availability/prices of substitutes and complementary goods may affect the elasticity 
of demand for the relevant product with respect to its own price. 
(ii) If expenditure or value-added taxes differ between countries, this will generally 
mean that any company which is able to pursue an independent pricing policy (ie not 
operating in a perfect market) and seeks to maximise profits will set different prices. If 
the price-demand relationships for consumers were identical, then elementary price 
theory suggests that the difference in VAT would partly be absorbed by the producer 
selling to both countries. In the country with the higher rate of VAT, consumers would 
pay a higher final price (including VAT) while producers would receive a lower net 
price (excluding VAT). 
4. Summarv comments 
It is clear from this analysis that the conditions under which different countries may be 
integrated into the same geographical market are fairly restrictive. The most likely to be 
fulfilled, from the evidence of cases analysed, is the transferability of demand by major 
undertakings, especially when the relevant product is fairly anonymous, so that their 
decision to buy “foreign” is unlikely to be recognised by customers with greater 
nationalist sentiment. It is important to re-emphasise that even complete absence of 
barriers to supply would be insufficient to ensure market integration unless either the 
supplying industry had a very competitive structure or demand conditions in each 
country were identical. 
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For measurement of (possible) market power, the most appropriate variable is total sales 
of the relevant product, ie of x and the demand-substitutes identified in Section A 
within the relevant geographical market identified in Section B. This is equivalent to 
total sales of the relevant product by domestic suppliers minus exports plus imports. 
The choice between sales volume and sales revenue depends upon the nature of the 
individual case. In some cases there may be substitute products without a common unit 
of volume (eg domestic furniture may constitute a relevant product), in other cases wide 
divergence of prices may make volume figures more appropriate (eg the market for 
travel between Great Britain and Ireland). Where possible, it may be useful to quote 
both sales volume and revenue, so that leading companies* shares of each may be 
calculated. 
Data on sales may often be obtained from national statistical sources. Where no direct 
estimates of domestic purchases are available, it may be necessary to deduct exports 
from total production and add imports. Practical problems here include (i) the 
difference between classifications used for industries (eg NICE) and the Standard Trade 
Classification of the United Nations, which is applied internationally and (ii) the 
inclusion of transport and insurance costs in import figures. 
Where data are not available in sufficient detail from national sources, sales revenue 
figures may be obtained from the accounts of producing companies. The names of 
producers can be obtained from trade directories. There are wide variations between 
countries both in the requirement to publish accounts and in the amount of information 
to be included. Where companies produce other goods or services as well as the relevant 
product, the accounts may not show the required split. 
Although these data problems are not insignificant, it is usually possible to overcome 
them by combining a variety of sources. 
D. DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF POTENTIAL SUPPLY 
In order to determine whether the market relevant to the allegation of dominance is also 
relevant to that of abuse of dominance, it is necessary to consider the restraining 
influence of potential competition. 
Relevant market potential supply is defined as the maximum supply of the relevant 
products which would be supplied to the relevant geographical market within one year 
of a permanent significant increase in profitability. The concept is hypothetical - it 
assumes that the profitability of all other products/markets remains unchanged (ceteris 
pnribus); it also assumes that unlimited demand accompanies the greater profitability. 
In assessing the elasticity of potential supply to the relevant market it will normally be 
advisable to analyse separately the likely responses to increased profitability of (1) 
companies already supplying that market and (2) other companies. Existing suppliers, 
whether producing within or outside the geographically defined market, will generally 
find fewer barriers to expansion. 
1. Potential SUDDIV from comoanies alreadv selling the relevant Droducts within the 
relevant eeoaraohical market 
(a) Unused caoacitv of domestic sunoliers 
The known or presumed existence of excess capacity available to competitors is a long 
recognised constraint on the freedom of action of major suppliers to oligopolistic 
markets. Evidence of excess capacity may be hard to obtain directly, though data are 
occasionally quoted publicly. Evidence of any recent changes in capacity should be 
noted, whether increases, via acquisition or investment, or decreases, via disposal or 
disinvestment. Any information on the degree of plant utilisation - overtime or short- 
time working, or the use of shiftwork - may also give some indication of potential 
compared with actual output. 
(b) Putnut of relevant broducts bv domestic subnliers not currentlv sold 
There are two possible elements of output of the relevant product not sold at all: (i).that 
part of the output of vertically integrated undertakings which is used as input to another 
good or service produced for sale by the company and (ii) any output as a by-product, 
in quantities (or in a form) which do not justify its recovery and sale at current price 
levels. 
(9 The response of vertically integrated firms to a price increase of an intermediate 
product would depend partly on their ability to use an alternative input into the 
later stages of their production processes, or to use these stages for other 
marketable products. If any rise in the price of the intermediate product would 
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be reflected in that of the final product, this would reduce the incentive for the 
vertically integrated firm  to increase its sales of the intermediate product at the 
cost of its own consumption. This element is not expected to be a significant 
source of potential supply in most cases. 
(ii) If the relevant products can be produced as by-products of other production 
processes, some companies may recover for sale only part of the by-product, 
because of dim inishing returns from  further recovery and consequently rising 
marginal cost. A  rise in price may increase the proportion recovered - this 
element is relevant only in certain cases with specific technical circumstances. 
(cl Variable Droduction of ioint Droducts (domestic SuDDliers) 
If relevant products are produced jointly with other products and the proportions are 
variable (eg in certain chemical processes), a rise in profitability may lead to fairly rapid 
increase in supply - also significant only in cases with specific technical circumstances. 
(d) Transferable canacitv of domestic suDDliers 
Certain products with different end-uses may be quite similar in production 
requirements - materials, labour skills and machinery. For example, textile companies 
can switch between curtain- and dress-fabrics; furniture makers between dining tables 
and beds; shipping companies between completely different routes. If some production 
capacity would be transferred from  other products in the event of an increase in the 
profitability of the relevant products, then this “transferable” capacity should be included 
in the relevant market potential supply. 
The word “transferable” does not refer only to the technical possibility of transfer of 
production. If production were to be switched from  other products then the total supply 
of these other products would fall, leading to a possible increase in their prices and 
profitability. The key variables (assum ing no technical obstacles to transfer) would be: 
(8 the price-elasticities of demand for the products from  which capacity would be 
switched; 
(ii) the ratio of current relevant product sales to the total of technically transferable 
capacity. 
It can be shown that the potential supply from  capacity transfer will be positively related 
to the (absolute value of) price-elasticity of demand for the products from  which 
transfer is possible; it will be negatively related to the proportion of total transferable 
capacity currently used for relevant products. 
Of these two factors, the proportion of technically transferable capacity currently 
devoted to relevant market sales may be comparatively easy to estimate. The (weighted 
average) price-elasticity of demand for production substitutes may be impossible to 
calculate in many cases. It may be possible to make an intuitive assessment (eg low for 
protected captive markets) and this should influence the weight accorded to transferable 
capacity in the analysis of relevant market potential supply. 
The switching of capacity between products has so far been assumed to be cost-free 
both in a technical sense and in a commercial sense. Technically, substitution of 
products may impose some costs - modification of some equipment, minor investment in 
specialist plant, recruitment or retraining for specialist labour skills. These should be 
considered. Commercially, the decision to run down an existing product line is unlikely 
to be taken unless that product line is only marginally profitable. Abandonment of 
existing customers in a competitive market would not be considered unless a company 
were certain that there had been a permanent change in the relative profitability of the 
relevant product compared with that of production substitutes. It is important not to 
exaggerate the importance of transferable capacity. 
63 Geoeraohical transfer 
In the event of a significant non-transitory increase in the profitability of supplying the 
relevant product to the relevant geographical market, domestic companies may switch 
output from exports. Research conducted in the 1960s. eg in the UK by Ball, Eaton and 
Steuer (1966) showed that companies did switch sales between home and export markets 
in response to changes in demand. A company with a predominant share of the home 
market which raised prices might find its competitors gaining sales from it by diverting 
from exports and undercutting marginally. 
The economics of diversion from exports will depend upon the ratio of exports to home 
sales and the price elasticity of demand for exports of the relevant product. The 
elasticity of supply to the home market will be positively related to (the absolute value 
of) both variables. An enterprise in which a high proportion of sales is derived from 
exports to price-elastic markets will be most inclined to increase supply to the home 
market in response to an increase in the profitability of that market. 
The fact that foreign companies already sell in the geographical market (G) proves that 
there is no insuperable barrier to supply, such as prohibitive transport costs, nationalistic 
preferences, tariffs or non-tariff barriers to trade. In order to overcome such barriers, 
foreign suppliers may have had to set lower prices than those in their home market. As 
Landes and Posner (1979) pointed out, this price difference may increase the elasticity 
of potential supply from such companies in the event of a small price increase, since this 
would imply a much greater, proportionate increase in their profit margins in market G. 
However, before going as far as the US recommendation that world-wide sales of 
companies with non-negligible sales in the USA should be included as potential supply 
to the US market, it is necessary to consider possible barriers to switching of supply to 
market G by foreign companies. 
(9 Tariffs 
The existence of a tariff against (mainly non-EEC) imports, which has not prevented 
foreign companies from selling in the protected country, is unlikely per se to deter an 
expansion in supply in response to increased profitability. This applies particularly to 
flat-rate duties (as opposed to percentage levies). 
(ii) Other nrotective measures 
While imports may not be prohibited, there may be “voluntary ceilings” (quotas) on 
imports from outside a country, eg Japanese cars into the United Kingdom, certain 
textiles into the EEC. Other non-tariff barriers to trade include slow-moving 
bureaucratic procedures and nationalist preferences in purchases either made or assisted 
by governments. 
(iii) pationalistic preferences 
It should be noted that significant import penetration does not imply that foreign 
countries will not encounter nationalist preferences in attempts to increase market share 
further. The UK car market provides a useful illustration. It is possible to identify 
three segments with differing propensities to buy foreign cars:- 
the private non-commercial owner, likely to buy on the basis of price 
versus perceived value and most likely to buy a foreign car; some 
observers believe that foreign penetration of this part of the market is 
now high; 
the company, purchasing either for “fleet” use or for provision to its own 
employees (as tools of their work, eg salesmen, or as perquisites), which 
may think it commercially wise to proclaim its desire to “buy British”; 
the public authority, undertaking or major institution which would be 
strongly criticised if it did not support the UK industry. 
Import penetration of the UK car market has remained just under 60 per cent for much 
of the last five years, only partly because of the effective quota on Japanese cars. 
Assuming that these barriers to expansion of imports can be overcome, one may consider 
the economics of increased supply by foreign companies in response to an increase in 
profitability. Such increased supply could come from unused capacity, transferable 
capacity, output produced but not currently sold (intermediate products consumed or by- 
products) and finally transfer of relevant product sales from other geographical markets. 
The factors influencing ability and willingness to supply from these sources are identical 
to those affecting domestic suppliers; the difference is that in addition to any obstacles 
to increasing availability of the relevant products there may be barriers to expansion of 
imports which would not be faced by products within the country. 
2. potential SUDD~V from comnanies not currentlv selline the relevant Droduct within 
the relevant EeoaraDhicai market 
(a) Barriers to entry 
One may begin by considering different forms of entry barrier and then go on to assess 
whether there exist firms in positions to overcome them. 
(3 Absolute prohibitions imposed by statute, licences, patents, etc. (conditions 
attached to such exclusive rights may limit abuse of monopoly power derived). 
(ii) Barriers associated with entry into production such as minimum economic scale 
of production - control by existing firms of supplies of materials or other inputs, 
through vertical integration or other ties. 
(iii) Barriers associated with distribution, especially where outlets are restricted in 
number and are owned or tied by exclusive dealing. Wide product range of existing 
companies, offering savings in transactions costs to outlets using one supplier may make 
access to such outlets difficult without supply of complementary products. 
(iv) Barriers associated with established brand preferences:- the cumulative effects 
of advertising, customer habits, goodwill, augmented by any cumulative loyalty 
discounts. 
69 Barriers associated with distance between the geographical market and point of 
supply: the significance of physical transportation costs depends on value:weight or 
value:bulk ratios and on the “perishability” of the product; there may also be difficulties 
in personal communication and selling. 
(vi) Barriers due to policies of existing sellers:- these may include predatory pricing, 
possibly cross-subsidised by other activities, and exclusive dealing arrangements. 
(vii) Barriers affecting new competition from imports:- as well as any of the barriers 
listed under (i) to (vi) foreign firms may face additional obstacles:- tariffs, non-tariff 
barriers, nationalistic preferences (especially associated with government or government- 
aided purchases), problems associated with communications (language and culture), 
differences in business practices. Differentiation of complementary products or facilities 
may be an important additional barrier. For example, different specifications in 
telecommunications and television transmission limit competition between EEC countries 
in the electronics industries. 
(b) Factors tending to reduce the sienificance of certain barriers 
The deterrent effect of these barriers on a company not currently selling the relevant 
product in the relevant geographical market may be assessed by examination of the 
following factors. 
Does the company produce the relevant product - either for sale 
elsewhere or for further processing, or as a by-product not currently 
sold? If so, barrier (ii) above may not apply. 
Does the company have appropriate capacity, either unused or used for 
other products but transferable? This may also diminish barrier (ii) 
Does the company sell other products in the relevant market? Is its name 
well-known? Does it have an established distribution network? If so, 
barriers (iii), (iv), (v) and, in the case of a foreign firm (vii) may be 
significantly diminished. The example of the French company Moulinex 
in widening its product range in the United Kingdom from food-mixers 
to other small domestic electrical appliances demonstrates this point. 
Does the company have any production at all within the geographical 
market? (This applies especially to multinational conglomerate 
companies). Alternatively, is it able to introduce production into that 
market without loss of economies of scale? The Belgian car assembly 
industry in the 1970s provides an example of penetration into a protected 
market via branch factories. Existing (even if unrelated) activity within a 
country is likely to reduce barriers to entry to a national market. 
Once barriers to entry have been identified these may be grouped, in accordance with 
the theory of contestable markets, into three categories (in diminishing order of 
importance):- 
permanent barriers to selling in the relevant market which cannot be 
surmounted by initial expenditures (these would include legal 
prohibitions); 
barriers surmountable by initial expenditure which would not be 
recovered on subsequent exit from the market (sunk costs); 
barriers surmountable by initial expenditure which could be substantially 
recovered on any subsequent exit. 
In assessing whether expenditures required to overcome barriers to entry would involve 
‘sunk costs”, one may consider the flexibility of any fixed assets which are purchased for 
products other than those in the relevant market and, therefore, their potential resale 
value if the relevant product market were to decline. For example, aircraft or ships are 
less likely to represent sunk costs than a railway; a factory built for light engineering in 
a metropolitan area is a more recoverable investment than a cement works built in 
remote limestone uplands. 
Using the logic of contestability theory one may consider that expenditure on fixed 
assets may involve fewer “sunk costs” than expenditures to overcome commercial barriers 
to entry . - the advertising and public relatiors required to overcome established 
preferences, the cost of developing distribution and goodwill. Purchase of fixed assets 
may be less important in many cases; arguments about minimum economic scale may 
also be modified when entry is by conglomerate companies and some of the indivisible 
fixed costs may be shared by products other than the product relevant to the case. 
3. Some nractical sueaestions 
I- 
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The concept of potential competition is important - if the potential supply to the 
relevant market greatly exceeds current market sales then concentration of that market 
does not imply dominance. No existing producer would be able to significantly reduce 
value for money offered to customers in order to increase his own profitability, because 
that increase in profitability would attract alternative supply. 
However, potential supply is difficult to quantify. For example, the price-elasticity of 
demand for production substitutes, which influences potential transfer from such 
products, must be considered but is impossible to measure. 
One practical possibility is consideration of past evidence. Each of the following may be 
examined: 
(a) Variations in total sales to the relevant market over the past few years - 
relevant market potential supply will not be less than maximum sales observed in the 
past (eg) five years, unless some loss of capacity has occurred. 
(b) Study of switches of production on an “industry” basis. How has the product- 
mix of an industry defined on the basis of technical similarity responded to changes in 
prices of different products? 
6) Any information on entry and exit into the market. Case studies on entry, 
whether permanent or “hit and run,” may cast considerable light on the factors listed in 
sub-section 2. 
(d) Potential supply from foreign competitors (imports) or from diversion of current 
exports from the relevant geographical market may be directly measurable, because of 
exchange rate variations. When there is a rise in the exchange rate of the currency of a 
country which constitutes a relevant geographical market, this implies an increase in the 
relative profitability of selling in that market, for both home and foreign producers. 
4. Snecial note on horizontal mergers and horizontal effects of other merEen 
. - 
In analysis of the possible consequences of horizontal mergers, it is necessary to consider 
their effect on potential supply. This is particularly important when one of the 
companies is not currently selling within the relevant market but has unused or 
transferable capacity which could be applied to the relevant product if this became more 
profitable. Elimination of potential competition between companies concerned may be 
an objective of a merger. This is sometimes commended as “rationalisation”. 
Even “conglomerate” mergers may have a significant horizontal effect in the sense that 
they may reduce the significance of market contestability. If a large company B were 
known to be able to overcome the barriers to entry into the relevant market either by 
establishing a new company or by acquiring a small competitor C, then this threat would 
restrain the behaviour of an incumbent market leader, A. If, instead, B acquired A, 
then, although the level of concentration in the relevant market might remain 
unchanged, the reduced threat of potential competition might allow abuse of A’s 
dominant position. 
The US Department of Justice’s 1984 Merger Guidelines discussed the horizontal effects 
and indicated concern about the possibility just described. The Department stated that it 
was likely to challenge any merger where the existing market participant (A in our 
description) had a share of 20 per cent or more of current sales. 
The recent (1986) pattern of reference and non-reference of proposed mergers to the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission in the United Kingdom appears to reflect emphasis 
on shares of current market sales, rather than potential competition. The UK legislation 
empowers the relevant minister to refer a proposed merger to the MMC when it would 
create or strengthen a market share (current sales) of at least 25% or when it would 
involve the transfer of assets of at least f 1Sm. Most recent decisions appear to have 
been based on the former criterion. 
5. Concludine remark on notential competition 
At the end of the assessment of relevant market potential supply, the conclusion may be 
no more exact than whether it is much larger than existing sales or only slightly larger. 
If only slightly, and a significant part is controlled by the dominant firm(s) then this 
means that shares of current market sales are relevant to assessment of dominance. The 
framework set out in this section is intended to ensure that such conclusions, even 
though general in nature, are based on appropriate logic. 
E. VERTICAL AND OTHER INTERDEPENDENCES 
The implications for competition/dominance of a given level of concentration in the 
relevant market (x) may be affected by the structure of supply in an interdependent 
market (y). Two cases may be considered:- (1) x is a “part” of product y and (2) y is a 
part of product x, or is complementary to x. 
1. ) f other or 
The simplest case is a primary or intermediate product with little final demand, eg wood 
pulp or a synthetic fibre yarn. A more complex situation occurs where x forms part of 
a complement of products and has little function outside that complement, eg spare parts 
for durable goods, films for cameras, videotapes. Such products have provided some of 
the more controversial cases in anti-trust jurisprudence. Under the methodology set out 
in Section A, where one starts with the narrowest definition and widens this by 
considering substitutes for that narrowly defined product, such products (eg exhausts 
specific to a particular Mercedes-Benz car model) will emerge as relevant for evaluation 
of dominance. Assessment of how far any dominance is tempered by competition in a 
wider product market is a necessary final stage of evaluation of dominant seller position. 
The methods of assessment for the intermediate product and the “wider complement” 
cases are similar but, because the latter has additional aspects, it is discussed separately. 
(a) Intermediate eood 
The following questions should be considered consecutively:- 
(i) What is the final product? 
(ii) What proportion of sales of the relevant product x is absorbed by each of 
the final products? (Pl) 
(iii) What proportion of the output of each final product requires at least some 
input of x? (P2) 
(iv) What proportion (approximate) of the price of each of the final products 
represents the cost of x? (P3) 
When for any final product the value of Pl times P2 times P3 is above (say) 0.05, 
examine the market for that product. Does it have any existing or potential substitutes 
which do not contain x so that a rise in the price of x might make those substitutes 
more attractive to customers? If so, competition in the wider final product market 
(including substitutes not containing x) may significantly restrain any abuse of 
dominance of the market for x. 
If none of the final product markets shows a value of PlP2P3 exceeding a minimal 
threshold level (0.05 seems reasonable) and the total of the values of PlP2P3 is also 
small, eg below 0.10, then the possible restraining influence of substitute final products 
not including x may be ignored. 
Usually only approximate, even intuitive, estimates will be available for Pl, P2 and P3 
but the logic of the approach is still recommended. 
@ I Relevant Droduct as Dart of wider comolementarv eroup 
The composite of complementary products (C) is defined at the stage of aggregation at 
which there is existing or potential competition from products not requiring the purchase 
of x. There may be more than one group - for example, distilled (deionised) water 
would come into at least two groups: motor transport (use in batteries) and steam 
ironing. 
Using the same notation as in the last sub-section 
Pl - Proportion of sales of x which is linked with use in C often = I but there 
may be more than one distinct use. 
P2 = Proportion of C requiring the use of .x rather than a substitute. In the 
analysis of complementary groups P2 should be close to 1 - otherwise C 
should have been defined at an earlier stage of aggregation. 
P3 = Cost of x as proportion of the price of C; in the case where C is a 
durable good P3 - expected expenditure on x divided by the total cost of 
ownership over life of good. 
The influence of competition in the market for the composite of products on that for x 
will again depend on (PlPzP3). The key ratio will probably be P3. 
some examples illustrate 
(9 Film for camera 
Composite: virtually all amateur photography, most professional 
photography (the only exception is videotape recording) 
PI = 1 P2 is close to I P3 probably > 0.5 
Although the demand for film depends upon that for photography, this composite 
product faces only limited competition within a general group of “recreational products”. 
This means that there is little restraint on a dominant producer of film. 
(ii) Car windscreen elass (renlacementj 
Composite: motor transport 
PI = 1 P2 = I 
P3 is very low. An average actual value of expenditure on replacement windscreens is 
around 0.005 over the life of a car but few motorists perceive this - for many it is 
covered by a small element in their insurance. Few would be deterred from car 
ownership by a moderate increase (say 10%) in the price of replacement windshields! 
Hence, dominance of the supply of car windscreen glass is a possible source of power. 
(iii) Snare eneine Darts for a narticular car (say Austin-Rover) 
Composite: 
PI = 1 
Austin-Rover cars using this range 
P2 - 1 
Pj P perceived probability (or frequency) of the need to replace times the price of x, 
divided by cost of ownership in a year. 
A problem arises with durable goods which normally change hands during their lifetime 
- P3 tends to rise, partly because of cumulative effects of wear and tear but also because 
the depreciation element in the denominator tends to fall. How far is the decision of Mr 
(or company) A about the purchase of an Austin-Rover Metro now likely to be affected 
by the level of expenditure on gearbox repairs (whether this level is high or low) in five 
years’ time? For evaluation of this, consider the second-hand market and its impact on 
purchasers of the brand new product. 
(cl Some wider considerations 
(3 Consumer versus Producer Welfare 
The logic of sections (a) and (b) may be summarised verbally. If 
(i) the cost of the relevant product is perceived to form a significant part of the 
total cost of some final product (or composite of products), and 
(ii) that final product (or composite) faces competition from products which do 
not include the relevant product, then this ultimate competition may mean that 
the market relevant to the alleged domination might not be relevant to an abuse 
of monopoly power, AT THE EXPENSE OF THE ULTIMATE CONSUMER. 
The standpoint of the ultimate consumer has so far been only implicit. Dominance over 
other companies within a vertical chain may be exploited to the detriment of the welfare 
of those other companies, without affecting the final consumer significantly. Is this 
“abuse of dominance” or part of a competitive process? Some cases in Chapter 4 
illustrate these issues. 
(ii) Durable Roods - the original eauinment v. reDlacement COntrOveW 
In all countries with anti-trust laws, cases have arisen concerning price discrimination by 
producers of components of durable goods - low prices in the competitive market for 
the new original equipment and high prices (or even resticted availability) of 
replacement parts. If each replacement part individually represents a small part of the 
cost of ownership (purchase plus maintenance) and the original buyer does not even 
think about it, the methodology above implies that monopoly of the replacement part 
market confers power. Price discrimination is an exploitation of that power. From the 
viewpoint of general consumer welfare this argument is open to question because 
high replacement prices accelerate scrapping of existing stock, leading to higher 
demand for original equipment, yielding greater economies of scale and higher 
rates of product innovation; 
the price discrimination spreads the cost of ownership over time: if original 
prices were higher fewer consumers could afford to buy the equipment at all 
and/or there would be an increase in debt burden; 
the time factor may be formalised by discounting expenditures on purchase and 
maintenance by the opportunity cost of capital for consumers. 
In other words, price discrimination may be in the public interest. The welfare 
arguments are complicated when the durable good is exchanged during its life, especially 
if second-hand prices do not fully reflect maintenance costs. The exploitation of 
monopoly power by discrimination may not always constitute an “abuse”. 
2. Relevant market dominated indirectly? 
In the last section we considered whether competition between products incorporating x 
and other products would affect interpretation of concentration in the supply of x. It is 
necessary also to consider whether suppliers of x may be affected by absence of 
competition in the supply of necessary inputs or complements for x. 
(a) InDuts 
If one of the producers of x also supplies an input necessary for production of x then its 
share of the market for x understates its power. This difficulty cannot be 
accommodated by vertical extension of the relevant market, because x may absorb only a 
small part of the input concerned and because other uses may have a different 
competitive structure. 
An example is the weaving or knitting of filament yarns in the textile industry, where 
major filament yarn producers compete with their own customers. Another is film- 
processing where Kodak competes with independents processing its own film. 
Suggested methodology: 
6) First check whether the supplier/competitor holds a dominant position in the 
supply of the input concerned. 
(ii) If so, check whether this dominant position is protected from potential 
competition. 
(iii) Examine whether any power derived is mitigated by competition from substitute 
inputs for the relevant product or, ultimately, by products further down a 
vertical chain which do not include the relevant product. 
If a supplier of an input for x is shown to be in a dominant position capable of abuse, 
the structure of the market for x may be less relevant for the purposes of competition 
policy. This situation is most likely to arise in assessments of competition in the supply 
of a pre-defined good or service (eg MMC references in the United Kingdom) or 
assessments of consequences of mergers. Where an investigation results from allegation 
of abuse, the source of power will normally be recognised at the outset. 
In certain cases of this kind, it may be easier to identify a dominant position by use of 
the partenaire obligatoire (trading dependency) concept rather than defining a company’s 
competitive position in the supply of x by reference to a dominant position in another 
market. 
@I Qther comoonents of a combosite Droduct 
Producers of complementary products enjoy advantages over competitors producing a 
narrower range, in that they are able to offer reduced transactions costs to customers. 
Any producer of x who also has a dominant position in the supply of z, a complement 
of x, has greater power in the market for x than his share of that specific market would 
suggest. If x must be compatible with z, then because the producer of z can control its 
specifications this enables him to limit or interfere with competition in the supply of x. 
Examples include production of ancillary telecommunications equipment in the 
UK (competing with and dependent upon British Telecom), production of cameras 
(competing with and largely dependent on Kodak) and production of computing 
equipment to be linked to main-frames (largely dependent upon IBM). 
Suggested methodology: Consider the following questions: 
(9 How important is the link between x and z for the sale of x? 
(ii) 
(iii) 
What is the structure of the market for z? 
Is any domination of the z market protected from potential 
competition? 
If the answers are that x does depend on z, that z is dominated and there is little 
potential competition, then the structure of the market for x, in isolation, is of little 
relevance to competition policy. The comments at the end of sub-section (a), 
immediately above, apply to such cases. The market which is relevant to the alleged 
abuse of monopoly power is that for z, even though the anti-competitive effects may 
appear in x. The use of the partenaire obligatoire approach (study of dependency) may 
again be easier, and equivalent to, the methodology set out here. 
F. PRODUCT MARKET DEFINITION IN CASES OF HORIZONTAL BUYER 
DOMINANCE 
1. Introduction 
There have been relatively few cases of abuse of buying power (monopsony) either in 
Community law or in national jurisprudence, including both Europe and the United 
States. The analytical framework for definition of the market in such cases is the 
obverse or “mirror-image”* of that used for definition of the relevant market in cases of 
abuse of selling power. Whereas analysis of selling power starts from the standpoint of 
the consumer, whose interests may be damaged by monopolistic practices, analysis of 
buyer power starts from that of the supplier facing a high level of concentration among 
purchasers. 
This last distinction raises an important question. Abuse of selling power implies 
adverse consequences for general welfare - divergence of prices from costs implies loss 
of consumer surplus and misallocation of resources; inertia, inefficiency and lack of 
innovation may be protected by monopoly power; diversion of competition under 
oligopoly to advertising, packaging, etc., is another object of criticism by welfare 
economists. The welfare consequences of “abuse of buying power” are less evident. 
The term may be used to denote transfer of any “abnormal profit” or producer surplus 
from the supplier of the intermediate product to the seller of the final product. Does 
this affect the consumer or general welfare at all? If the seller of the final product 
l The German Monopolkommission used this term in its highly formal presentation 
of the two analytical frameworks (op.cit) 
faces intensive competition, then his ability to “squeeze” suppliers may be reflected in 
lower prices paid by the ultimate consumer - a welfare gain. 
In the analysis of cases of buyer dominance, two markets are relevant. First the market 
represented by purchases of the intermediate product - the “relevant purchase market”; 
secondly, the selling market in which the intermediate product is finally sold. Both 
need careful definition. 
2. The relevant Durchasina market 
In the discussion of the selling markets, a demand substitute (y) for product x was 
defined as a product to which consumers of x would transfer within one year of a 
moderate but significant increase in the price of x. Definition of a “purchasing market” 
requires identification of substitute outlets to which suppliers could sell their products. 
If x is the narrowest definition of the relevant product then if y is a substitute, a modest 
but significant fall in the profitability of x (say, equivalent to 5% of its price) would 
cause suppliers to switch to outlet y within (say) one year*. 
Just as with demand substitutes, substitutability of product/outlet y for x depends on 
technical capability (functional interchangeability) plus the effects of custom and 
practice (reactive interchangeability). Of greater significance in the purchasing market, 
perhaps invalidating the formal approach in some cases, are barriers to substitution 
resulting from established trading links between customers. 
Oligopsony (a small number of buyers) sometimes results in bilateral trading, whereby 
each large purchaser may use, for example, five suppliers of a product with particular 
specification. Each supplier becomes dependent on the purchaser, since his production 
facilities are geared to that purchaser’s requirements and he has little or no marketing to 
outside companies. This process of “tying in” suppliers was noted in the Commission’s 
study of concentration in the UK textile industry (Fishwick 1975). 
Because of these effective bilateral links, making it difficult for dependent suppliers to 
turn to substitute outlets, it is not considered that tests of substitutability similar to those 
described in Section A would normally be applicable to the purchasing market. The 
concept of partenaire obligatoire is relevant. 
* This is the Monopolkommission’s definition 
However, in order to assess the degree of dependence, it may be necessary to define the 
range of outlets/products available to the supplier, it is important that these are not 
grouped by end-use. The appropriate criterion is that suppliers would be able to switch 
between these goods or services and their associated outlets. It is improbable that this 
ability to switch will be determined solely (or even mainly) by technical considerations. 
The principles here are best illustrated with a hypothetical example. Suppose company 
A processes and cans a range of temperate fruits - cherries, raspberries, strawberries, 
plums, etc. It is a small company unable to match the marketing expenditures of major 
multinationals in this field but economies of scale in production are limited and the 
company has been able to survive by supplying a major supermarket chain (S) with a 
part of the requirements of these products. S is one of about seven large chains selling 
similar products under their own retail brand-names. Because of this established 
custom, A has discontinued its own marketing, concentrating on liaison with S, quality 
and cost-reduction. 
The relevant purchasing market could be defined as the total of “sales of temperate 
fruits under retailers’ brand names”. It cannot be widened to include all retail sales of 
such fruits, even when these are physically identical, because A could not afford to 
market its products to the final consumer on a scale sufficient to persuade retailers to 
stock them with A’s own brand name. Moreover, if S and the other supermarket chains 
have all used their power to push suppliers* margins down, it is possible that A may not 
be able economically to switch to supplying one of S’s competitors. Any significant 
differences in product or packaging specifications would restrict A’s ability to switch. It 
may well be argued, in extreme cases, that the relevant purchasing market for A’s 
product consists of purchases of that product by S - a position which A might fight to 
avoid! 
G. IDENTIFICATION OF DOMINANCE THROUGH DEPENDENT 
RELATIONSHIPS (“PARTENAIRE OBLIGATOIRE”) 
A company may hold a dominant position because its customers or supliers depend upon 
it for survival; they cannot avoid trading with it if they are to continue their current 
activities. 
In many instances this position of “obligatory trading partner” (the partenaire obligatoire 
in the terminology of Glais) may result from dominance of a well-recognised market. 
For example, IBM is a partenaire obligatoire of many purchasers of big computers in 
Europe because of its large market share and the advantages to companies of having 
computers which can communicate with and accept software from those of trading 
partners. The partenaire obligatoire concept adds little to the analysis of the market for 
big computers. 
Let us consider the market for micro-computers and computer peripherals. IBM’s 
importance in this market may be greater than is indicated by its share of sales, because 
of the need on the part of many users of non-IBM equipment for this to be connectable 
to main-frame computers, in which IBM is dominant. A company like IBM could 
accelerate the pace of obsolescence in the micro-computer or peripheral markets by 
modification of main-frame computers. This would be an abuse of dominance of the 
main-frame market, not the market in which the abuse took place. In such cases, the 
concept of partenaire obligatoire may be a useful, supplementary tool of analysis, though 
the analytical framework set out in Sections A to E would lead to the same conclusion. 
A third type of case, where the partenaire obligatoire concept avoids apparent contortion 
of the notion of relevant market, occurs when individual concerns depend on much 
larger suppliers or customers. For example, suppose a major computer manufacturer (A) 
were to license a company (B) to maintain its computers covered by A’s service 
guarantees. The maintenance company’s staff would become expert specifically to A’s 
equipment; customers would be owners of such equipment. If A were to enforce 
trading conditions on B, such as reduced margins on spare parts or exclusive dealing 
clauses affecting accessories, then it might have no alternative but to accept, at least in 
the short-term. For B, company A would be a partenaire obligatoire. 
In this last case the definition of the relevant market would produce an unrealistic, 
though theoretically valid, result - the market in licences granted by A for the 
maintenance of computers. Similar examples would be the granting of distributorships 
(concessions) for motor cars of one particular make, or (on the purchasing side) 
recognition as an accredited supplier of a major group of chain stores. These are not 
“markets” in the normally accepted sense of the term. 
In cases where the concept of partenaire obligatoire is more recognisable and acceptable 
than dominance of an artificially constructed “relevant market”, it is important to fit this 
into the overall framework outlined earlier in this chapter. 
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If it is fo u n d  th a t B  is current ly  d e p e n d e n t o n  A  (its p a r tena i r e  ob l igato i re) ,  th e  
fo l l ow ing  q u e s tio n s  n e e d  to  b e  cons ide red  b e fo re  it is conc l uded  th a t A  is in  a  pos i t ion  
to  a b u s e  its d o m i n a n c e , to  th e  d e trim e n t o f th e  ultim a te  c o n s u m e r . 
(1)  
(2)  
(3 )  
W h a t a re  th e  bar r ie rs  to  reduct ion /e l iminat ion  o f th e  d e p e n d e n c e ?  (In th e  
h y p o th e tical case  a b o v e , th e  n e e d  to  ret ra in staff, to  fin d  a n o the r  c o m p u ter  
m a n u facturer  as  a  t rad ing  par tner  a n d  to  fin d  n e w  customers. )  
If A  we re  to  a b u s e  its pos i t ion  w o u l d  th is  a ttract  p o te n tia l  c o m p e titio n , e g  in  th e  
fo r m  o f “p i ra te” spa re  par ts  a n d  m a i n te n a n c e  agenc ies  ab l e  to  o ffe r  serv ices to  
rep lace  th o s e  o f th e  m a n u fac turer?  
Is th e  p o w e r  o f A  ove r  B  cons t ra ined  by  c o m p e titio n  in  a  wider  o r  vert ical ly 
“down-s t ream” ma rke t?  For  e x a m p l e , if A  ins is ted th a t B  shou ld  fit on ly  A ’s 
h igh -p r i ced  accessor ies ,  caus ing  A  to  lose  par t  o f th e  bus iness  o u ts ide essen tia l  
m a i n te n a n c e , B  m ight  b e  ob l i ged  to  cha rge  h ighe r  serv ice cha rges  a n d  th e s e  m a y  
in  th e  l onge r  te r m  a ffect  sa les  o f A ’s e q u i p m e n t. 
It is c lear  f rom th is  o u t l ine o f th e  d e p e n d e n c y  a p p r o a c h  th a t th is  rep laces  on ly  th e  first 
par t  o f th e  f ramework  fo r  ana lys is  o f d o m i n a n c e  set o u t in  th is  c h a p te r  a n d  th a t th e  
d i f ference is ma in l y  o n e  o f p resen ta tio n . A  p a r tena i r e  ob l iga to i re  is in  a  d o m i n a n t 
pos i t ion  wh ich  it m a y  a b u s e  on ly  if th o s e  d e p e n d e n t o n  it c a n n o t subst i tute o the r  
par terns,  if a b u s e  w o u l d  n o t l ead  to  n e w  (potent ia l )  c o m p e titio n  a n d  if it is n o t 
cons t ra ined  by  c o m p e titio n  in  w ide r  o r  “down-s t ream” ma rke ts. 
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A P P E N D IX  1  
T E S T S  O F  S U B S T ITUTABIL ITY (THE  M A T H E M A T ICS)  
(9  Cross-pr ice-elast ic i tv  o f d e m a n d  (see  C h a p te r  2  C .2(b) .  For  r easons  g i ven  in  
C h a p te r  2 , the re  a re  l ikely to  b e  ma jo r  dif f icult ies in  assess ing  th e  respons iveness  o f 
d e m a n d  fo r  x  to  c h a n g e s  in  th e  pr ice  o f y, m o s t o f th e m  de r i ved  f rom th e  p r o b l e m  o f 
ho ld i ng  o the r  var iab les  constant .  In  o rde r  to  iso late th e  e ffect  o f c h a n g e s  in  th e  pr ice  
o f y  o n  th e  d e m a n d  fo r  x, it is necessary  to  u s e  m u l tip le  regress ion.  
T h e  e q u a tio n s  fo r  es t imat ion o f cross-pr ice-elast ic i ty  f rom time-ser ies  a re  e i ther  ( ia)  o r  
( ib):- 
9, =  a p  b p  ‘p  d D g  x Y  =  ( ia)  
a , b , c  a n d  d  a re  constants  : b  is th e  own-p r i ce  elast ici ty o f x  a n d  c is th e  cross-pr ice-  
elast ici ty o f x  wi th respect  to  y; g  is th e  income-elast ic i ty .  (D is d i sposab le  i ncome)  
E s tim a tio n  o f th e  e q u a tio n  in  th is  fo r m  is l ikely to  e n c o u n te r  s igni f icant  p rob lems  o f 
m u l t icol l inear i ty (equ iva len t  to  th e  ceter is  pa r ibus  a s s u m p tion) ,  a n d , s ince  th e  elast ic i t ies 
m a y  n o t b e  constant  ove r  tim e , to  er rors  assoc ia ted  wi th speci f icat ion.  These  p rob lems  
m a y  d im in ish  if, as  is m o r e  usua l ,  th e  e q u a tio n  is t rans fo rmed to  first d i f ferences:-  
A lw 9 , =  b  & o g  p , +  & log  py  . . . . +  d  A log  p , +  g  A  l og  D  
E v e n  wi th th is  first d i f fe rence e q u a tio n , m u l t icol l inear i ty m a y  still occur  if p roduce rs  o f 
x  a n d  y r e s p o n d  qu ick ly  to  e a c h  o the r’s pr ice  c h a n g e s . It shou ld  b e  recogn i sed  th a t th e  
va lue  o f th e  c o e fficient c  a n d  its s tandard  er ror  c a n n o t b e  es t imated e ff iciently w h e n  th e  
cor re la t ion b e tween  ( l og  p ,) a n d  ( l og  p ,) is s igni f icant.  
(i i) S u b s titu tio n  elast ici tv o f d e m a n d  - a  m e a s u r e  s u g g e s te d  by  th e  G e r m a n  
M o n o p o l k o m m i s s i o n  (op.  cit.) b u t n o t d e v e l o p e d . Th is  m a y  b e  m o r e  eas i ly  app l i ed  th a n  
th e  cross-elast ic i ty m e a s u r e . If x  a n d  y a re  subst i tutes in  th e  s a m e  ma rke t th e n  by  
m a k i n g  th e  d e p e n d e n t va r iab le  th e  & Q  b e tween  the i r  sa les,  o n e  m a y  o m i t var iab les  such  
as  d i sposab le  i n c o m e  a n d  th e  pr ices  o f o the r  p roduc ts wh ich  in f luence th e  to ta l  ma rke t 
fo r  x  a n d  y c o m b i n e d . Thus  o n e  m a y  est imate ove r  recent  pe r iods  th e  e q u a tio n  
9, =  a  P , ’ 
Q y  i ) p 7 ; 
or Log 9, - log qy = log a + s(log p, - log p,) (iia) 
Other factors may influence relative market shares over time. For example, either x or 
y may have been introduced during the period covered by the analysis and may be 
making progressive inroads into the market; there may have been significant changes in 
comparative quality or marketing. It may be possible to modify equation (ii a) to take 
account of these other variables. As it stands, equation (ii a) should not be used when 
it yields significant autocorrelation of residuals, which would indicate either the 
omission of other variables significantly affecting market share or inappropriate 
specification (e.g. is not constant over the period studied). 
These problems may be reduced, though not necessarily eliminated, by use of first- 
differences:- 
A(log q, - log qy) = k + s Atlog p, - log p,) 
(A constant term is included here to deal with the possibility of a “trend” change in 
market shares over the period analysed, e.g., if either x or y were a new product). 
Provided the required data exist, the substitution elasticity approach may prove more 
reliable than the estimation of cross-price elasticity. If competition between x and y is 
so intense that price changes coincide, then it will not be possible to derive a satisfactory 
estimate of s. The principal value of this test may be negative - unless s is 
significantly different from zero one cannot conclude that x and y are substitutes.* 
(iii) Price-similaritv between Droducts (the Horowitz test) 
The principles underlying the Horowitz test were explained in Chapter 2 (C.~(C)), where 
it was suggested that, in order to eliminate variable inflation, the equation for 
estimation should be: 
(Loi3 P, - lot3 Py)t = a + b (log P, - log pyJml + W, (iii) 
If x and y are substitutes in the neo-classical sense a will tend to 0, b will lie between 0 
and 1 and W, will be randomly distributed.** 
* s will lie between zero (either unrelated products or complements) and - 00 (perfect 
substitutes). 
** to be checked by Durbin’s h test. 
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Other results may be interpreted as follows:- 
a# l,b= O(*): prices of x and y are not equal and show no systematic relationship - 
unlikely to be substitutes. 
=: 0. b = Q : prices of x and y are (approximately) equal on average with no 
correlation between any price differences in successive periods. Interpretation of this 
result is difficult. The products may be perfect and immediate substitutes or common 
cost inputs may push prices towards equality. The result could arise purely 
coincidentally, e.g., the prices per kilogram  of cement and sugar may not differ much on 
average in some areas, but it is unlikely in such cases that equation (iii b) would yield a 
random  distribution of residuals. 
= 0. b= 1: implies that (Px/Py) is constant but not equal to 1. The dearer of the 
two products may be a “superior” alternative to the cheaper. 
This result may also reflect a major weakness of the Horowitz test when applied to 
definition of product, rather than geographical, markets**: absolute price is very 
difficult to define. P roducts may be competing substitutes even though they have 
different combinations of characteristics. One cannot compare travel modes by prices 
in pence per kilometre, because that would fail to take account of speed, reliability, etc; 
one cannot compare foods in pence per kilogram . If x and y are substitutes then their 
prices will tend to equality in terms  of units of satisfaction for the consumer, which 
often cannot be approximated by any single physical unit. 
(iv) Correspondence of price changes (the Stigler-Sherwin test) 
The problems in comparison of absolute prices may be avoided by comparison of 
changes in prices. Correction for general inflation is essential*** to avoid correlation 
resulting from  this common influence. The equation to be tested is 
Alo8 P, - Alog ‘p = a + b (Alog p, - Alog ‘p) (iv) 
* For brevity, the equality symbol (=) is used to mean “not significantly different from ” 
and + indicates “significantly different from ”. 
l * Horowitz (1981) applied to test whether adjacent US cities were in the same retail 
meat markets, though he did claim  that it could logically be extended to product 
market definition. 
*** Stigler and Sherwin appear to have overlooked this necessity. 
Where A indicates changes between successive time periods (e.g., years) and 5 represents 
an index of general prices. 
If x and y were perfect substitutes then a would be zero and b would be unity. The 
degree of substitutability can best be measured by the square of the correlation 
coefficient (r ) derived from equation (iv). 
One defect of this test is the danger of correlation reflecting common costs in x and y, 
for example if x were fuel oil for heating and y were gasoline (petrol) for use in cars. 
These products can hardly be described as substitutes in demand. Note also that if x 
and y are complementary products, subject to common demand characteristics, the value 
of b may be significantly positive. For example, a severe winter might cause increases 
in the prices of both outergarmets and waterproof footwear. (See also the case of Ice 
Cream in Chapter 4.) 
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APPENDIX 2 
CHECK-LIST FOR ANALYSIS (BASED ON FRAMEWORK OF CHAPTER 3) 
A. DEFINITION OF RELEVANT PRODUCT 
A.1 Starting point for narrow definition (x) - depends on reason for case: 
A.2 
(a) general reference - normally pre-defined; 
tb) effects of merger - any concentration of supply; 
(cl alleged abuse - source of power to abuse. 
Choice of Droducts for consideration as substitutes (y) 
In cases of types (b) and (c) the enterprises (or groups) eager to refute allegations 
of dominance may suggest a “wide range”. 
Possibility of customer surveys? 
A.3 Criteria of substitutability 
Hypothetical criterion: y is a substitute for x and should be included in same 
product group if a rise in price of x (consider 5 to 10% range) would cause 
substantial transfer of demand to y. 
Factual criteria: functional interchangeability (end-use) 
reactive interchangeability (consumer attitudes) 
barriers to substitution 
Do factual evidence and consideration of hypothetical criterion suggest sub- 
markets for x? 
A.4 Direct tests of substitutabilitv 
If data are available, test whether either or both of the following can 
satisfactorily be estimated: 
cross-price-elasticity 
substitution-elasticity 
(See Chapter 3 Appendix 1 regarding statistical validity.) 
A.5 Indirect tests of substitutabilitv 
Horowitz test 1 if price data are available but 
Stigler-Sherwin test) note warnings in Chapter 3, Appendix 1. 
Any general observations on coincidence of price changes. 
Similarity in other elements of marketing of x and y- eg advertising, product 
modifications, distribution channels and margins, customer warranties. For each 
element consider current similarities and coincidence of changes. 
A.6 Substitution gg,~? 
If so, on what grounds. If not, use wide rather than narrow definition or advise 
use of alternative definitions of market. 
B. GEOGRAPHICAL MARKET DEFINITION 
B.1 Basic criterion for integration: similarity of prices within the market. 
B.2 StartinE Doint for analvsis - narrow definition (A) 
general reference - normally pre-defined 
effects of merger - identify areas of concentration 
alleged abuse - geographical source of power to abuse. 
B.3 Choice of areas to be tested for inclusion 
As with product definition, enterprises (or groups) eager to refute allegation of 
dominance may suggest a wide range. Other criteria for inclusion: physical 
proximity, shipments to and from A, personal travel to and from A, absence or 
low level of trade barriers. 
B.4 Broad factual evidence 
ta) Similarity of market shares, of leading enterprises and, in case of 
different countries, of combinations of national suppliers in each country? 
tb) Similarity of prices? Where different countries involved, calculate series 
of price ratios for relevant product, corrected by prevailing exchange rates. If 
mean of these ratios is significantly different from 1 over 2-year period, 
countries unlikely to be in same market. 
(c) Stigler-Sherwin test may be appropriate but exchange rate variations 
could either mask or exaggerate correlation between price changes. 
B.5 Further examination of svecific conditions for aeoaravhical integration 
Fulfilment of any ONE of these conditions is sufficient for integration. If all 
three contravened, areas under consideration form separate markets. 
ta) Transferability of demand 
Are customers able and willing to transfer demand between areas? 
Barriers to transfer may include: 
physical transportation costs, 
lack of customer knowledge, 
brand loyalties, goodwill, long-term contracts, 
fidelity rebates, etc., 
plus in the case of different countries: 
nationalist sentiment and cultural or business differences, 
exchange transactions costs and risks, 
legal and institutional barriers, including tariffs, and administrative 
obstacles associated with them. 
Significance of international barriers likely to diminish where demand transfer 
involves: 
large purchasers, especially multinational companies, 
an anonymous, intermediate product. 
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Note, however, that government involvement in purchasing decisions (including 
any subvention) may imply political pressure towards indigenous industries. 
@ I Transferability of supply combined with 
either highly competitive supply structure - large number of suppliers, 
homogeneous product (no differentiation) 
or similar demand conditions in different areas (countries): 
similar determ inants of demand, variables other than price have same 
levels; 
any one seller faces the same price-elasticity in each country; 
no differences in VAT or other add-on taxes. 
Condition (b) may appear rather restrictive. Analysis of how far it is fulfilled 
can supplement findings under B.4 
C. DEFINITION OF RELEVANT MARKET SALES 
Denominator for shares of relevant market = Sales of relevant product, from  all 
sources within the relevant geographical market = Domestic output - exports + 
imports 
Choice between sales value and sales volume depends upon nature of product. 
D. DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF POTENTIAL SUPPLY 
Maximum supply of relevant product which would be supplied to relevant 
geographical market within one year of a permanent significant increase in 
profitability. (Hypothetical assumption of unlim ited demand.) 
D.1 Potential sup~lv from  companies alreadv selling relevant vroducts within relevant 
geoaraDhica1 market 
(a) Unused capacity of domestic suppliers 
@ I Output of relevant products by domestic suppliers not currently sold 
(i) Transfer to market from  consumption by vertically integrated 
concerns. 
Would price of final product reflect increased price of intermediate 
product? If so, no incentive to transfer. Is there an alternative input to 
replace relevant product in subsequent processing? Otherwise, can the 
capacity in further processing be used for other products containing less 
of the relevant product? If “no” to both of these questions, vertically 
integrated concerns less likely to transfer output of intermediate product 
to market sale. 
(ii) Output of relevant product as a by-product - is the supply for 
market sale likely to be price-elastic? 
@ I Variable production of joint products - technical cases only 
b-0 Transferable capacity of domestic suppliers 
Transferability not determ ined exclusively by technical factors. Need also to 
take into account 
D.2 
(i) price-elasticities of demand for products from which capacity would 
be switched - the greater the (absolute) values of these price-elasticities 
the more economic the transfer; 
(ii) ratio of current relevant product sales to total technically transferable 
capacity - the smaller the ratio the more economic the transfer. 
(i) may be a matter for intuitive assessment, (ii) probably easier. 
Take into account any costs of transfer capacity. 
te) Geographical transfer 
Diversion from exports by home producers? Transferability increases with 
(absolute value) of price-elasticity of demand for exports and ratio of exports to 
total sales. 
Foreign companies already selling some relevant product in relevant geographical 
market (G) have overcome any barriers such as transport costs, nationalistic 
preferences, trade barriers, etc. Provided there is no barrier to expansion of 
imports, potential supply from this source may be quite elastic, especially if 
imports are currently only marginally profitable. 
Barriers to expansion of imports may include 
non-tariff trade barriers, such as “voluntary” quotas, bureaucratic 
procedures, 
nationalistic preferences affecting particularly those segments of market 
not yet significantly penetrated. 
Increased supply by foreign companies can come from their unused capacity, 
capacity transferable from other products or transfer of sales from other markets. 
Some comments apply as under (a) to (d) for domestic suppliers. 
Potential suvvlv from comvanies not currentlv selling the relevant vroduct within 
the relevant geogravhical market 
(a) Barriers to entry 
Absolute prohibition? 
Barriers to entry into production - minimum scale, restricted 
access to inputs? 
(iii) Barriers to distribution - including need for complementary 
product range? 
(iv) Existing brand preferences, possibly reinforced by loyalty rebates? 
(4 Physical barriers to geographical market - transportation and 
communication costs? 
(vi) Defensive actions by existing sellers? 
(vii) Additional barriers to imports? 
(b) Factors tending to reduce the significance of certain barriers 
Barrier (ii) would not apply to company producing relevant product (but not 
selling it in relevant market) or with transferable capacity. 
Company already selling some other products in relevant geographical market, 
especially if name well-known and distribution network established, may face 
fewer barriers of types (ii) to (v) and, if foreign, (vii). 
Company with ~QB-& production (and employment) in a country, even if unrelated 
to relevant product, may face fewer type (vii) barriers. 
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Group barriers in dim inishing order of importance:- 
permanent barriers not surmountable by initial expenditures 
barriers surmountable but only with sunk costs 
barriers surmountable by recoverable expenditure 
Sunk v. recoverable depends partly on flexibility of any fixed assets. 
Expenditures to overcome commercial barriers - goodwill etc - may be less 
recoverable than purchase of fixed assets. 
D.3 Some practical suaaestions 
Because potential supply difficult to quantify, some guidance may be obtained 
from : 
ta) 
(b) 
Variations in total sales to relevant market over recent years 
Production switches within industries 
Any information on entry and exit, hence contestability 
Response by importers and exporters to exchange rate changes. 
D.4 Horizontal mergers and horizontal effects of other mergers 
In merger cases, note particularly the effects on potential competition, which 
may be of greater significance than addition of market shares. This is true of 
“conglomerate” as well as “horizontal” mergers. 
E. VERTICAL AND OTHER INTERDEPENDENCES 
(Relevant product market referred to below as x) 
E.1 Relevant Droducts as part of other vroducts 
(a) Intermediate good 
Determ ine, as far as possible:- 
final product(s) 
5 = proportion of sales of x absorbed in each final product 
P2 = proportion of output of final product requiring at least some input of x P3 = cost of x as proportion of price of each final product 
If, for any final product, PlP2P3 > 0.05 (arbitrary value, subject to discretion) 
examine whether that final product has substitutes containing substantially less of 
X. If so, competition in wider product market may reduce significance of 
dominance of supply of x. 
If, for every individual final product PlP2P3 < 0.05 
and for ail final products C PlP2P3 < 0.10 (arbitrary) 
restraining influence of final product markets may be ignored. 
(Approach will rarely be applicable mathematically but logic is important) 
(b) Relevant product as part of wider complementary group 
Composite of complementary products (C) is defined at stage of aggregation 
where there is actual or potential competition from products not containing x. 
Pl = proportion of sales of x which is linked with C 
P2 = proportion of C requiring use of x - should be close to 1, otherwise C 
incorrectly defined 
P3 = cost of x as proportion of price of C. 
Where C is ownership of durable good, P3 = 
expected or perceived expenditure on x divided by total ownership cost 
Apply PlP2P3 as with intermediate goods. 
(cl Wider considerations 
(i) Where competition in market for final products or for a composite of 
complementary products is found to limit significance of dominance of x 
from consumer’s standpoint, consider the economic significance of any 
appreciable loss of welfare suffered by other parties. 
(ii) For cases involving price discrimination between original equipment 
and spare parts, the comments in Section El(c) may be pertinent. 
E.2 Relevant market dominated indirectly 
Do suppliers of necessary inputs or complements for x also themselves produce 
x? If so, with what consequences? 
(a> Inputs 
(i) Is any supplier/competitor in a dominant position in a previous stage 
of the vertical chain? 
(ii) If so, is this dominant position protected from potential competition? 
(iii) Is power limited by competition for products further along the 
vertical chain? - see section E.1 (a). 
If the answer to (i) and (ii) is “yes” and to (iii) “no”, then the structure of 
product/geographical market chosen for study may be less relevant to 
competition policy than that of the input concerned. 
(b) Other components of a composite product 
Any producer of x also holding a dominant position in the supply of a necessary 
complement, has greater power in the market for x than market share may 
indicate. 
If x depends on z and market for z is dominated and protected from 
competition, structure of market for x is less relevant to competition policy. 
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CASE STUDIES IN THE APPLICATION OF 
THE FRAMEWORK TO ASSESSMENT OF DOMINANCE 
]NTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the analytical framework presented in Chapter 3 is applied to a number 
of cases drawn from EEC, UK and French jurisprudence. The objective is to illustrate 
how it could have been used to resolve some of the elements of dispute about market 
definition in cases concerned with abuse of dominance. 
The first three cases relate to alleged dominance with no issues of “vertical” product 
interdependence. The first case, Continental Can, is well-known in Community 
jurisprudence because of the importance assigned by the European Court of Justice to 
definition of the product and geographical markets. A more recent UK merger case is 
introduced to provide additional evidence relevant to Continental Can. The second and 
third cases, Hovercraft and Ferry Services and Cat and Dog ‘Foods, both drawn from 
UK competition policy, provide useful insight into definition of product markets and 
evaluation of potential competition and demonstrate the usefulness of the analytical 
framework. 
Case studies numbered 4 to 6 all raised issues of vertical interdependence and illustrate 
particularly the application of Section E of the framework (though other elements are 
also important). The cases are CSC v. Zoja and Hugin v. Liptons (both EEC cases) and 
Replacement body panels for Ford vehicles (UK). Despite criticisms reported in Chapter 
1 above, the analysis of these cases reveals that both the Commission of the European 
Communities and the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission did consider product 
interdependence, using an approach similar to that in the analytical framework. 
Cases 4 to 6 also provide an oppportunity to compare the application of the framework 
relating to the relevant market with the approach : based on dependency relationships 
(partenaire obligatoire). Case study number 7 is a recent (December 1985) decision of 
the Commission of the European Communities relating to AKZO v. ECS. The 
analytical framework appears to support fully those decisions in this case which relate to 
definitions of the product and geographical markets and to potential competition. 
Product interdependence is also discussed, since the case relates to an intermediate 
product. 
The framework for assessment of markets relevant to seller dominance is applied in full 
in cases 1 to 7. Three further cases are analysed only partly, because their main interest 
is in the elucidation of particular aspects. These are:- 
case number 8 - three cases relating to outdoor advertising in France and 
the UK, which illustrate problems of product definition in cases of 
general reference rather than alleged abuse; 
case number 9 - United Brands where the analytical framework confirms 
the Community decision on product market definition but casts doubt on 
the validity of that of the geographical market; 
case number 10 - Ice Cream (UK), which provides an opportunity to test 
(and to show the pitfalls) of certain of the statistical measures of 
substitutability. 
Case study number 11, the “supercentrales d’achat” (arrangements whereby retailers pool 
orders through common purchasing organisations) illustrates some of the issues in 
assessment of markets relevant to purchaser dominance. 
The findings from the case study analyses are discussed at the end of the chapter. 
,- 
CASE STUDY NO.1: CONTINENTAL CAN COMPANY (EEC CASE) 
Documentation 
Commission of the EC: 
WC) 
Decision (8 February 1972) Case 72/2 
Journal Officiel (French language) 1972 L7, 
pp.25-39 
European Court of Justice: 
WJ) 
Judgement on appeal (21 February 1973) in 
Case 6/72 
European Court Record, pp.21 5-65 
Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission, UK: 
(MM0 
Rockware/United Glass - Redfern National 
Glass, Proposed Merger (1977-8), HC 431, 
HMSO, London 
Price Commission, UK Metal Box Ltd - Open Top Food and 
Beverage and Aerosol Cans, HC 135, 
HMSO, London, 1977. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case concerned the acquisition by Continental Can Company Inc. (USA), via a 
European subsidiary, of a majority shareholding in Thomassen en Drijver-Verblifa NV 
(“TDV”) in the Netherlands. Continental Can already controlled the largest supplier of 
light metal cans (for preserved foods) in W  Germany (Schmalbach-Lubeca-Werke AG - 
“SLW”) and since TDV dominated the corresponding market in the Netherlands and 
Belgium, the takeover gave the US company a dominant position in a wider geographical 
area. 
The case established an important legal principle: extension through acquisition or 
merger by a company already in a dominant position within a substantial part of the 
Common Market constitutes an “abuse” of that position, under Article 86. (ECJ, pp.242- 
5) Critical examination of this logic lies outside the terms of reference of the current 
study. However, it seems strange that, in order to condemn a takeover by a US 
company of a near-monopoly supplier in Belgium and Holland, it was necessary for the 
Commission to prove that the US company’s German subsidiary had a dominant position 
in Germany, particularly as there was very little competition between SLW and TDV. 
The decision of the Commission against the acquisition was annulled by the Court of 
Justice, on the grounds that large shares of three narrowly defined sub-markets did not 
constitute a dominant position. The Court stated explicitly that if Continental Can had 
been shown to hold a dominant position then the acquisition would have constituted an 
abuse. 
The Court’s decision on the definition of dominance corresponds closely to the approach 
set out in Chapter 3 - although SLW was shown to hold a dominant position in three 
segments defined by substitutability in demand, this position did not confer power, 
because of potential competition: 
“A dominant position on the market for light metal 
containers for meat and fish cannot be decisive, as long as 
it has not been proved that competitors from other sectors 
of the market for light metal containers are not in a 
position to enter this market, by simple adaptation, with 
sufficient strength to create a serious counterweight.” 
(ECJ, pp.248) 
A. DEFINITION OF THE RELEVANT PRODUCT 
Startinp, Point (A. 11 
Although this case concerned an alleged abuse of a dominant position, the takeover of 
TDV by Continental Can was not made possible by the domination of the German 
market by its subsidiary SLW. The starting point was not defined by the abuse. 
Instead, the Commission investigated SLW’s activities and sought to find product markets 
in which the company held a dominant position. 
The Commission considered four groups of products within SLW’s range:- 
(a) 
(b) 
(cl 
(d) 
cans supplied “open top” for subsequent sealing by insertion of a metal top - used 
for meats, fruit and vegetables, fish, pet foods and drinks (especially beer and 
soft drinks); 
“general line” cans with separate lids - used for packaging of foods and other 
products in powder or granular form and for viscose, non-perishable liquids; 
aerosol cans: 
metal closures, especially for glass and plastic jars and bottles, including crown 
corks. 
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S u b s titu te  D roduc ts 
T h e  commiss ion  cons ide red  a  w ide  r a n g e  o f subst i tutes fo r  (a), (b)  a n d  (c), i nc lud ing  
p a p e r b o a r d , p last ic  a n d  g lass  c o n ta iners .  A lth o u g h  th e  te rms  we re  n o t u s e d , th e  factors 
l is ted by  th e  Commiss i on  ( C E C , p .33 )  cover  aspec ts o f b o th  func tiona l  a n d  react ive 
in terchangeabi l i ty  ( A .3 ) . These  factors i nc luded  opac i ty  v. t ransparence,  r igidi ty v. 
flexibi l i ty, w e i g h t, s h a p e , e tc (al l  fu n c tiona l )  a n d  th e  p re fe rences  o f d ist r ibutors a n d  
cus tomers  (react ive).  A  bar r ie r  to  subst i tut ion was  i den tifie d  in  th e  n e e d  fo r  inves tment  
in  packag ing  e q u i p m e n t speci f ic  to  e a c h  m a ter ial .  N o  statist ical m e a s u r e s  o f 
subst i tutabi l i ty we re  repor ted.  (A.4,  A S ) 
Resul ts  o f Commiss i on’s Ana lvs is  
Th ree  p roduc t ma rke ts in  G e r m a n y  we re  i den tifie d  as  d o m i n a te d  by  S L W : “o p e n  to p ” 
cans  fo r  m e a t ( S L W ’s sha re  o f G e r m a n  ma rke t 7 0  - 8 0 % ) ; “o p e n  to p ” cans  fo r  f ish 
(90% ); m e ta l  l ids fo r  w ide- top  g lass  c o n ta iners  (55% ). T h e  cans  fo r  f ish fa c e d  
c o m p e titio n  f rom g lass  a n d  plast ic  c o n ta iners  b u t, b e c a u s e  o f th e  cost  o f c h a n g i n g  to  
th e s e  m a ter ials,  th e s e  we re  n o t c o m b i n e d  wi th m e ta l  cans  in  th e  ca lcu la t ion o f ma rke t 
shares.  It m a y  b e  n o te d  th a t th e  Monopo l i e s  a n d  Merge rs  Commiss i on  in  th e  Un i ted  
K i n g d o m  r e a c h e d  a  s imi lar  conc lus ion  - th e  cost  o f r e - e q u i p m e n t fo r  packag ing  c rea ted  
a  g a p  b e tween  m e ta l  a n d  g lass  c o n ta iners  wh ich  w o u l d  b e  subst i tu table in  e n d - u s e  
( M M C , pa ra .45) .  Th is  v iew was  a lso  sha red  by  th e  U K  P r ice Commiss i on  (op  cit. pa ra . 
2 .7 )  T h e  Cou r t (para .34)  exp ressed  s o m e  d o u b t a b o u t th e  sepa ra tio n  o f th e  th ree  
p roduc ts f rom near-subst i tu tes.  In  part icular ,  s o m e  d o u b t was  cast  o n  th e  iso la t ion o f 
m e ta l  l ids fo r  g lass  jars. 
B . G E O G R A P H ICAL  M A R K E T  
T h e  star t ing-point  was  th e  G e r m a n  Federa l  Repub l ic ,  s ince  th is  was  S L W ’s o w n  ma rke t. 
S u p p o r t fo r  u s e  o f th is  n a tiona l  d e fin i t ion was  p rov ided  by  th e  neg l ig ib le  leve l  o f t rade 
b e tween  G e r m a n y  a n d  o the r  c o u n tr ies - fo r  “o p e n  to p ” cans,  b o th  expor ts  a n d  impor ts  
we re  less th a n  4 %  o f c o n s u m p tio n  wi th in  G e r m a n y . A lso th e  ma rke t sha res  o f th e  ma jo r  
c o m p a n i e s  we re  w ide ly  di f ferent - S L W  p r e d o m i n a tin g  in  G e r m a n y , T D V  ( inc lud ing  
S o b e m i )  in  th e  N e the r l ands  a n d  B e l g i u m  a n d  C a r n a u d  in  France.  
In  its j u d g e m e n t, th e  Cou r t (ECJ,  p .246 )  po i n ts to  incons is tenc ies  in  th e  Commiss i on’s 
a r g u m e n ts a b o u t th e  geog raph i ca l  ma rke t, wh ich  d id  n o t exp la in  th e  low level  o f t rade.  
T h e  Cou r t fo u n d  as  “u n s u b s ta n tia te d ” a r g u m e n ts b a s e d  o n  t ranspor t  costs. A  r ead ing  o f 
the Commission’s own analysis suggests that the main reason for national dominance in 
each of the four countries - W Germany, Netherlands, Belgium and France - may be 
found in the collaboration (reported in detail) among all major would-be competitors in 
the supply of metal cans. 
Use of the framework for geographical market definition in Chapter 3 would indicate a 
wider market, because of transferability of demand (B5(a)) and also transferability of 
supply combined with similar demand conditions (B5(b)). User companies include large 
multinationals easily able to accommodate international transactions and with little or no 
national preference; the product (the metal can or metal lid) is anonymous; physical 
transport costs are low - a “profitability threshold” of between 500 and 1000 km. was 
suggested by the Commission for products with contents of less than 1 kg. If container 
producers sought to market their products in other countries they would find generally 
similar price-elasticities for their products. 
The UK Price Commission, in commenting (para 2.1) on Metal BOX’S 70% plus share of 
the UK light can market, interpreted the low levels of both imports and exports as a 
result of high cost of transport. With a significant part of the UK fruit and vegetable 
industry located near East coast ports, it is difficult to accept this interpretation. 
In this case, the absence of shipments and the wide differences in market share suggest 
national markets. The economic analysis shows no reason for such national separation 
and reinforces the suggestion that this separation may have been the result of inter- 
company agreements. A more accurate definition might have been dominance of the 
EEC market for certain metal cans by a group of enterprises, though even this could be 
contested on the grounds of potential competition (Section D of Checklist). 
Evidence regarding glass containers in the United Kingdom (MMC, p.12) shows 
significant elasticity of supply through imports at times of shortage, which confirms the 
view that the market for containers for foods and drinks has no significant national 
boundaries. 
(Section C of the framework requires no discussion with respect to this case) 
D. POTENTIAL COMPETITION 
The Court referred specifically to two elements of potential competition (1) entry into 
production of cans by food processors, and increased output and supply by existing 
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vertically integrated concerns and (2) transfer into production of cans for meat and fish 
by producers of cans currently used for fruit and vegetables, soups, drinks, etc. None 
of the companies who m ight have been able to increase supply by either of these two 
means was currently selling significant quantities of cans for meat or fish in Germany. 
The factors likely to influence such potential competition are, therefore, those listed in 
Section D.2 of the checklist at the end of Chapter 3. 
W ith regard to the development or increase of production of cans by food processors, 
the Court interpreted the existence of such vertically integrated concerns as evidence 
refuting the opinion of the Commission that there was a significant barrier to entry in 
the form  of m inimum economic scale, deterring all but the largest companies. The 
Court criticised the lack of evidence to show that the supply of cans for meat or fish 
could not be increased from  this source. Another criticism  was that the Commission had 
failed to show what characteristics of light metal cans for meat and fish distinguished 
them , in terms  of production requirements, from  other cans. In the terms  used in 
Chapter 3, what would be the barrier to transfer of capacity if the price of cans for 
meat and fish rose significantly, because of a dominant position on the part of SLW? 
There is an absence of satisfactory answers to these questions, and the geographical 
market definition is of dubious validity. 
E. PRODUCT INTERDEPENDENCE 
The demand for metal cans is derived from  that for the processed foods they contain. 
Thus canned meat and canned fish may be substitutable by fresh or frozen products. 
Although this was not discussed by the Commission or the Court of Justice, the 
exploitation of any monopoly in the supply of cans for meat and fish may be partly 
restrained by the availability of the same (and/or substitute) foods in fresh or frozen 
form . 
In order to assess the significance of such indirect competition, it would be necessary to 
know the value of p3 in Section E.l(a) of the Chapter 3 checklist - p1 and p2 are both 
close to unity. 
CONCLUSIONS ON THIS CASE 
The case is slightly unusual because, as the Commission and the Court both explicitly 
accepted, the acquisition of TDV by Continental Can was not caused by dominance of 
the German market. The Commission had to prove that Continental Can’s subsidiary in 
Germany held a dominant position in some product market(s) with protection from 
competition. The logic failed because it was based on the observed absence of 
competition rather than the reasons for its absence. These probably lay in the 
agreements between would-be competitors. 
CASE STUDY NO.2 FERRY AND HOVERCRAFT SERVICES (UK) 
Documentation (two cases of DroDosed mernerl 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission: British Rail Hovercraft-Hoverlloyd (1980- 1) 
(MMC) HC374, HMSO, London 
I I (1 I European Ferries Ltd - Sealink Ltd (1980-l) 
HC65, HMSO, London 
INTRODUCTION 
The first of these two merger proposals was between two companies operating hovercraft 
services for accompanies cars and foot passengers between Dover and Calais and Dover 
and Boulogne (British Rail Hovercraft, Seaspeed) and between Ramsgate and Calais 
(Hoverlloyd). The effect of the merger was the closure of the latter route and 
concentration of hovercraft services on the two routes from Dover. 
The second proposal was a takeover bid by European Ferries Ltd for Sealink UK, the 
maritime subsidiary of the British Railways Board; this bid was resisted by BRB 
management. 
The first proposal was allowed by the MMC on the grounds that it was necessary to 
ensure the survival of hovercraft services between England and France across the Straits 
of Dover; the second was rejected on the grounds that the combined company would 
command a dominant position, especially on these same Anglo-French sea routes. 
The analysis below looks specifically at the definition of the market in which the short 
Anglo-French ferry services are located. The case provides interesting illustrations of 
the criteria of substitutability and the assessment of potential competition. 
A. 
1. 
DEFINITION OF THE RELEVANT PRODUCT 
Starting Point 
In the case of the hovercraft merger, the narrowest definition was the market for travel 
by hovercraft between England and France which after the merger would be controlled 
completely by the merged company. 
In the EFL-Sealink case the MMC’s logic was similar to that proposed in the Chapter 3 
checklist (A.1): it identified a narrow market (short crossings by ship between England 
and France). 
2. Choice of Droducts to be considered as substitutes 
In these two cases there were two forms of possible substitution: 
(a) travel mode - ship, hovercraft, hydrofoil, air 
@I choice of route - discussed in Section B. 
In the hovercraft case (pp.28-9), the MMC reported an extensive and detailed analysis of 
competition on a spectrum of ferry and hovercraft routes ranging from Plymouth- 
Roscoff in the far west to Hull or Great Yarmouth to the Netherlands ports in the far 
east. This analysis drew on a survey carried out for the UK Department of Transport 
into the travel patterns of the occupants of 14,000 cars using cross-channel services in 
1979 and 1980. 
3. Criteria of substitutabilitv 
Functional interchangeability. 
For accompanied car and motorcycle traffic, a choice of mode was available only in the 
Anglo-French short-sea sector. This “sector” was defined by the MMC as services 
between Dover, Folkstone or Ramsgate in England and Boulogne, Calais or Dunkerque 
in France. This modal choice was (and remains) between ferry and hovercraft. 
Since some of the Anglo-French traffic could alternatively have travelled via Oostende 
or Zeebrugge (in Belgium), one might add the “Jetfoil” service between Dover and 
Oostende, for foot passengers only. Again for passengers not obliged to transfer cars, 
airline services linking origins and destinations directly could be considered. 
The MMC considered ferry and hovercraft services as functional substitutes - the shorter 
time required to cross by hovercraft gave this mode a slight advantage, reflected in a 
“premium” in the price (see below) but this was partly offset for some travellers by the 
fact that it provided less break-time. (In particular, unlike ferries, hovercraft could not 
be used to “spend a night” on the journey.) 
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For foot passengers only, Jetfoil services were functionally substitutable for those 
hovercraft or ferry passengers on the short-sea crossing for whom Dover-Oostende 
would be a convenient alternative. Air travel offered such major savings in travel time 
that its functional substitutability was lim ited. (One m ight add that if waiting time and 
airport access time are included, the saving on journeys between city centres is less 
significant.) 
Reactive interchangeability 
Passengers did consider both rival ferry services and hovercraft services as substitutes 
and compared prices with service quality, such as frequency and crossing times. The 
impact of the introduction and development of hovercraft services on ferry traffic in the 
late 1960’s and early 1970’s was quoted by the M M C  as further evidence of consumer 
reaction. 
For foot passengers between Engand and Belgium, the Jetfoil service competed not only 
with the Dover-Oostende ferry service but also with the Anglo-French short crossing, by 
ferry or hovercraft, because of coach (autocar) links between Calais or Dunkerque and 
Belgian cities. 
While aircraft provided functionally substitutable services for some foot passengers, 
business travellers in particular do not appear to regard them  as functional substitutes. 
Barriers to substitution 
There are no obvious barriers to substitution between shipping and hovercraft services. 
One factor lim iting competition between surface transport and the more expensive air 
travel is the comparatively low proportion of air travellers paying their own fares. 
4. m  ili 
Although the M M C  uses the term  “high cross elasticity of demand” (Hovercraft report, 
p.4) in describing competition, it does not report any statistical estimation of cross- 
elasticity. W ithout specific data collection it would not be possible to calculate either 
cross-price elasticity or substitution elasticity. 
There is some potential for comparison of price movements, including the Stigler- 
Sherwin and Horowitz tests (A.5). Relevant data could be obtained from  tariff 
information published annually.* The incomplete evidence now available suggests 
parallel price changes. 
Similarity in prices and product tailoring 
In 1980, market shares of accompanied tourist vehicle traffic on the Anglo-French 
short-sea routes (“French straits”) were European Ferries 36%; Sealink 27%; Hoverlloyd 
15%; Seaspeed 14%. 
An examination of the 1986 tariff structures of European Ferries, Sealink and the 
merged Hovercraft company, Hoverspeed, shows remarkable similarities. Each company 
has four basic tariff grades for Dover-Calais and Dover-Boulogne (B,C,D,E) and these 
grades are applied at almost identical times of the year and times of day. Within each 
grade the fares of European Ferries and Sealink are virtually identical; those of 
Hoverspeed are about 10% higher - BRHL (Seaspeed) told the MMC that this premium 
was made possible by the difference in “service quality” (Hovercraft report, p.4). This 
premium is consistent with the emphasis placed in speed in the advertising of hovercraft 
services. The MMC, however, believed that this premium did not invalidate the 
substitutability of hovercraft and ferry services, because a high cross-price elasticity 
remained. (ibid.) 
Both ferry companies and Hoverspeed offer very similar “bargain deal” arrangements: 
five-day mini-break, 60-hour excursions and day-trips for foot passengers. The tariff 
structure of Jetfoil is based on that for Dover-Oostende ship crossing (f6 supplement for 
each crossing). The MMC found that the Belgian RMT aimed to match its car ferry 
tariffs on the Dover-Oostende route to those of the much shorter French straits 
crossings. For foot passengers, the fares on the Belgian ferries differ little from those 
on the Dover-Calais route, even though the latter is one-third the distance. 
From the evidence presented in the MMC’s reports, it seems probable that prices and 
tariff structures 
instances where 
operators, in the 
competitors has 
arrangement. 
were due to competition rather than collusion. The MMC reported 
new bargain fares had been introduced by one of the competing 
belief that this particular offer would increase the total market. Other 
been obliged, by competitive pressure, to offer a similar bargain 
* It has proved difficult to obtain comprehensive retrospective data for this study but 
these would probably be supplied in full in response to an official request. 
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T h e  sepa ra tio n  o f a i r  t ravel  is e m p h a s i s e d  by  th e  di f ferent tariff structures, dea l s  a n d  
adver t is ing.  A ir fa res  a re  lower  fo r  w e e k - e n d  t ravel  in  d i rect  c o n trast to  fer r ies  a n d  
hovercraf t  a n d  th e  w in te r -summer  var ia t ion is a l so  th e  reverse  o f th a t app l y ing  to  s e a  
cross ings.  
5 . D e fin i t ion o f Re levan t P roduct  (Mode )  
T h e  M M C  conc luded  th a t o n  th e  shor t  Ang lo -F rench  s e a  routes  hovercraf t  a n d  sh ips  
o p e r a te d  in  th e  s a m e  p roduc t ma rke t; fo r  fo o t passenge rs  to  B e l g i u m  th e  hydrofo i l  
(Jetfoi l)  serv ice was  a  subst i tute b u t th e s e  rep resen ted  on ly  a  smal l  p ropor t ion  o f th e  
ma rke t. A ir t ravel  was  n o t i nc luded  in  th e  p roduc t ma rke t, b e c a u s e  it app l i ed  on ly  to  
fo o t passenge rs  a n d  a p p e a l e d  to  a  di f ferent g r o u p  o f passenge rs  (bus inessmen) .  T h e  
M M C  d id  state, howeve r , th a t a i r  fa res  ac ted  as  “a n  u p p e r  lim it fo r  th e  fer ry  o p e r a tors*  
p r ic ing  po l ic ies” (EFL-Sea l i nk  report ,  p .45) .  In  v iew o f th e  g a p  b e tween  th e  fares,  it is 
ha rd  to  interpret  th is  last c o m m e n t. 
B . G E O G R A P H ICAL  M A R K E T  
1 . S tar t ing P o i n t 
T h e  p roduc t ma rke t was  d e fin e d  as  fer ry  a n d  hovercraf t  serv ices a n d  th e  nar rowest  
d e fin i t ion fo r  s tudy o f th e  geog raph i ca l  ma rke t m u s t b e  th e  serv ices l ink ing Dover ,  
Fo lks tone o r  R a m s g a te  wi th Cala is ,  B o u l o g n e  o r  D u n k e r q u e  ( the “shor t  c ross ing  sector”). 
Serv ices  o n  th e s e  routes  c o m p e te  in tense ly  wi th e a c h  o ther .  
2 . Cho i ce  o f o the r  sectors fo r  inc lus ion  
Th is  was  easy  in  th is  case  b e c a u s e  o f in fo rmat ion  o n  routes  ava i lab le  a n d  serv ice qual i ty.  
T h e  cho ice  o f rou te  is in f luenced  by  or ig ins  a n d  d e s tin a tio n s  o f t ravel  a n d  by  th e  
impor tance  o f tim e . In fo r m a tio n  o n  th e s e  factors was  ava i lab le  f rom th e  D .Tp. survey.  
O n e  factor  wh ich  m a y  in f luence compar i son  o f sectors is th a t fo r  ma jo r  c o n u r b a tio n s  in  
th e  Un i ted  K i n g d o m , th e  K e n t por ts  a re  e n  rou te  fo r  m o s t c o n tin e n ta l  d e s tin a tio n s , 
whe reas  th e  por ts  in  ‘E a s t Ang l i a  o r  fur ther  wes t a l o n g  th e  C h a n n e l  coast  requ i re  s o m e  
d ivers ion.  
For  m a n y  passenge rs  in  th e  shor t -c ross ing sector,  a l ternat ives w o u l d  m e a n  signi f icant ly 
l onge r  journeys.  S u b s titu tes  w o u l d  b e  cons ide red  by  th o s e  passenge rs  t ravel l ing to /fro m  
Routes and sectors: Anglo-Continental Services 
\ 
4 
&h\ 
Immingl~am l w 
h 
Hook of Holland 
Yushino 
Calais 
Boulogne 
Key 
Western Channel 
M id Channel * v 
Anglo-French Short Sea 
Belgian Straits 
North Sea 
places further north in Europe, in Belgium, Netherlands or Northern Germany. Another 
group who would be likely to consider substitute services are passengers travelling to and 
from places in the western half of France, for whom routes further west in the channel 
would be appropriate (see map). 
3. Factual Evidence 
Some evidence on prices has been presented in Section A. It is interesting to compare 
the current (1986) fares between Dover and Calais with those between Dover and 
Oostende and Newhaven and Dieppe. The distance involved on each of the latter two 
services is approximately three times that between Dover and Calais. On the Dover- 
Oostende service the fares are virtually identical with those on the Dover-Calais. On the 
Newhaven-Dieppe service the fares are significantly higher. This evidence confirms the 
conclusion of the MMC that the relevant geographical market was the short-sea crossing 
sector plus Belgian services out of Dover. 
One slight problem with this definition is that the overlap between the short-sea crossing 
sector and Belgian routes applies only to those passengers wishing to travel via Belgium. 
A small but significant price increase on the short-sea routes would have a smaller effect 
on passenger traffic on those routes than the corresponding effect of a price increase 
between Dover-Oostende. For this reason, the geographical market associated with a 
dominant position in the short-sea crossing sector might well be defined as that sector 
only. 
This last conclusion illustrates the theoretical point made by the German 
Monopolkommission, that y may be considered as a substitute for x when a change in 
the price of y has a substantial effect on the change in demand for x (not vice versa). 
Thus, the short-sea crossing is a substitute for the Dover-Oostende service but the latter 
is not a substitute for the short-sea crossing. 
(Section C, Definition of Relevant Market Sales, is not an issue in this case.) 
D. DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF POTENTIAL SUPPLY 
1. Potential SUDD~Y from comoanies alreadv selling relevant Droducts within the 
relevant neoaraDhica1 market 
In 1980, at the time of the proposed merger 
increase in capacity and capacity utilisation 
30-35%. The existence of this excess capa’ 
merger proposals. 
., a fall in traffic had coincided with a large 
in the short-sea crossing sector had fallen to 
city was one of the specific reasons for the 
Another element of potential supply is transferable capacity. Both European Ferries and 
Sealink as well as P & 0 (the other company in this sector at the time) operate ships on 
a number of routes outside the relevant market and also own freight only ships which 
could be converted. 
“One of the more important developments during the 
1970’s on the Anglo-Continental routes has been the 
development of new services, partly by the entry of new 
competitors, and partly by existing competitors opening 
additional services.” 
2. 
(EFL-Sealink report, p.54) 
Potential SUDD~V from companies not currentlv active in this market 
(a) Access to ports is the principal barrier to entry. The right of entry to a port is 
legally established and the owner or operator of a port may not refuse access to any 
shipping line prepared to pay harbour dues. However, port authorities may be granted 
powers to limit the use of a particular berth (section of quay) to specified shipping 
companies. Also the right of entry is subject to existing user rights and a new entrant 
may be able to obtain less attractive harbour facilities and timings (slot cycle). Sealink 
owned part of the port facilities at Dover which gave it control over slot cycles. 
To overcome this problem a shipping company new to a particular sector may need to 
persuade port authorities to invest in new capacity, which may entail long-term financial 
guarantees from the shipping company. These guarantees would prove a burden in the 
event of subsequent withdrawal, ie they would be sunk-costs (EFL-Sealink report, p.56). 
@I Capital requirements other than those associated with harbour facilities are less 
likely to act as a barrier to entry. Except occasionally in a literal sense, investment in 
ships is rarely a sunk-cost, because these can be transferred to other routes. 
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(cl Minimum scale of entry may be required for commercial rather than technical 
reasons. In order to make a route attractive, shipping may need to operate a sufficient 
frequency of sailings to offer choice to passengers. 
Conclusion on Potential Competition 
The nature of the barriers indicates strongly that competition is most likely to come 
from companies already within the relevant market or adjacent to it. If the merger 
between Sealink and European Ferries had been allowed, this would have given the 
combined group a dominant position in the ferry operation and, together with the 
merged hovercraft operator, it would have formed an effective duopoly. However, if 
the merged company had acted to reduce excess capacity by limiting the number of 
sailings, this would have reduced the principal barrier to potential competition from 
other companies. One potential competitor (Bell Lines) expressed the view that 
excessively high pricing by a merged company would quickly be followed by new entry 
into the market as long as port capacity was available (EFL-Sealink report, p.71). 
Another potential rival, Brittany Ferries, took a similar view and considered that the 
merger would be of net benefit provided that the merged company were not allowed to 
control ports and thereby restrict potential competition. 
The Monopolies and Mergers Commission recommended that the merger should not be 
allowed mainly on the grounds that the merged company would be able to control access 
to ports. 
Section E, dealing with product interdependence, is not pertinent to this case. 
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CASE STUDY N0.3: CAT AND DOG FOODS (UK CASE) 
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Documentation 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission: Cat and Dog Foods (July 1977) 
WMC) HC447, HMSO, London 
INTRODUCTION 
This case resulted from a reference to the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission of 
the United Kingdom sales of prepared food for dogs and cats. About 50% was supplied 
by Pedigree Petfoods, a division of Mars Ltd (a wholly owned subsidiary of Mars Inc 
(USA)); a further 30% was supplied by Spillers. The case illustrates problems of 
product definition and emphasises the importance of the restraining influence of 
potential competition. 
A. DEFINITION OF THE RELEVANT PRODUCT 
The generic description “cat and dog foods” covers a wide variety of different products. 
It would clearly be risky to assume that every cat or dog would regard with equal favour 
every product included within the group. However, the purchasing decision and the 
system of distribution is fairly consistent across the range and it was therefore 
reasonable for the MMC to regard the group as a single product at the outset (Section 
A.1 of Chapter 3). 
The product range includes canned, semi-moist and rehydratable foods, biscuits and 
meal and a variety of other products. 
Possible substitutes would include fresh meat and fish, household scraps and milk. 
Pedigree Petfoods and the MMC calculated that specially prepared foods accounted for 
46% of the diet of British cats and dogs in 1975, compared with only 25% in 1960. 
Since there was an estimated 48% increase in the numbers of both cats and dogs during 
this 15 year period and an increase in prices, the total retail sales value of prepared 
foods rose five-fold over the 15 years. 
The reasons for the higher proportion of prepared foods include their convenience (at a 
time when more pet owners were going out to work); the declining availability of 
household scraps because people were eating more convenience foods; heavy advertising 
which was facilitated by the advent of commercial television in 1955; finally efficient 
marketing and distribution by the companies concerned. 
In terms of functional substitutability prepared foods enjoy significant advantages. 
They can be bought in a wider range of shops than fresh foods, they are more easily 
stored and they need no cooking. 
Reactive substitutability is slightly ambiguous. Who is the final consumer? Apparently 
some dogs and more particularly cats are very unwilling to switch between products. 
There is a significant gap in substitution between prepared pet foods and the less 
expensive alternatives, but both major manufacturers and the MMC itself were satisfied 
that competition from these alternatives acted as a restraint upon prices which could be 
charged for prepared pet foods. 
One may perhaps consider the addictions of particular pets as a barrier to short-term 
substitution. In the longer-term, there can be little doubt that a significant increase in 
the price of prepared foods would lead to declining sales. The barrier to substitution is 
probably increased by the continued advertising of pet foods (much of it intended to 
maintain a market share) in contrast with the complete absence of any advertising of the 
alternatives. 
B. GEOGRAPHICAL MARKET 
The starting point for the analysis (B.2) was pre-defined as the United Kingdom. The 
MMC report contains very little information about overseas trade, either existing or 
potential. Both companies have some multinationality but international shipments appear 
to be low. 
Examining the geographical market using Section B of the framework, it is easy to 
recognise that the final consumer demand is not transferable, that the structure of the 
industry does not approach perfect competition at EEC level and that demand conditions 
are unlikely to be similar in different countries (partly because of the relative supply of 
scraps etc). International trade is likely to be limited also by the low value to volume 
ratio. 
Although the information contained in the MMC report is rather limited, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that it was correct in not widening the geographical market 
beyond the United Kingdom. 
m. 
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C. RELEVANT MARKET SALES 
The M M C  report contains information both on the total sales of prepared cat and dog 
foods and also on the total value of products given to cats and dogs for consumption. 
The commercial interests of Mars and Spillers in this area have led them  to devote 
considerable resources to monitoring the market and the case presents an unexpected 
abundance of relevant statistical information. 
D. POTENTIAL COMPETITION 
1. Potential SUDD~V from  firms  alreadv selling the relevant Droduct 
The M M C  report does not discuss capacity utilisation and one must assume that the 
leading companies were operating at or near full capacity. This would be consistent 
with the rapid growth of the market which had preceded the M M C  investigation. 
Transferable capacity is significant. Both of the major suppliers and some of the more 
recent entrants (Quaker and Carnation) are also producers of food for human 
consumption and all these companies have “massive resources available” (p.43) which 
could be directed towards the processing, marketing and distribution of pet foods. 
2. potential SuDD~ieS from COmDanieS not sel)ina the relevant broduct 
,- 
Barriers to entry are mainly of a commercial type. They are significant but could be 
overcome by companies producing human food. Among barriers to entry are the 
following:- 
(a) Brand loyalties created by heavy advertising. Existing producers of branded 
foods for human consumption could transfer their goodwill and reputation to pet 
foods if they were to enter this market. This explains the successful entry of 
Quaker and Carnation. 
@ I Access to widespread distribution outlets. Again it would be necessary to enter 
on a significant scale in order to cover the variety of outlets but companies 
producing branded foods for human consumption would already be present in the 
majority of these outlets. 
The MMC concluded that smaller suppliers would face disadvantages in trying to enter 
the grocery trade but that these were not insurmountable. Such smaller concerns could 
confine their activities to a particular locality or could enter the significant market in 
supplies to multiple retailers for sale under those retailers “own brand” labels. 
(Section E is not relevant to this case.) 
CONCLUSION 
This is a market dominated by two enterprises. Analysis of substitutability does indicate 
a “gap” in substitution in the short-term, though in the longer-term a significant increase 
in prices would cause a switch to cheaper alternatives available. More significantly, the 
MMC concluded that this market was highly vulnerable to potential competition 
(“contestable” in the more recent economic terminology), especially because of potential 
entry by general food manufacturers. 
The MMC conclusion was that Pedigree and Spillers did hold a dominant position in the 
market relevant to the reference but that this dominant position could not be abused and 
was therefore not relevant to the aims and objectives of UK legislation concerned with 
competition policy. 
CASE STUDY N0.4: COMMERCIAL SOLVENTS CORPORATION (EEC CASE) 
-. 
Documentation 
Commission of the EC: 
European Court of Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
Decision (14 December 1972) in case of 
Zoja v. CSC, Journal Officiel (French 
language) 1972, L299, pp.51 -58. 
Judgement on appeal (6 March 1974) in 
cases 6 and 7/73, European Court Record 
1974, pp.223-75. 
At the time of the case (1970-l) the Commercial Solvents Corporation (CSC) of the USA 
enjoyed an effective world monopoly of products derived from the nitrification of 
paraffins, including nitropropane from which is derived aminobutanol. The last is an 
essential raw material for the production of ethambutol, used in anti-tuberculosis drugs. 
In 1962 CSC acquired a majority holding of Istituto Chemioterapico Italian0 (ICI), 
Milan, which then became the sole direct distributor of CSC’s products in the EEC. 
From 1966 onwards the main customer of ICI for aminobutanol was the Laboratorio 
Chimico Farmaceutico Georgio Zoja (“Zoja”) which manufactured ethambutol and 
exported it to France and Germany and to countries outside the EEC. In 1968 CSC 
decided to extend its activities in Europe forwards to the manufacture of ethambutol and 
ethambutol-specialities. After unsuccessful negotiations for a merger with Zoja, ICI 
began this manufacturing at the beginning of 1970. At the same time, CSC decided to 
discontinue the supply of nitropropane and aminobutanol to customers in the EEC. 
Zoja had a contract for supplies from ICI but following a substantial price rise by ICI at 
a time when stocks of aminobutanol held by independents were high, it cancelled its 
order. When the alternative supplies were exhausted, Zoja found that neither ICI nor 
other distributors outside Europe were prepared to sell it any of the raw material, a 
consequence of CSc’s policy, 
The Commission decided that CSC’s refusal to supply constituted an abuse of its (world 
wide) dominant position over the market for nitropropane and aminobutanol. This 
decision was upheld by the Court of Justice. 
A. DEFINITION OF THE RELEVANT PRODUCT 
The Starting. Point (A.]) 
This was defined by the alleged abuse. Unless CSC held a dominant position in the 
supply of an essential material with no easy substitute, its refusal to supply would be of 
no consequence to Zoja. The starting-point was nitro-propane, from which 
aminobutanol can easily but (according to Zoja) exclusively be derived. 
Substitutes? 
CSC suggested a number of substitutable methods of producing aminobutanol other than 
from nitropropane and also of producing nitropropane by methods other than those used 
by CSC (A.2). The technical evidence on this issue was conflicting - the Court (p.247- 
8) appears to have decided that, in both respects, the methods described were still 
mainly experimental and not economic on a commercial scale. Absence of products 
funtlonally interchangeable (A.3) confirms that nitropropane was the relevant product. 
B. GEOGRAPHICAL MARKET 
This was not an issue in this case because of CSC’s world-wide dominance of the supply 
of the relevant product. In seeking alternative supplies, after ICI’s refusal in 1971, Zoja 
contacted possible sources world-wide (Commission, p.53) suggesting free transferability 
of demand. If .other suppliers had existed elsewhere in the world, Zoja would have 
purchased from them. Aminobutanol has a high value:weight ratio - in 1970 about $3 
per kg. (in today’s prices about 11 ecu); its identity is anonymous. It would therefore 
seem reasonable to define the geographical market as at least the entire EEC and 
possibly all countries not affected by trade restrictions. 
(Section C of the framework was not at issue) 
-. 
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D. POTENTIAL COMPETITION 
The patents relating to the production methods used by CSC had expired but the 
Commission (p.51) listed other barriers to entry to the production of nitropropane:- 
the necessity for long and costly research to obtain know-how; 
the high cost and technical complexity of installations 
the difficulty of finding new outlets for the two other products derived from the 
nitration of paraffin. 
This aspect was not analysed at any length nor was it discussed before the Court. Only 
the last of the three is a commercial barrier; one may have expected to read some 
evidence about how far the first two were insuperable for a large entrant. The new 
enterprise might have been able to attract established researchers from the incumbent 
monopolist; the extent to which expenditure on the fixed assets would be “sunk cost” 
depends on the degree to which their design is specific and also on the minimum scale 
of activity. One reason why these issues may not have been discussed is the relatively 
small size of Zoja compared with CSC. Nevertheless, if CSC’s ultimate goal were to 
maximise profits by eliminating competitors via vertical integration, other companies 
bigger than CSC, with substantial chemical know-how and experience might have 
considered entry. 
E. PRODUCT INTERDEPENDENCE 
Nitropropane and the derivative aminobutanol are both intermediate products; CSC 
argued in its appeal that a dominant position in the supply of nitropropane could not be 
abused to the detriment of the ultimate consumer because of competition at the level of 
final products. Ethambutol faced competition from other drugs in the treatment of 
tuberculosis. 
This argument implies that the decision by CSC to develop its own manufacture of 
ethambutol and to eliminate competition from Zoja by refusing to supply to it the 
essential raw material was not an abuse because the consumer was unaffected. The 
market for nitropropane for use in ethambutol was not relevant to competition policy 
because dominance of that market could not be exploited to the detriment of the 
ultimate consumer.* 
* It is surprising in this connection that the appellants do not appear to have cited 
Article 86(b), which (in its English version) specifically condemns “limiting production, 
markets or technical development lo the prejudice of cowmers” (author’s italics). 
There appears to have been a difference between the response of the Commission to this 
argument and that of the Court. The Commission (CEC p.55) sought to refute it by 
showing that, although ethambutol was not the single largest anti-tubercular drug, the 
various treatments for the disease were complementary rather than competitive. In other 
words, abuse of dominance in the intermediate product market was not restrained by 
competition in that of the final product. 
In its judgement the Court seems to have rejected the principle that abuse must affect 
the final consumer:- 
“An undertaking being in a dominant position as regards 
the production of raw material and therefore able to 
control the supply to manufacturers of derivatives, cannot, 
just because it decides to start manufacturing these 
derivatives (in competition with its former customers), act 
in such a way as to eliminate their competition, which, in 
the case in question, would amount to eliminating one of 
the principal manufacturers of ethambutol in the Common 
Market.” 
(ECJ, pp.250- 1) 
Fox (1983) is among critics of this decision. She stated : 
“Commercial Solvetzts is a case of internal vertical 
integration. The decision to vertically integrate did not, as 
the Court said, eliminate a competitor; it substituted one 
competitor for another.” 
CONCLUSION ON APPLJCATlON OF FRAMEWORK TO THIS CASE 
The logic set out in the Commission’s decision seems to correspond closely to that in the 
framework set out in Chapter 3. It defined the relevant product from the nature of the 
abuse; considered functional substitutes and found that there was no commerical 
alternative (hence no need to consider reactive substitutability or substitution barriers); 
looked at barriers to entry and decided that these were substantial, so that potential 
competition was limited; finally it assessed the degree of competition for the final 
product in which the relevant product was used. The question which remains 
unanswered is what the Commission’s decision would have been if it had found intense 
competition between ethambutol and other anti-tubercular drugs. 
The analysis of this case would not be significantly assisted by the introduction of the 
concept of dependency. Zoja was dependent upon CSC, which (in the terminology of 
Glais, 1983 and 1985) was a parlenaire obligatoire, but this dependence resulted entirely 
from CSC’s monopoly of the supply of nitropropane. It applied to any purchaser of 
nitropropane. The degree of dependence can be assessed only by analysis of possible 
substitution and potential competition. Its importance for competition policy can be 
measured only when the degree of competition in the “downstream” end-use market is 
considered. The adoption of the partenaire obligatoire approach in this case would 
require use of the analytical framework in full. 
CASE STUDY N0.5: HUGIN v. LIPTON (EEC CASE) 
I- 
Documentation 
Commission of the EC: Decision (8 Dec. 1977), 
(CEC) Official Journal 1978, L22 (pp.23-35) 
European Court of Justice: 
NJ) 
Judgement on appeal (31 May 1979) in 
case 22/78, European Court Record 1979, 
pp. 1869- 1922. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case casts further light on the question whether dominance in a market defined in 
terms of demand substitutes can be compensated by competition in a wider, composite 
market to the extent that it cannot be abused. 
Hugin AB is a Swedish manufacturer of cash registers, wholly owned by the Swedish 
consumers’ cooperative organisation. At the time of the case it sold its product via 
subsidiaries or appointed distributors in EEC member countries. The shares of the 
market for new cash registers enjoyed by major suppliers in the United Kingdom in the 
mid-1970’s were estimated by the Commission (CEC, p.25) as follows:- 
National Cash Register (USA) 
Sweda (USA) 
Gross (UK) 
Hugin (Sweden) 
Anka (Germany) 
Others 
40 
18 
16 
13 
4 
2 
IQ!2 
Liptons Ltd is a London company which rents, services, reconditions and sells cash 
registers from a wide range of manufacturers. From the late 1950’s to 1969 Lipton was 
able to purchase spare parts for the repair of Hugin machines from the appointed UK 
importer of Hugin cash registers, a subsidiary of the UK Cooperative Wholesale Society. 
Under an agreement with this latter company, Lipton was appointed in 1969 as main 
agent for the sale of Hugin cash registers in the UK with rights to service and repair. 
This arrangement lasted until after the introduction of decimal currency in 1971, which 
caused a boom in this market. 
Early in 1972 Lipton’s agency was terminated and later in the same year Hugin refused 
to supply either machines or spare parts to Lipton’s (or to any other UK company), at 
wholesale prices, reserving this business to a new wholly owned subsidiary. The 
company explained that this was part of its policy of maintaining quality and providing 
its own comprehensive repair and maintenance service. 
The effect of the change in Hugin’s policy (of which Lipton had been forewarned) was 
a sharp (but temporary) drop in Lipton’s turnover, which caused the latter company to 
complain that Hugin’s policy, applied throughout the EEC, contravened Article 86. 
A. DEFINITION OF THE RELEVANT PRODUCT 
1. Startina Point 
The narrowest definition would be an individual spare part for a Hugin cash register. 
This would mean 5,000 separate markets. It was suggested in Section A of Chapter 3 
above that in such circumstances, where there is a group of variants of a product with 
common demand and supply conditions, all used for the same purpose, the group may 
generally be taken as the relevant product. This step was adopted by the Commission 
which defined the market as “Hugin spare parts required by independent undertakings”. 
This definition is based on the abuse - refusal to supply spare parts to independent 
undertakings specialising in the maintenance, repair and reconditioning of cash registers, 
who require them for their business. 
2. Substitutability 
There were no substitutes - components of cash registers of other manufacturers were 
not interchangeable with those of Hugin. The manufacturers argued that it did not have 
a 100% control over the supply of its own spare parts because of the possibility of 
dismantling used machines (cannibalisation). The Commission considered that this 
.- 
source of supply was insignificant; the effects of the withdrawal of supplies on Lipton’s 
turnover was evidence of the effective dominance of the market by Hugin. 
3. A comment on the definition adooted 
The definition of the relevant product with specific reference to a group of customers 
(independent undertakings) caused certain difficulties in the subsequent analysis - see 
Sections C and D below. Such a distinction may be useful, as well as valid, for 
definition of a sub-market, especially where some discrimination is involved. However, 
in this case the definition described a non-existent market. Hugin did not supply spare 
parts to independent undertakings. The analysis would have been easier if the relevant 
product had been defined simply as Hugin spare parts and the abuse the refusal to 
SUPPlY these to independent undertakings. 
B. GEOGRAPHICAL MARKET 
There was a difference of view between the Commission and the Court about the 
geographical market and Hugin’s appeal was upheld on the grounds that its conduct in 
refusing to supply spare parts could not affect trade between member countries of the 
EEC. 
The Commission’s view (CEC, p.32) was that the alleged abuse of a dominant position 
by Hugin did affect trade between member countries. Hugin’s policy of refusal to 
supply spare parts applied Community-wide; subsidiaries and appointed distributors in 
member states were explicitly prohibited by Hugin from selling spare parts anywhere, 
including export customers. Moreover, Lipton had actively tried to obtain supplies via 
other member countries. 
The Court (ECJ, pp.1898-1900) defined the geographical market as the United Kingdom. 
Part of its reasoning for doing so seems to be based on confusion about the definition of 
the product. Paragraph 19 of its judgement (ECJ, p.1899) stated:- 
“It is established that the centre of Lipton’s activities is the 
London region and that, in any event, its commercial 
activities have never extended beyond the United 
Kingdom.” 
(ECJ, p. 1899) 
So the market in which Lipton was competing was Greater London or, at most, Great 
Britain. This was not, however, the relevant geographical market for the supply of spare 
parts, but that for repair and reconditioning of cash machines. In the words of Chapter 
3, the geographical market should be based on “the source of power for the abuse” (B.2). 
In this case Hugin’s power was world-wide and certainly covered the EEC. 
The second part of the Court’s reasoning is less easy to challenge but is based on a 
hypothetical argument: if Hugin allowed resale of spare parts between member countries 
its refusal to supply anyone but its appointed agents would be inoperable and would be 
discontinued. If there were no refusal to supply, there would still be no trade between 
member countries since each would buy directly from Sweden. Thus the ban on intra- 
EEC trade did not prevent trade which would otherwise have taken place. 
The validity of this argument lies outside the terms of reference of this analysis. Under 
the framework of Chapter 3, the geographical market would include all areas within 
which Lipton would have been willing to purchase the relevant product if it had been 
allowed to do so (“transferability of demand”). Since it tried throughout the EEC then 
the Community could be regarded as the relevant geographical market. 
C. MEASUREMENT OF RELEVANT MARKET SALES 
This aspect was not analysed in any detail by the Commission or before the Court but is 
quite important in this case. Some difficulty was created by the inclusion of a customer 
group (“independent undertakings”) in the product definition. In 1975, Hugin’s turnover 
from the sale of spare parts world-wide was estimated by the Commission at S Kr. 7 
million out of total turnover of S Kr. 246 million. In the UK the respective figures 
were S Kr. 0.7/22.0 millions (CEC, p.24). 
However, it is not clear how these estimates take account of transfer pricing between 
companies within the Hugin group. Of Hugin’s total UK turnover of S Kr. 22.0 million, 
S Kr. 7.5 million (35%) was derived from maintenance services. (ibid.) It must be 
presumed that a substantial part of this was accounted for by spare parts - the sales 
figure of S Kr. 0.7 millions for spare parts might relate only to those parts sold directly 
to customers without maintenance contracts which were also easy to fit (see ECJ, 
p.1881). Spare parts for customers with maintenance contracts were supplied “free of 
charge”. Some estimates of the total size of the relevant market, if this were defined so 
as to relate to spare parts for Hugin cash registers throughout the EEC, could be derived 
from the total turnover from maintenance and repair within the wider area. 
D. POTENTIAL COMPETITION 
Hugin has exclusive rights over most components (ECJ, p.1905) and (though there was 
some doubt about this) may also have enjoyed protection from copy manufacturing in 
the United Kingdom because of the Design Copy Act 1968. Apart from the legal risks, 
there would also be disadvantages to a new entrant from Hugin’s lead in know-how and 
its ability to modify machines. Production would also be less economic because of the 
small scale of operation compared with that of the original equipment producer. Hugin’s 
monopoly in spare parts for its own machines was not regarded as contestable by the 
Commission, or by the Advocate-General (ECJ, pp.1906-7). 
E. PRODUCT INTERDEPENDENCE 
Lipton was able to survive without handling Hugin’s machines and is still trading in the 
rent, repair and sale of cash registers (used and new) in 1986. However, if every major 
producer had adopted Hugin’s policy of undertaking all maintenance and repair of cash 
registers originally produced by it, companies such as Lipton would have been forced 
out of business. This would have given each cash register supplier a monopoly in the 
servicing of its own machines. 
Product interdependence was the most disputed aspect of this case. Hugin argued that 
neither the supply of spare parts nor the provision of maintenance services could be 
regarded as a market separate from that for cash registers as a whole. The provision of 
a reliable maintenance service, at competitive prices, was an essential parameter of 
competition in the market for cash registers; the quality and cost of maintenance was 
one of the criteria taken into account by customers when choosing cash registers. The 
dominant positions held by Hugin in the supply of spare parts and, consequently, in the 
repair, maintenance and reconditioning of Hugin’s machines could not be abused to the 
detriment of the consumer, who would turn to other machines. 
The Court did not pronounce on this issue, because its judgement that the alleged abuse 
did not affect trade between EEC-member countries made it unnecessary to do so. In 
countering Hugin’s argument, the Commission and the Advocate-General (ECJ, p.1908) 
quote the fact that spare parts sales accounted for only 3% of Hugin’s UK turnover as 
evidence that spare parts purchases amounted on average to only 3 per cent of the cost 
of owning a Hugin cash register over its total life. The logic of Section E.l of the 
framework in Chapter 3 reflects the argument of the Commission (p3 = 0.03). In this 
current analysis of the case, the Commission’s view is questioned only on grounds of fact 
- is the figure of 3% correct. 7 (See Section C above.) A second figure provided by the 
Commission before the Court was the minimum ratio of 18 to 1 between the price of a 
new cash register and the annual charge for maintenance. (ECJ, p.1879.) If this figure 
was correct, then the Commission’s view that a dominant position in the supply of spare 
parts could be exploited with negligible effect on the customer’s choice of new cash 
registers would be consistent with our framework. 
It is unfortunate that the Commission’s factual evidence should have related to 1975 in 
the United Kingdom, for two reasons. First, 1975 was a year of recession following the 
oil price increase and the introduction of anti-inflation policies; secondly, the UK 
market for cash registers had been disturbed by the change to decimal currency in 1971. 
In order to obtain a more reliable estimate of the relative importance to Hugin of new 
machine sales, repair and maintenance and spare parts, it would have been necessary to 
use average figures for a number of years. 
Although the facts are uncertain, the Commission does appear to have followed fairly 
closely, in this case, a logical framework very similar to that set out in Chapter 3. 
WAS DEFINITION OF THE MARKET NECESSARY IN THIS CASE? 
The Commission’s approach to relevant market definition in this case has been criticised 
from two different angles by Glais and Laurent (1983) and Fox (1983). 
Glais and Laurent argued that the definition was contrived UnneCeSSarilY in order to 
impose an inappropriate rigid methodology. The concept of partenaire obligatoire was 
sufficient to demonstrate the dominance - dependence relationship between Hugin and 
Lipton (op. cit., p.289). 
Their argument may be challenged. It may be true that in 1970- 1 the sale and 
maintenance of Hugin machines accounted for 89% of Lipton’s turnover (CEC, p.26), 
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th a t s ince  its a p p o i n tm e n t as  H u g i n ’s m a i n  a g e n t it h a d  r e d u c e d  o the r  activit ies, th a t 
t ransfer  to  o the r  mach ines  w o u l d  b e  diff icult b e c a u s e  o the r  cash  regis ter  c o m p a n i e s  h a d  
the i r  o w n  dist r ibutors a n d  L ip ton  h a d  b e c o m e  specia l is t  in  serv ic ing H u g i n  mach ines . 
Howeve r , poss ib ly  b e c a u s e  o f H u g i n ’s m o d e s t ( 13% ) sha re  o f th e  U K  ma rke t, L ip ton  was  
ab le  to  fin d  o the r  bus iness .  It d id  surv ive - H u g i n  w ’ds  n o t a  p a r tena i r e  ob l igato i re .  
A lth o u g h  th e  re la t ionsh ip  b e tween  th e  two c o m p a n i e s  is a n  in terest ing aspec t o f th is  
case,  a n  ana lys is  b a s e d  exc lus ive ly  o n  th e  d e p e n d e n c e  (a l leged)  o f L ip ton  o n  H u g i n  
m ight  h a v e  m issed th e  m a i n  issues.  ( I ndeed  it is poss ib le  th a t th e  focuss ing  o f a tte n tio n  
o n  L ip ton  l ed  to  th e  Cou r t’s d e fin i t ion o f th e  geog raph i ca l  ma rke t, he re  cons ide red  
m istaken).  B y  w i thho ld ing  supp l ies  o f spa re  parts,  H u g i n  was  ab le  to  e l im ina te  
c o m p e titio n  in  th e  m a i n te n a n c e  o f its o w n  mach ines  - it u s e d  d o m i n a n c e  ove r  o n e  
“ma rke t” to  es tab l ish  d o m i n a n c e  ove r  a n o ther .  T h a t L ip ton  surv ived by  deve lop ing  o the r  
bus iness  is i m m a ter ia l  to  th e  i ssued  ra ised  fo r  pub l i c  pol icy.  O w n e r s  o f H u g i n  cash  
regis ters cou ld  g e t m a i n te n a n c e  on ly  f rom H u g i n . 
Fox’s crit icism  was  th a t th e  ma rke t d e fin e d  by  th e  Commiss i on  was  on ly  par t  o f a  w ide r  
ma rke t - th e  supp ly  o f cash  registers.  Th is  crit icism  a lso  a p p e a r s  unjust i f ied.  T h e  
analy t ica l  a p p r o a c h  a d o p te d  by  th e  Commiss i on  (essent ia l ly  equ iva len t  to  th e  f ramework  
o f C h a p te r  3 )  correct ly i den tifie d  th e  sou rce  o f H ig in’s p o w e r  (supp ly  o f spa re  parts)  
a n d , us ing  th e  rat io o f m a i n te n a n c e  to  pu rchase  costs o f cash  registers,  expl ic i t ly assessed  
w h e the r  c o m p e titio n  in  th e  w ide r  ma rke t w o u l d  rest ra in a b u s e  o f a  m o n o p o l y  in  
m a i n te n a n c e . The re  m a y  b e  s o m e  d o u b t a b o u t th e  fac tua l  ev idence ,  b a s e d  o n  o n e  
u n typical  year ,  b u t th e  m e th o d  o f ana lys is  a p p e a r s  s o u n d . 
S O M E  C O N C L U D ING O B S E R V A T IO N S  
B e c a u s e  o f th e  uncer ta in  fac tua l  ev i dence  a n d  th e  a b s e n c e  o f a n y  j u d g e m e n t o f th e  
Cou r t r ega rd ing  ma rke t i n te rdependence ,  it is n o t poss ib le  to  der i ve  f rom th is  case  a  
d e fin i t ive v iew o f th e  c o n c e p t o f a b u s e  in  cases  w h e r e  ma rke ts a re  i n t e rdependen t, 
w h e r e  a n y  poss ib le  a b u s e  w o u l d  a ffect  a n o the r  t rader  ra ther  th a n  th e  c o n s u m e r . 
L e t us  a s s u m e  th a t H u g i n ’s a r g u m e n ts h a d  b e e n  va l ida ted  - it he l d  on ly  a b o u t one -e i gh th  
o f a  h igh ly  c o m p e tit ive ma rke t in  wh ich  it was  r anked  th i rd;  a s s u m e  th a t it cou ld  n o t 
cha rge  pr ices  fo r  m a i n te n a n c e  s igni f icant ly a b o v e  costs b e c a u s e  m a i n te n a n c e  was  a n  
impor tant  e l e m e n t o f c o m p e titio n  in  th e  cash  regis ter  ma rke t. L e t us  s u p p o s e  a lso  th a t 
all cash-register companies had adopted the same policy of “cornering” the maintenance 
of their own machines possibly to preserve turnover after the slump in new machine 
sales. What would have been the consequences? 
(4 For the customer, perhaps little of significance. Individual traders may purchase 
cash registers only at irregular intervals but they are specialist customers with trade 
associations, trade magazines and regular professional contacts. Any attempt at 
exploitation of a maintenance monopoly might rebound. 
(b) For independent undertakings engaged in maintenance and repair, perhaps 
extinction. 
A definitive judgement on the applicability of Article 86 would have been valuable. 
Postscript 
The case is rather dated. The electro-mechanical cash registers then predominant have 
been extensively replaced by much less expensive electronic units using silicon chips. 
Some shopkeepers, with whom the matter was discussed, expect to use new cash registers 
until they go wrong and then replace them with further improved, perhaps still cheaper, 
models. 
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C A S E  S T U D Y  N 0 .6 : R E P L A C E M E N T  B O D Y  P A N E L S  F O R  F O R D  C A R S  ( U K  
C A S E )  
D o c u m e n ta tio n  
Monopo l i e s  a n d  Merge rs  Commiss i on : 
N W  
For  s imi lar  case  in  France:  
Commiss i on  d e  la  Concur rence :  
(CC)  
A lso re levant  
Monopo l i e s  a n d  Merge rs  Commiss i on : 
INTRODUCTIO N  
This  is o n e  o f a  n u m b e r  o f cases  
Fo rd  M o tor  C o . L td ., C m n d .9 4 3 7  
H M S O , L o n d o n , F e b . 1 9 8 5  
Av is  relati f  a  d e s  p ra t iques  pa r  lesque l les  
d e s  impor ta teurs*  d ’a u tomob i l es  se  r tservent  
le  m o n o p o l e  d ’app rov i s i onnemen t d e  leur  
r eseau  d e  d is t r ibut ion d e  cer ta ines p ieces  
d i tachbes,  R a p p o r t d e  la  C C  1 9 8 3  (pp .300-  
3 1  l), Jou rnaux  O fficiels, Par is ,  1 9 8 4  
(* i nc lud ing  Ford)  
Ca r  P a r ts, H C  3 1 8 , H M S O , L o n d o n , M a y  
1 9 8 2  
invo lv ing  th e  d is t r ibut ion o f car  par ts  a n d , in  
part icular ,  ac t ions by  veh ic le  p roduce rs  to  ensu re  th a t th e y  m a i n ta in  d o m i n a n t pos i t ions 
in  th e  ma rke t fo r  r e p l a c e m e n t parts.  
In  1 9 7 5  th e  Commiss i on  o f th e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i ties  e x e m p te d  f rom proh ib i t ion  u n d e r  
A rt icle 8 5  a n  a r r a n g e m e n t whe reby  B M W  dea le rs  in  G e r m a n y  we re  restr icted to  
o b ta in ing  cer ta in  par ts  f rom th e  veh ic le  p roducer ,  o n  th e  g r o u n d s  th a t th is  a r r a n g e m e n t 
c o n tr ibuted to  improv ing  th e  p roduc tio n  a n d  d is t r ibut ion o f g o o d s  a n d  to  p r o m o tin g  
techn ica l  p rogress .  
In  th e  G e r m a n  Federa l  Repub l i c  in  1 9 8 1 , th e  Federa l  S u p r e m e  Cou r t set  as ide  dec is ions  
o f th e  Federa l  Car te l  O ffice a n d  th e  H ighe r  Reg iona l  Cou r t a n d  a l l owed  V W  to  c o n tin u e  
a  restr ict ive a r r a n g e m e n t o f th is  k ind.  T h e  a r g u m e n t was  th a t V W  h a d  r ights a n d  
responsib i l i t ies  rega rd ing  th e  en i t re  l i fe o f th e  m o tor  vehic le ,  i nc lud ing  th e  ex is tence o f 
appropr ia te  a fte r -sa les  a n d  spa re  par ts  serv ice.  
In  c o n trast, th e  Monopo l i e s  a n d  Merge rs  Commiss i on  in  th e  Un i ted  K i n g d o m  in  1 9 8 2  
a n d  th e  F rench  Commiss i on  d e  la  Concu r rence  in  1 9 8 3  dec i ded  th a t th e  a r g u m e n ts in  
favour of the exclusive purchasing arrangements were insufficient to justify the 
distortion of competition which these restrictions entailed. 
Car parts in total would be a product range too wide for application of the detailed 
analytical framework. The case of body panels for Ford cars provides a more specific 
example. 
The case arose from a complaint that Ford was pursuing an anti-competitive practice in 
refusing to license independent companies to produce replacement body panels for Ford 
cars (for which it held a design copyright) and in instituting legal proceedings against 
independent companies producing such panels illegally. 
A. DEFINITION OF THE RELEVANT PRODUCT 
1. Starting Point (A.1 in the check-list in Chapter 3) 
The narrowest possible definition would be a specific body panel supplied by Ford, eg 
for the right front wing of a Fiesta. Ford lists over 4,000 individual panels, none of 
which is a substitute for any other. However, as suggested in Chapter 3 and as assumed 
by the MMC, it is possible to group together large numbers of these variants because the 
same demand and supply conditions apply to each. 
The MMC starts with Ford panels and groups these into the same categories adopted by 
Ford:- 
“full panel”, identical to that used in the original vehicle assembly; 
“service part panel”, a sub-division of the full panel produced specifically for 
repairs; 
“crash part panel”, a smaller part specially developed to facilitate repair of 
localised crash damage; 
“corrosion part panel”, for replacement of areas of the car body most susceptible 
to rust and for welding into position when the rusted area has been cut out. 
2. Possible substitutes (A.2) 
All body panels except corrosion part panels are subject to Ford design copyright - the 
actions taken by Ford to enforce this copyright prompted the reference to the MMC. 
Possible substitutes exist in the form of 
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(a )  
(b)  
impor ts  f rom Ford  p l an ts in  o the r  E E C  c o u n tries, wh ich  Fo rd  U K  s u g g e s te d  as  a  
poss ib le  th r ea t res t ra in ing the i r  f r eedom o f act ion,  b u t o f wh ich  th e  M M C  fo u n d  
little ev idence ;  
“i l legal” cop ies  p r o d u c e d  by  i n d e p e n d e n ts, m o s tly o u ts ide th e  U K ; th e s e  we re  
ma in l y  fo r  o lde r  cars.  
Cor ros ion  p a r t pane l s  were  p r o d u c e d  on ly  by  i n d e p e n d e n t c o m p a n i e s  u n til 1 9 8 4  w h e n  
Fo rd  e n te red  th e  ma rke t to  d ist r ibute impor ts  f rom th e  V a n  W e z e l  In te rna tiona l  g r o u p , 
wh ich  p roduces  in  fou r  E E C  c o u n tr ies o u ts ide th e  U K . 
3 . Cr i ter ia o f subst i tutabi l i tv (A.3)  
Func tiona l  in terchangeabi l i ty :  fo r  m a n y  o f th e  m o r e  f requent ly  rep laced  pane l s  the re  
was  a t least  o n e  subst i tute ava i lab le  f rom i n d e p e n d e n ts, espec ia l l y  fo r  o lde r  cars;  
Reac tive  in terchangeabi l i ty :  m a n y  car  owne rs  w o u l d  n o t b e  a w a r e  o f th e  ex is tence o f 
non -Fo rd  pane l s  a n d  s o m e  m ight  b e  re luctant  to  subst i tute th e m  b e c a u s e  o f fea rs  a b o u t 
qual i ty;  
Bar r ie r  to  subst i tut ion: M M C  est imated th a t 7 5 %  o f a l l  c rash  repa i rs  we re  fin a n c e d  by  
insurers.  T h e  fittin g  o f pane l s  o the r  th a n  th o s e  supp l i ed  by  th e  or ig ina l  veh ic le  
m a n u facturer  m ight  c o n t ravene war ranty  a r r a n g e m e n ts a n d  insurers  a re  genera l l y  
p repa red  to  p a y  th e  cost  o f r e p l a c e m e n t pane l s  o f th e  car  m a n u facturer.  Th is  m e a n s  
e ffect ively th a t a lmos t a l l  o f th e  ma rke t fo r  pane l s  resu l t ing f rom c rashes  is 
a u to m a tical ly o b ta i n e d  by  th e  car  p roducer .  
A n o the r  bar r ie r  was  th e  te n d e n c y  fo r  m a n y  owne rs  to  ta k e  Fo rd  cars  to  specia l is t  Fo rd  
dea le rs  fo r  repai r .  T h e  latter o b ta in  m o s t o f the i r  spa re  par ts  f rom Ford.  Howeve r  th e  
M M C  repor ted  (para.  3 .15 )  th a t s o m e  i n d e p e n d e n ts occas iona l l y  supp l i ed  the i r  subst i tute 
pane l s  to  Fo rd  dea lers .  
T h e  pu rchasers  m o s t l ikely to  cons ide r  i n d e p e n d e n t ly -p roduced subst i tutes fo r  Fo rd  
pane l s  a re  (i) fle e t -owners  o f suff ic ient s ize to  u n d e r ta k e  the i r  o w n  c rash  repa i rs  a n d  
insur ing  on ly  aga ins t  th i rd-par ty  c la ims a n d  (i i) cos t -consc ious owne rs  o f o lde r  cars  
m a k i n g  pr ivate a r r a n g e m e n ts to  g e t bad l y  co r roded  pane l s  rep laced.  B o th  o f th e s e  
e l e m e n ts a re  smal l .  T h e  M M C  repor ted  th a t Fo rd  he l d  ove r  8 5 %  o f th e  to ta l  ma rke t fo r  
r e p l a c e m e n t b o d y  pane l s  in  1 9 8 4  (not  i nc lud ing  cor ros ion  par t  pane ls ) .  
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4. Tests of substitutability (indirect, A.5) 
The MMC made a study of prices which confirmed the analysis of substitutability, 
suggesting that Ford had a measure of protection from competition in the full- and 
part-replacement body panel segment, that is excluding corrosion part panels. Among a 
random sample of 17 panels, the Ford price was higher than those quoted by 
independents in 16 of the 17 cases. Nevertheless, the MMC confirmed Ford’s report that 
competition in the supply of panels for some older cars had forced it to make significant 
price reductions. 
In the supply of corrosion part panels, where Ford was breaking into a market from 
which it had previously been absent, the price it charged was higher than those of all 
independents in only 5 of 19 cases. In this particular sub-group the barrier to 
substitution associated with the practice of insurance companies was not present. 
Conclusion on Droduct definition 
There is an obvious substitution gap isolating the product “body panels for Ford cars” 
but there is also reason to argue that body panels produced by Ford constitute a separate 
product for many customers by whom no substitute would be considered even if it were 
available. 
B. GEOGRAPHICAL MARKET 
The logic of Chapter 3 would indicate that the relevant market is the United Kingdom, 
despite the role of imports and the multinational nature of Ford’s operations. The 
reasoning is as follows:- 
(0 final customer demand is not transferable overseas; 
(ii) while supply may be organised on an EEC basis, much of this supply is 
dominated by Ford, which is therefore in a position to discriminate according to 
different demand conditions. 
(iii) demand conditions are probably different, not least because of variations in 
prices of new cars, which affect the economics of the repair v. replace decision. 
Another factor is the much greater proportion of cars in the United Kingdom 
which are owned by businesses. 
(Section C, Measurement of Relevant Market Sales, is not necessary in this case.) 
D. POTENTIAL COMPETITION 
Ford was protected by four factors: 
(1) It could insist that repairs made to a car under warranty must include only Ford 
replacement panels. 
(2) Although its control over Ford distributors and dealers was not absolute (some 
did occasionally buy competitive panels), these companies were highly dependent 
on Ford (a partenaire obligatoire) and it could limit any incursion by new 
competitors into specialist Ford outlets. 
(3) For crash repairs, the majority of vehicle owners relied on insurance companies, 
who generally approved the use of manufacturers’ parts. 
(4) The only segment of the market in which potential competition might be 
significant was the supply to independent (not Ford-franchised) car body 
repairers of panels to replace those which had corroded (on older cars). Ford 
was trying to stem this limited competition by legal enforcement of copyright on 
its own designs. Potential competition from the substitution of corrosion part 
panels for replacement parts was being countered by Ford’s entry into this 
market at competitive prices. Again penetration through its own dealer network 
would give it some advantage though much of the low-cost patching of older cars 
is undertaken by concerns unconnected with the original manufacturers. The 
fact that Ford had decided not to market certain corrosion part panels on grounds 
of safety could contribute to the building of customer confidence in those panels 
which it did not supply. 
E. PRODUCT INTERDEPENDENCE 
This is of key importance in this case. Ford’s defence of its policy of reserving the total 
market for replacement panels was that it needed to obtain adequate return on its 
investment in product improvement. 
It argued that competition in the sale of cars was sufficient to prevent abuse of the 
dominant position in the sale of replacement parts. 
This argument may be analysed with the help of Section E of the check-list. Using the 
notation of the check-list we can see that Pl and P2 are both equal to unity. (Nobody 
would buy a replacement panel for a Ford car unless he also had the car concerned and 
there is no substitute for a Ford replacement panel if the definition is extended to 
include independent “copies”.) The main argument must relate to P3, the expected cost 
of replacement panels over the life of the car. 
This expected cost can be broken down into two components, crash repairs and wear and 
tear. For most people crash repairs are financed by insurance companies, who can 
modify premiums to take account of known costs of replacement parts. Data from the 
UK Family Expenditure Survey (1984) enabled one to estimate that premiums for 
comprehensive insurance are about 18% of the average annual cost of car ownership, 
(excluding fuel costs). The element in this which represents crash damage to the insured 
vehicle is probably about one third. This means that P3 will be marginally above the 
critical value of 0.05 during the first few years of the car’s life. Subsequently, the car 
will probably cover fewer kilometres per annum and so will run less risk of crash 
damage, but there will be a corresponding increase in wear and tear replacement. 
Overall the value of P3 at about 6% of total ownership costs seems reasonable. 
Given that PlP2P3 is approximately 0.06 does this mean that purchasers will be at all 
influenced by the cost of replacement panels when they are deciding on their choice of 
car? This may depend upon the extent to which possible crash repair costs are reflected 
in the insurance premium. The expected level of insurance premium may influence the 
car purchase decision. A survey of fleet purchasers undertaken by the MMC showed 
that 16 of the 56 fleet operators interviewed considered the cost of “spare parts, 
particularly body panels” a vital factor in their decision to buy a particular car; a 
further 31 said it would be a marginal factor. Again of the 56, 6 said that insurance 
rating would be vital and 27 said that it would be marginal. All this evidence suggests 
that the cost of replacement panels is just about significant in influencing the decision 
about which car to purchase. 
The problem is complicated by the general practice whereby cars are sold after three or 
four years use. To what extent does the cost of replacement panels influence the 
secondhand prices of cars and to what extent does the secondhand price influence the 
initial purchase decision? Ford argued that both these influences were significant. 
There is little in the MMC document to enable one to quantify the arguments, but it 
would be possible to do so fairly easily, both by direct survey and by study of the large 
quantity of statistics available. The motor industry is characterised by an unusual degree 
of transparency. 
The MMC concluded that Ford’s argument about the total “package” of car ownership, 
corresponding to the “composite” product in Section E of Chapter 3, applied least 
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st rongly  to  th e  m o torist w h o  pu r chased  Fo rd  cars  s e c o n d h a n d . E lim inat ion  o f th e  (fair ly 
lim ited )  c o m p e titio n  in  r e p l a c e m e n t pane l s  th r o u g h  th e  cour t  ac t ions p u r s u e d  by  Fo rd  
w o u l d  e n a b l e  it to  ra ise  pr ices  in  th is  sector  (para.6.39) .  
For  th is  r eason  th e  M M C  r e a c h e d  a  comprom ise  conc lus ion  - in  o rde r  to  protect  a n d  
leg i t imise c o m p e titio n  in  th e  ma rke t s e g m e n t w h e r e  subst i tut ion cou ld  ta k e  p lace,  wh i le  
a t th e  s a m e  tim e  recogn is ing  th e  n e e d  fo r  Fo rd  to  recover  des ign  a n d  d e v e l o p m e n t costs. 
Th is  dec is ion  is a l so  consis tent  wi th th e  observa t ion  th a t, e i ther  di rect ly o r  v ia  i nsu rance  
p r e m i u m s , th e  cost  o f pane l s  to  rep lace  c rash  d a m a g e  m ight  b e  ta k e n  into a c c o u n t by  
s o m e  la rger  commerc ia l  pu rchasers  - Fo rd  is s t rong in  th e  U K  c o m p a n y  car  sector.  T h e  
comprom ise  was  th a t Fo rd’s des ign  copyr ight  shou ld  b e  lim ite d  to  f ive years,  th u s  
restr ict ing its e ffect  to  re lat ively n e w  cars  ( and  to  th e  first fe w  years  o f a  m o d e l ’s 
ex is tence) .  
C O M M E N T S  O N  T H E  C A S E  
L ike  th e  Commiss i on  o f th e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i ties  in  cases  4  a n d  5 , w h e r e  p roduc t 
i n t e rdependence  was  a lso  a n  issue,  th e  M M C  u s e d  a  log ic  fo r  ana lys is  essen tia l ly  s imi lar  
to  th a t set o u t in  C h a p te r  3 . 
T h e  issues  invo lved  a re  fa i r ly complex .  Fo rd  was  impl ic i t ly accused  o f two “a b u s e s ” -
first o f t ry ing to  re in force its a l ready  d o m i n a n c e  pos i t ion  in  th e  supp ly  o f r e p l a c e m e n t 
b o d y  pane l s  fo r  its o w n  cars  a n d  second ly  o f cha rg ing  h ighe r  pr ices  fo r  th o s e  pane l s  
th a n  th o s e  wh ich  w o u l d  h a v e  p reva i led  u n d e r  c o m p e tit ive condi t ions.  
The re  is o n e  aspec t o f th is  case  a n d  o the rs  invo lv ing  car  par ts  a n d  accessor ies  to  wh ich  
th e  c o n c e p t o f p a r tena i r e  ob l iga to i re  is h igh ly  per t inent  - exc lus ive  pu rchas ing  
a r r a n g e m e n ts e n fo rced  by  c o n tract o r  by  commerc ia l  pe rsuas ion ,  wh ich  restr icted th e  
f r eedom o f Fo rd  dea le rs  to  stock c o m p e tit ive pane ls .  T h e  fact  th a t Fo rd  h a d  on ly  
recent ly  fo u n d  it necessary  to  protect  its des ign  copyr ight  in  th e  cour ts  a n d  th a t o the r  
veh ic le  p roduce rs  h a d  n o t h a d  to  ta k e  such  ac t ion ref lected th e  “c a p tive” n a tu re  o f m u c h  
o f th e  ma rke t. 
T h e  M M C ’s gene ra l  repor t  o n  car  par ts  ( 1982 )  l is ted exc lus ive  dea l i ng  a r r a n g e m e n ts 
wi th in  th e  Un i ted  K i n g d o m  a n d  c o m m e n te d  o n  cases  in  o the r  co; lntr ies invo lv ing  th is  
pract ice.  In  s o m e  o f th e s e  cases  th e  f ranch ised dist r ibutor  was  requ i red  to  o b ta in  
exc lus ive ly  f rom th e  veh ic le  p roduce r  n o t on ly  veh ic le  c o m p o n e n ts b u t a l so  accessor ies  
a n d , in  o n e  U S  case,  e v e n  lubr icants.  T h e  proh ib i t ion  o f c o n tractual  exc lus ive  dea l i ng  
will not affect the practice significantly (as the MMC pointed out) when the distributor 
depends upon the vehicle manufacturer. 
The imposition of exclusive dealing as a means of securing a dominant position in the 
supply of vehicle components or accessories may itself be regarded as abuse of 
dominance, which results from the power to grant and withdraw the status of authorised 
distributor. Ford’s share of the UK car market in 1984 was 29%, hardly dominant. The 
greater this share the more difficult it would be for a current Ford dealer to find an 
alternative vehicle franchise but, since most other vehicle producers already had 
distribution networks, Ford was for most of its distributors a partenaire obligatoire. 
Ford’s dominance over an individual distributor depends only partly on Ford’s share of 
the car market: other factors include the size of the distributor, the existence of possible 
alternative outlets for Ford and whether other vehicle producers are aggressively seeking 
to extend their distribution within the area concerned. 
In the case of exclusive dealing arrangements imposed on franchised distributors the 
relevant market approach proves much less satisfactory than consideration of the concept 
of partenaire obligatoire. This comment applies only to this aspect of the case of 
replacement panels for Ford cars; for the rest of the case the relevant market approach 
identified the major issues clearly. 
,- 
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CASE STUDY NO. 7: AK20 v. ENGINEERING AND CHEMICAL SUPPLIES LTD 
Documentation 
Commission of the EC: 
KEC) 
Decision (14 December 1985) reported in 
Official Journal 1985 L374, pp.1 -27 
INTRODUCTION 
This case arose from a complaint by Engineering and Chemical Supplies Ltd (ECS), a 
small producer of benzoyl peroxide (an organic peroxide) located in England, that 
AKZO Chemie had abused a dominant position in the EEC organic peroxides market. 
The alleged abuse was selective and below-cost price-cutting in the relatively specialised 
sub-market for flour additives in the UK and Ireland from which ECS then (1980-2) 
derived most of its turnover. The alleged price-cutting occurred after ECS had begun to 
extend its activities to the wider market for organic peroxides in the plastics industry, 
initially in Germany. 
The case raised a number of disputes concerned with market definition, including both 
the relevant product and the relevant geographical market. 
A. DEFINITION OF THE RELEVANT PRODUCT 
The Commission’s discussion refers to two markets - the EEC market for organic 
peroxides and the UK/Irish market for flour additives. It concludes that the former is 
the relevant market in which AKZO abused a dominant position. (The “flour additives 
market” is a disputed concept since flour additives are complementary, rather than 
substitute, products.) 
1. Startinn noint 
In this case the narrowest definition may be taken from the alleged abuse - AKZO’s 
source of power was its dominance of the sales of organic peroxides in total within the 
EEC. Its share of such sales exceeded 5046, it offered a broader range than that of any 
rival and held a secure stable lead in this sector. Since AKZO was accused of price- 
cutting in the small sub-sector of flour additives in the British Isles, the source of its 
power to do so could not be within that sub-sector. 
2. Substitutes 
Except in the relatively minor cross-linking application, for which sulphur compounds 
are substitutable on a limited basis, there are no functional substitutes for organic 
peroxides. As a proportion of the total costs of the final products in which they are 
incorporated, the price of organic peroxides is insignificant. This means that purchasers, 
while obtaining supplies from the cheapest source, have little incentive to search for 
alternative chemicals. 
B. GEOGRAPHICAL MARKET 
Organic peroxides are an anonymous product with relatively high value to weight ratio. 
Purchasers can transfer demand easily and would tend to switch to imports if these were 
significantly cheaper. Two features of this case confirm the international nature of 
competition. These are: 
(1) 
(2) 
the entry of ECS into the market for application in plastics in Germany, which 
provoked AKZO into the response of (alleged) predatory price-cutting in the 
UK; 
the apparent effectiveness of AKZO’s price-cutting in the UK flour additives 
sub-sector. 
(Section C - Measurement of Relevant Market Sales - is not necessary in this case.) 
D. POTENTIAL COMPETITION 
AKZO have a number of advantages which could be grouped under the heading of 
“economies of scale”. These include a strong commercial and technical marketing 
organisation, a broad product range and considerable technical know-how maintained by 
high research and development expenditure. 
The power of the wider AKZO group, with its wide-ranging chemicals interest, might 
provide defensive cross-subsidisation if this were necessary to ward off large-scale entry 
into the organic peroxides market. 
A more probable source of potential competition is entry by small specialist producers 
aimed at narrow sub-sectors of the market, for specific organic peroxides. AKZO’s 
overall power has enabled it, on previous occasions as well as in response to the 
attempted expansion into Germany by ECS, to restrict or prevent such potential 
competition by selective price-cutting. This price-cutting may not only be used to 
defend the sub-market which the small firm attempts to enter but may also extend to 
retaliatory action, possibly threatening the potential competitor’s survival. Small 
companies may find their existence dependent on the sufferance of AKZO. 
E. PRODUCT INTERDEPENDENCE 
For all the final products in which organic peroxides are incorporated, their cost is only 
a small proportion of the final product total price. Because of this low proportion (P3 in 
the analytical framework), competition in the market for all the final products is 
unlikely to have any significant restraining effect on the freedom of a company with a 
dominant position in the supply of organic peroxides. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the record of this case indicates considerable controversy about the definition 
of the relevant market, analysis based on the framework in Chapter 3 leads relatively 
simply and incontrovertibly to the conclusions reached by the Commission:- the relevant 
market is organic peroxides in the EEC as a whole; dominance is not significantly 
restrained by either potential competition or by product interdependence. 
CASE STUDY NO. 8: CERTATN FORMS OF OUTDOOR ADVERTISING 
(3 CASES - UK AND FRANCE) 
Documentation 
Monopolies & Mergers Commission: 
WMC) 
Commission de la Concurrence: 
(CC) 
11 II 
Roadside Advertising Services, HC365, 
HMSO, London, 1981 
Situation de la concurrence dans le secteur 
de la publicite sur les abribus et le mobilier 
urbain, Rapport Annuel 1978, pp.26-9, 
Paris, 1979. 
Situation de la concurrence dans le secteur 
d’affichage publicitaire exterieur, Rapport 
Annuel 1981, pp.45-6, Paris, 1982. 
JNTRODUCTION 
The differences between the approaches of the MMC in the United Kingdom and the 
CC in France illustrate that general references may provide a misleading point of 
departure for analysis. 
It may be useful at this point to consider the terms of reference of the MMC regarding 
“the existence or possible existence of a monopoly situation”. It is asked to consider 
6-d whether a monopoly exists, 
(b) the identity of the monopolist(s) 
(cl steps to maintain or exploit monopoly, 
(d) other effects attributable to monopoly, 
W whether facts found under (a) to (d) operate against the public interest. 
The titles of the three references - roadside advertising services (UK), advertising on 
bus shelters and urban fixtures (France, 1978) and outdoor poster advertising in general 
(France, 1981) - raise an obvious first question: .do these constitute separate markets 
from advertising by other media’ ! There is evidence in the MMC report to support the 
French conclusion that from the point of view of the purchasers of advertising space 
(the customers), they are parts of a wider range of substitutes. However, the MMC 
concluded otherwise, possibly because it found evidence of exploitation of a “monopoly”. 
If its analysis had begun from the abuse, it would have become evident that this was a 
case of monopsony in the renting of sites by advertising agencies, to the detriment of the 
owners of the sites. 
In both countries there was oligopolistic collusion. In the UK in 1978, two companies 
shared 50% of total turnover in roadside advertising; these companies supplied part of 
their services via British Posters Ltd. which they owned jointly with eight other 
companies. The combined share of turnover attributable to member companies of 
British Posters was 79 per cent. In France in the same year, four companies controlled 
83 per cent of the total sales of poster advertising but market segmentation agreements 
limited competition between them: in particular, one company had a virtual monopoly 
of advertising on bus shelters and certain other urban fixtures. 
DEFINITION OF THE RELEVANT PRODUCT (only section of framework considered 
in this case study) 
1. Startinp Point 
In all cases this was defined by the reference from the government department 
concerned. In the UK case the reference specified “the undertaking and performance of 
engagements to display and exhibit advertisements on sites of not less than 40 inches 
wide and 60 inches deep*, visible from a highway, excluding sites on or within any 
form of conveyance”. 
In the French 1978 case the definition was “la publicite sur les abribus et le mobilier 
urbain” (advertising on bus shelters and urban street fixtures) and in the 1981 case 
“l’affichage publicitaire exterieur” (outdoor poster advertising). 
2. Substitutabilitv 
(a) In the UK case, the MMC stated the following: 
“Our conclusion is that although there is an element of 
choice for advertisers and their agents between roadside 
and other posters and also between posters and other 
media, the market defined in the reference is sufficiently 
discrete to justify our examination” (MMC, p.5) 
The grounds for this implied “substitution gap” were as follows:- (i) British Posters’ 
activities were confined to roadside sites; (ii) British Transport Advertising Ltd 
* approximately l.Om x 1 Sm 
distinguished between roadside and transport advertising; (iii) many advertisers 
regarded fixed roadside advertising as more effective than that on or within vehicles. 
The first of these reasons seems tenuous - British Railways do not operate aircraft 
between London and Edinburgh but this does not imply absence of competition between 
rail and air on this route! The second and third reasons refer only to one element of 
possible substitution. A more detailed study of functional and reactive substitutability 
would appear necessary. 
While direct tests of substitutability (cross-price elasticity etc) are not possible, because 
of lack of data on actual prices paid for poster advertising, indirect evidence is 
presented in the MMC’s discussion of prices. This appears to contradict quite starkly 
the Commission’s earlier conclusion that there was a distinct market for roadside 
advertising. For example 
“The objective of the poster contractor will in principle be 
to set his prices at the highest level which is consistent 
with a sufficiently large body of advertisers choosing to 
use his medium rather than rejecting it in favour of other 
media.” (MMC, p.92, para. 0.19) 
and 
“The evidence we have been given by those involved in 
pricing decisions suggests that the movement in rates 
charged for other media, and particularly for television 
advertising, has been the principal determinant of the 
general movement in roadside advertising rates.” (ibid., 
para.lO.21) 
On the basis of the analytical framework in Chapter 3, one would conclude from this 
that the relevant product market was advertising though all media. The main reason 
why the MMC did not reach this conclusion appears to be its discovery of an abuse of 
power: the roadside advertising contractors were collaborating, through effective 
agreements, to keep down the rentals of their roadside sites (owned by local authorities 
or companies with roadside premises). This had the effect of discouraging the provision 
of new sites. But this was an abuse of monopsony - concentrated buying power. For 
owners of sites (temporary or permanent hoardings, street fixtures etc) there was no 
alternative source of income to lease for advertising. The MMC’s analysis appears 
defective in its failure to recognise that the market needed to be defined from the 
standpoint of buyer dominance. 
(b) In the French 1978 case, the logic is more clearly presented. The CC stated 
” 
. . . . vis a vis de la clientele des annonceurs, le march6 de la 
publicite sur le mobilier urbain ne peut Btre isoli du 
marche plus vaste de la publicite exterieure.” (CC, p.25) 
Although the CC thus concluded that from the point of view of the customers 
(advertisers) only the total of all media was a relevant market, it also considered the 
position of local authorities who depended upon advertising revenue to finance bus 
shelters, street light fixtures, litter bins and other urban “street furniture”. From this 
point of view, advertising on such fixtures constituted a distinct market. 
The CC went on 
0 
. . . . le groupe Decaux occupe une position dominante vis a 
vis des collectivites locales disireuses de faire mettre par 
des entreprises de publicite des abris a la disposition des 
usagers des transports en commun.” (ibid.) 
No advertising, no bus shelters. Advertising on bus shelters was dominated by Decaux, 
by agreement with potential competitors. This is analogous to the monopsony enjoyed 
by British Posters in the UK. The French analysis correctly identified the distinction. 
(c) In the French 1981 case, concerning outdoor advertising in total, the CC decided 
that although this was dominated by three companies, the relevant market was wider and 
there was sufficient competition to prevent abuse of dominance of customers. It 
reasserted a need for vigilance regarding the anti-competitive effects of agreements 
within the industry, similar to those observed in the 1978 case. 
CONCLUSION 
It is not clear from the French documentation whether the 1978 case was referred to the 
Commission de la Concurrence because of complaints by local authorities. The origins 
of the British reference are also unknown. 
When a case originates from an alleged abuse or an expression of concern about a 
possible specific abuse, this makes a good starting point for analysis - is there a source 
of power? In the French 1978 case the source of power was ability to finance the 
erection and maintenance of bus shelters and street furniture. Since local authorities had 
no alternative revenue from such fixtures, dominance of advertising via this specific 
medium constituted monopsony. 
Similarly in the British case - owners of hoardings or other potential advertisement sites 
depended on roadside poster advertisers for their revenue. If the reference had resulted 
from a complaint that site rents were being forced down by abuse of buying power, the 
definition of the market would have been simpler. The contorted (perhaps fallacious) 
arguments to show that roadside advertising was a distinct segment from the viewpoint 
of the customer would have been obviously irrelevant. 
The cases demonstrate certain dangers in general references and emphasise the need to 
adhere to some formal analytical framework in the definition of substitutability. 
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C A S E  S T U D Y  N O . 9 : U N ITE D  B R A N D S  ( B A N A N A S  - E E C  C A S E )  
(part  ana lys is )  
D o c u m e n ta tio n  
Commiss i on  o f th e  E C : 
W C ) 
Dec is ion  (17  D e c e m b e r  1 9 8 5 ) , 
O fficial Jou rna l  1 9 7 6 , L 9 5 , p p . l -20 
E u r o p e a n  Cou r t o f Just ice: 
W J) 
J u d g e m e n t ( 14  Februa ry  1 9 7 8 ) . 
E u r o p e a n  Cou r t Reco rd  1 9 7 8 , p p .2 0 7 - 3 3 3  
INTRODUCTIO N  
This  is o n e  o f th e  m o r e  c o n trovers ia l  cases  in  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i ty ju r i sprudence.  T h e  
Un i ted  B rands  Co rpo ra tio n  (UBC) ,  o n e  o f fou r  U S  c o m p a n i e s  wh ich  d o m i n a te d  th e  
wor ld  supp ly  o f b a n a n a s , was  accused  ( and  fo u n d  gui l ty)  o f th e  fo l l ow ing  e l e m e n ts o f 
a b u s e  o f d o m i n a n c e : 
(a)  
(b)  
(cl 
impos ing  cond i t ions  o n  c o m p a n i e s  wh ich  pu r chased  its b a n a n a s  fo r  r i pen ing  a n d  
resale;  
app l y ing  pr ice  d iscr iminat ion b e tween  c o u n tries, fac i l i tated by  o n e  o f th e  
restr ict ions u n d e r  (a); 
cha rg ing  “u n fair ly” h i gh  pr ices  in  cer ta in  c o u n tries. 
T w o  par t icu lar  i ssues  a re  i l lustrated by  th is  case  - d e fin i t ion o f th e  re levant  p roduc t 
( b a n a n a s  o r  f resh fruit?) a n d  o f th e  geog raph i ca l  ma rke t. Th is  par t -ana lys is  c o n c e n trates 
o n  th e s e  two aspec ts. 
A . D E F INITIO N  O F  T H E  R E L E V A N T  P R O D U C T  
1 . S tar t ing P o i n t 
Th is  was  b a n a n a s  in  to tal; ne i ther  U B C  no r  th e  Commiss i on  a r g u e d  th a t b r a n d e d  
b a n a n a s  const i tu ted a  sepa ra te  ma rke t, th o u g h  the re  was  ev idence  o f p r ice  d i f ferences.  
W ith in  th e  c o u n tr ies i nc luded  wi th in  th e  Commiss i on’s d e fin i t ion o f th e  re levant  
geog raph i ca l  ma rke t ( see  S e c tio n  B ), U B C s  sha re  o f to ta l  sa les  o f b a n a n a s  var ied  f rom 
4 0  to  5 0  pe r  c e n t (ECJ,  p .215 )  
2. Substitutabilitv 
UBC suggested that the relevant product should have a wide definition - “the fresh fruit 
market, since bananas are reasonably interchangeable by consumers with other kinds of 
fresh fruit: for example, apples, oranges, grapes, peaches, strawberries, etc, and these 
other kinds of fruit offered on the same stall or shelves at comparable prices can be 
substituted for bananas at the level of consumption, distribution and of the wholesale 
trade.” (ECJ, p.224) 
The Commission argued that substitution was a matter of degree and described three 
distinctive features of bananas: their physical characteristics, functional convenience and 
non-seasonality. Although evidence from FA0 studies confirmed competition from 
other soft fruits, particularly peaches and grapes, during the summer months, at other 
times bananas formed a distinct product. It was especially suitable for young children 
and elderly people (CEC, p.12). 
With reference to the framework of Chapter 3, functional substitutability is difficult to 
assess. Bananas are unique in flavour and texture but it is difficult to assess how 
important these features are. For example, harder fruits such as apples and pears, 
available all the year round because of imports from the southern hemisphere, can be 
made easier to eat and digest by liquidisation or boiling. Few groups of consumers 
depend on bananas. Reactive substitution may be restrained by the fact that bananas are 
generally inexpensive. Price-elasticity is generally inversely related to price: a rise in 
the price of bananas of (for example) 10 per cent is unlikely to affect demand to the 
same degree as a 10 per cent increase in the price of a product which represents a larger 
proportion of consumers’ expenditure. In order to prove this argument it would be 
necessary to study consumers’ buying habits. 
This suggests that bananas are a distinct product and that dominance of the market for 
the product would enable the supplier to make profits well in excess of costs, subject 
only to a ceiling imposed by the prices of fruits which are more expensive to supply. 
These other fruits are also either seasonal in character (other soft fruit) or would require 
some processing before they would be acceptable to certain groups of consumers. 
-- 
3. Conclusion on definition of relevant Droduct 
The Commission’s decision, confirmed by the Court, that bananas were a distinct 
product was based on careful analysis of both functional and reactive interchangeability. 
One might add to this the further consideration that products which are inexpensive 
compared with substitutes are generally characterised by low price-elasticity of demand. 
B. DEFINITION OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL MARKET 
The Commission defined the geographical market as the rest of the EEC after the 
exclusion of France, Italy and the United Kingdom. In France there were restrictions 
on imports and price controls which reduced the accessibility and attractiveness to UBC; 
in the United Kingdom competition was distorted by Commonwealth preferences; in 
Italy quotas were applied to imports of bananas from outside the EEC. In all other 
member countries access to importers was non-discriminatory, so they could all be 
treated as one market from the standpoint of the external supplier. 
UBC disputed this view on two grounds: (a) different rates of customs duties applied 
in the remaining member countries; (b) there were considerable differences in market 
sizes and characteristics. 
Use of the framework in Chapter 3 suggests a logical weakness in the definition of the 
Commission, a definition confirmed by the Court. Except in Ireland, the market shares 
of the major world-wide suppliers were fairly similar in each of the countries within the 
Commission’s definition. This evidence suggests that competition between suppliers is 
similar in each country, one of the criteria for integrating them into a single 
geographical area (Section B.4 of the framework). However, the most fundamental 
criterion of a single geographical market is equality of prices; since UBC was 
specifically accused of abusing its dominant position by charging significantly different 
prices in different countries, the conclusion that these formed a single geographical 
market was inconsistent with economic priacipies. 
Further confirmation that the national markets should have been treated separately may 
be obtained by considering the basic conditions which lead to integration:- 
!a) Customers were not able to transfer demand to other countries within the EEC, 
because the trading conditions imposed by UBC specifically prohibited this. 
(b) Although banana producers were able to supply each country on similar 
conditions (apart from relatively minor tariff differences), this would lead to 
market integration only if 
6) the structure of supply were highly competitive, which it was not because 
of a world-wide oligopoly 
QE 
(ii) demand conditions in each country were identical. 
This last condition was not fulfilled, hence the discrimination in prices. 
In this particular case, the definition of the geographical market was not pertinent to the 
conclusion - this would not have been significantly affected if it had been argued that 
UBC had a dominant position in each country. This alternative argument would have 
been more consistent with the mainstream of economic literature summarised in Chapter 
2 and would have emerged from the application of the framework in Chapter 3. 
CASE STUDY N0.10: ICE CREAM (UK CASE1 
(part analysis) 
Documentation 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission: 
(MMC) 
The Supply of Ice Cream and Water Ices in 
the United Kingdom, Cmnd.7632, HMSO, 
London, 1977 
INTRODUCTION 
C.  
Ice cream was considered by the MMC in 1977 following a reference by the Office of 
Fair Trading. The case does not illustrate any elements of the analytical framework 
which have not been equally illustrated by more recent cases included in this Chapter, 
with one exception: some of the statistical tests described in Section A.5 can be used to 
resolve some of the questions raised regarding substitute products. Two companies 
(Unilever and Lyons) together held about 63 per cent of the UK national market for ice 
cream but both had stated that their freedom of action on prices was restrained by the 
existence of substitute products, including soft (ie non-alcoholic) drinks and sugar 
confectionery. Although the MMC does not appear to have attempted any statistical 
evaluation of this substitutability, data are now available for this purpose. The results 
are presented and discussed below. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE TESTS 
Two groups of substitutes were considered: 
(1) Carbonated non-alcoholic drinks 
(21 Sweets and chocolates 
Producer price indices were derived from volume and value data in Business Monitor 
series, except that for sweets and chocolates the relevant series was discontinued in 1980 
so that it was necessary to use the retail price index for subsequent years, with 
correction for the change in value added tax (from 8 to 15 per cent) in 1979. 
Derived 
Ice cream Soft drinks Sweets & General r.p.i. 
chocolate 
PX PY PZ ‘p 
1974 83.4 73.9 75.5 80.5 
1975 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
976 
977 
978 
979 
10.7 109.4 109.6 
33.1 124.0 135.2 
54.0 135.1 154.4 
66.8 148.8 172.3 
16.5 
35.1 
46.2 
65.8 
1980 187.0 181.6 189.5 195.6 
1981 199.1 190.9 206.1 218.8 
1982 198.0 198.2 212.7 237.7 
1983 199.4 179.5 222.5 248.6 
1984 175.9 173.6 230.6 261.0 
1985 159.6 163.8 243.5 278.7 
1. I ce Cream (x) v. Soft Drinks(v) 
The first stage was the Stigler-Sherwin test, which is based on the principle that if x 
and y are substitutes their prices should tend to equality. Because of the need to 
eliminate correlation due to common time trends, Stigler and Sherwin (1985) suggest the 
correlation of first differences of logarithms of prices (broadly equivalent to correlation 
of annual percentage changes). 
n Log P, = 0.007 + 0.720 &Log py r= 0.800 
(0.285) (0.184) DW= 1.71 
The regression coefficient is significantly different from zero but not from unity. This 
would confirm that x (ice cream) and y (soft drinks) are products of which the prices 
vary in parallel. The Stigler-Sherwin paper (1985) would suggest that they were 
substitutes. 
However, it is necessary to correct the data for general inflation:- 
A Log (p,/p) =-0.034 + 0.503 A Log (p,/@ r= 0.46 
(0.024) (0.3 15) DW = 1.57 
The regression coefficient is no longer significantly different from zero though because 
it is also not significantly different from unity, the test is inconclusive. 
The example illustrates another problem with the Stigler-Sherwin concept: a positive 
correlation between price changes may be due to complementarity rather than 
substitutability. An increase in demand for complementary products in inelastic supply 
would lead to parallel price increases. This may be tested by substitution elasticity: 
(qx/qy) = dPx/Py)S 
where s must be negative if x and y are substitutes. Transforming the equation into 
logarithms and using data for quantities (q) in litres of ice-cream (x) and soft-drinks (y) 
we have 
Log (clx/qy) = - 2.39 + I.479 Log (Px/Py) r= 0.60 
(0.624) DW= 1.04 
which indicates that ice-cream and soft-drinks were not substitute products. (The 
positively significant regression coefficient may be misleading. The DW coefficient 
suggests autocorrelation. When the equation was transformed to first differences, the 
coefficient remained positive at 0.604 but its standard error increased to 0,507.) 
It is clear that the Stigler-Sherwin test in isolation would have led to an erroneous 
conclusion. 
2. Ice-cream (x) v. Sweets (z) 
Here the results of the Stigler-Sherwin test were similar, suggesting that x and z are 
substitutes, though again the DW coefficient indicates autocorrelation: 
A Log p, = -0.056 + 1.082 &Log p, r= 0.82 
(0.035) (0.270) DW- 1.03 
The correction for general inflation again reduced the regression coefficient and 
increased its standard error, leaving the test inconclusive. The DW coefficient remained 
unsatisfactory. 
ALog (p,/fi) z-o.049 + 0.715 Am (P,/~x r- 0.488 
(0.020) (0.427) DW= 0.79 
Since there are no data on quantities of sweets after 1980, it was not possible to test 
whether the two product groups were complements rather than substitutes. 
CONCLUSION 
This exercise has shown clearly two dangers in the Stigler-Sherwin test: 
(a) spuriously high correlation due to general inflation and (b) its inability to distinguish 
between substitutes and complements. 
Since more of both ice-cream and soft-drinks will be sold in hot summers a positive 
correlation between price changes may be expected. In order to test whether they are 
substitutes or complements it was necessary to compare relative sales with relative prices. 
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CASE STUDY NO, 11: POOLED PURCHASING ORGANISATIONS IN 
DISTRIBUTION 
mcumentation 
Glais, M . Les effets Cconomiques de la creation des 
supercentrales d’achat dans la distribution, 
Economic et Gestion - printemps 1985, 
pp.99-102, B rest, 1985. 
INTRODUCTION 
Glais analyses the economic effects of arrangements whereby retail distributors pool 
their purchases via a combined organisation in order to achieve “economies of scale”. He 
suggests that the real objective may be an attempt to transfer to distributors a part of 
the profits of producers, that is to establish and exploit purchaser dominance:- 
“11 est a craindre que cette reference aux economies 
d’bchelle constitue une sorte de paravent dissimulant la 
volontt des distributeurs de confisquer . . . les profits 
realists par Ieurs fournisseurs industriels.” 
He goes on to argue that for most of the products concerned the economies of scale 
from  large orders - savings in production and transactions costs - are relatively modest 
and that the main savings obtained by pooled purchasing organisations are the fruits of 
negotiating strength. 
The three pooled organisations considered by Glais together accounted for about 32 per 
cent of all retail trade in France in 1984; the largest single retailer in France had a total 
market share of 3.3%. 
Glais argues that such organisations may become *partenaires obligatoires” (obligatory 
trading partners) of certain suppliers and that this concept is more useful for purposes of 
competition policy than the “relevant market” approach. It is argued below that the 
latter approach may be necessary. 
DEFINITION OF THE RELEVANT PURCHASING MARKET 
In order to determ ine whether any one retail distributor is a partenaire obligatoire it may 
be necessary to estimate his share of a market. For any individual supplier, the relevant 
market is not the total retail trade but the total of purchases of the product range which 
he is capable of supplying. This will include total purchases by wholesalers and retailers 
and (if any) direct purchases by final consumers, with the exclusion of any elements to 
which the supplier cannot gain access (eg because of vertical integration). 
In order to assess the influence of pooled purchasing organisations, it is necessary to 
estimate their share of major product markets. For example, one might expect chains of 
independent retailers with pooled purchasing to have much greater market shares in 
products bought frequently with little advance planning at local outlets than in more 
specialist goods. The first category might include most types of prepared foods, 
domestic cleaning materials and soft drinks; the latter would include gramophone 
records, books and any more expensive items. A manufacturer of household detergents 
would be interested in the share of the total market for that specific product which is 
obtained by a retail chain. This will determine whether the chain is an obligatory 
customer. 
POTENTIAL COMPETITION ON THE PURCHASING SIDE 
Pooled purchasing organisations will lead to monopsony power only if their profitability 
does not attract additional distributors into the market, not only reducing retail margins 
but also reducing the dependence of the supplier on the limited number of existing 
purchasers. Even if there is some effective restraint on the number of retail outlets (eg 
because of environmental planning restrictions), suppliers of certain products may be 
able to by-pass the powerful distributors by using other channels of distribution, eg 
specialist outlets backed up by advertising aimed at the final customer. 
In this particular case, the concept of partenaire obligatoire appears to be no substitute 
for the analysis of the relevant market, including potential competition. Unless such an 
analysis is undertaken, it is not possible for the external observer to determine whether a 
major purchaser can be regarded as an obligatory customer of the suppliers of any 
particular product. 
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SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS FROM ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES 
(Cases 1 to 10) 
1. Definition of the relevant Droduct 
In cases 1 to 3 (Continental Can, Ferry and Hovercraft Services and Cat and Dog Foods) 
the starting point for analysis was not specific abuse but was defined either by the 
activities of the companies involved or (cat and dog foods) by a general reference from  
the body responsible for competition policy. In all three cases, the analysis made by the 
Commission of the European Communities (case 1) or by the UK Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission was similar to that proposed in the framework of Chapter 3 and 
appears to have led to fairly clear-cut conclusions. 
Cases 4 to 7 (Commercial Solvents, Hugin-Lipton, spare parts for Ford cars and AKZO) 
all related to allegations of specific abuse of dominance and in each case the starting- 
point was defined by the alleged abuse. Assessment of functional and reactive 
interchangeability together with barriers to substitution appears to have been made in 
each case, either by the Commission of the EC or by the M M C  in the UK, whose 
decisions in each case are confirmed by the analysis here. 
In cases 8 and 9 (outdoor advertising and United Brands) definition of the relevant 
product was a major element of dispute. 
In defining a product market in roadside advertising in isolation, the UK Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission overlooked the indications in its own evidence on pricing 
practices that there was close competition with other media. Use of the analytical 
framework would have avoided this apparent error. The M M C  seems to have been 
influenced by the evident market power of the group which controlled most of roadside 
advertising, but this was power over suppliers of sites, that is monopsony. This 
distinction w’as recognised by the French Commission de la Concurrence in a very 
similar case. 
The definition by the European Commission of a market in bananas, rather than all soft 
fresh fruit, received considerable press criticism  at the time but is supported by analysis 
based on framework in Chapter 3. 
Finally, case 10 (ice cream ) provided an opportunity to test certain of the statistical 
devices proposed by some authors as short-cuts to product market definition. It was 
shown that, unless these are used with great care and awareness of pitfalls, they can lead 
to misleading results. After appropriate modifications the tests proved inconclusive. 
Overall, the analytical framework of Chapter 3 produced reasonably clear-cut definitions 
of product markets. These confirmed the decisions of the anti-trust authorities 
concerned, with the single exception of roadside advertising in the UK, where use of the 
Chapter 3 framework would have avoided an apparently mistaken definition. 
2. Definition of the geoaraDhica1 market 
There is less agreement in this respect between the decisions taken by the organs of the 
European Community and those which would have emerged from use of the framework. 
Case 1 (Continental Can) was unusual in that there was no international competition, not 
because of obstacles beyond the control of producers but because of collusion between 
them. The European Court of Justice found it a weakness in the Commission’s case that 
it did not explain the absence of international trade; it rejected the significance of 
transport costs (on which the UK Price Commission’s observations are also 
unconvincing). Use of the framework would have shown that there was no reason (other 
than collusion) for isolation of the German Federal Republic as a geographical market. 
In case 5 (Hugin-Lipton) the definition of the geographical market by the European 
Court of Justice (but not that of the Commission) appears to have been based on 
confusion. The Court focussed its attention on Lipton, the company which complained 
of abuse and defined the geographical market as the area of Lipton’s activities. If the 
reasoning of the Court had adhered more closely to the relevant market concept (Hugin 
dominated the supply of its own spare parts world-wide) it would have avoided this 
mistake, which led to the Court to conclude that the case lay outside Community 
jurisdiction (because the abuse did not affect trade between countries). 
Use of the framework would also have led to a different definition of the geographical 
market in case 8 (United Brands). In this case the Commission ruled and the Court 
upheld that United Brands had abused a dominant position in a single market (EEC 
countries other than France, Italy and the UK) by charging differential prices in 
countries within that market. This conflicts with the theory of price discrimination 
which is possible only when price-elasticities of demand differ between areas and when 
there is no transfer or resale between them, that is. they form separate markets. United 
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Brands’ pricing reflected different characteristics of demand for bananas in each of the 
countries in which it dominated the supply of this product. 
Although Section B  of the analytical framework adds very little to received theory and 
previous research, these three apparent aberrations suggest that accepted economic 
analysis has been applied less consistently to definition of geographical markets than to 
that of products. 
3. Potential Comoetition 
In case 1 (Continental Can) the decision of the European Court of Justice implied that 
the Commission of the European Communities had paid insufficient attention to 
potential competition, which m ight be expected to follow any abuse of the dominant 
position that Continental’s subsidiary was alleged to hold in the German market. This 
case was unusual in two respects: (i) the development by takeover of a near-monopoly 
for Continental Can in Benelux countries was not an abuse of its dominant position in 
Germany and (ii) both actual and potential competition were restricted by agreements 
with possible competitors. This made the logic artificial. In all the other cases reported 
in full (cases 2 to 7) the body responsible for competition policy does appear to have 
considered potential competition quite comprehensively and has generally adopted 
analysis similar to that set out in the Chapter 3 framework. 
Potential competition was an important aspect of three of these cases. In case 2 
(Hovercraft and Cross-Channel Ferries) the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
identified the main barrier to entry as lim ited access to port facilities, rather than 
investment in ships which would be at least partly recoverable. In case no 3 (Cat and 
Dog Foods) the M M C  concluded that potential competition meant that current 
dominance of these products did not imply monopoly power which could be abused. In 
case no 7 (AKZO), restriction of potential competition was an important consequence of 
the alleged abuse (predatory pricing). 
4. P roduct Interdenendence 
The analysis of cases has not provided a definitive conclusion on whether dominance 
over the market is of significance to competition policy only when it can be abused to 
the detriment of the welfare of the final consumer. 
The pronouncements of the Court of Justice in cases 4 and 5 (Commercial Solvents and 
Hugin Lipton) indicate that elimination of a dependent customer, down-stream in a 
vertical chain, may constitute abuse under Article 86. Such views have been strongly 
criticised by American authors such as Fox (1983) and Hay (1985). On the other hand, 
the Commission of the European Communities (cases 4 and 5) and the UK Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission (case 6) examined product interdependence in great detail, 
using an approach almost identical to that set out in the framework in Chapter 3. In the 
Commercial Solvents and Hugin-Lipton cases respectively the CEC assessed whether 
competition in the anti-tubercular drugs and cash register markets was sufficient to 
prevent any adverse effects for the ultimate consumer. In both cases they concluded 
that the wider competition provided insufficient constraint. 
In the UK, the MMC discussed in some detail whether exploitation of the captive 
market for replacement body panels for Ford cars would be prevented by overall 
competition in the car market. On the basis of specific quantitative evidence and using 
a logic very similar to that proposed in the framework of Chapter 3, the MMC decided 
that some purchasers did consider crash repair costs in choosing new vehicles but that 
competition in the new car market did not diminish the captive nature of the market for 
panels for older cars. Its recommendation (of design rights protection for five years) 
reflects this analysis. 
An unequivocal ruling on the interpretation of Article 86 in this respect would emerge 
only if the Commission and the Court, on appeal, were to consider a case in which 
6) a dependent trader had been adversely affected by “abuse” of dominance of some 
intermediate product, but 
(ii) the Community authorities explicitly acknowledged that because of “down- 
stream” or wider competition, there were no welfare consequences for final 
consumers or for the efficient allocation of resources. 
5. Th 9 nc t f 
In all cases except nos 5 and 6 (Hugin-Lipton and body panels for Ford cars) it would 
not be possible to determine whether one company (or group) was a complusory trading 
partner for its customers without considering most of the elements of the framework. It 
would be necessary to define the market, in terms of products and geographical area, 
calculate market share and, if this were substantial, assess whether any resulting power 
might be reduced by potential competition. 
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In the case of Hugin-Lipton the definition of a market in Hugin spare parts is 
obviously, as Glais (1983 and 1985) asserts, an artificial construct. However, the analysis 
of that case suggests that use of the partenaire obligatoire approach, without the 
reference to the relevant market, would not have revealed the main issues. The 
dependence of Lipton on Hugin was emphasised in the Commission’s analysis and in the 
Court proceedings, which focussed attention on Lipton and possibly led to the 
misdefinition of the geographical area of Hugin’s dominance - the Court decided that 
this coincided with the area of Lipton’s activities. The main focus raised by the case, as 
shown in the Commission’s own analysis, should have been the refusal by Hugin to 
supply spare parts to any independent maintenance company and the implications of this 
for the quality and costs of maintenance. In the event, Lipton’s survival has proved that 
Hugin was not a partenaire obligatoire. 
Case 6, replacement panels for Ford cars, demonstrates that the concept of partenaire 
obligatoire is useful as one element of analysis of a dominant position, in explaining how 
vertical dependence may augment power beyond that attributable to market share. A 
franchised distributor (B) of a product like a motor-car is “tied” to the manufacturer 
(A), to the degree that it may be difficult to switch to another manufacturer because 
distribution channels have already been established. This enables A to impose conditions 
on B, including exclusive dealing clauses tying B to him and affecting not only vehicles 
and components but also accessories and even lubricants and ancillary products (cleaning 
fluids etc). One could define a “market” in franchises to distribute A’s product and then 
use the framework of Chapter 3 but most of this would be superfluous. 
In the particular case of the use of vertical tie-ins to distort competition in other 
markets, the concept of partenaire crbligatoire may well provide a better method of 
analysis. Assessment of this concept requires consideration of barriers to reduction of 
dependence, potential new trading partners and any possible constraints on exploitation 
C. of the dominance-dependence relationship (See Section G of Chapter 3). 
The case of vertical tie-ins may not be unique and, on the other hand, it may be not be 
satisfactory to use the partenaire obligatoire approach in all cases involving vertical links. 
(Hugin-Lipton was an example.) The conclusion of the arguments presented here is that 
the analytical framework of Chapter 3 should be applied to all cases of alleged seller or 
buyer dominance. In certain cases it may become obvious that this is artifical and 
inappropriate because much of the framework is superfluous. Only then should the 
partenaire obligatoire approach be used to provide more realistic analysis. 
-. 
L. 
-. 
-I-- 
CHAPTER 5 
PEFINITION OF THE MARKET IN CASES NOT 
INVOLVING ALLEGED ABUSE OF DOMINANCE 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapters 3 and 4 have been devoted to the definition of the relevant market in the 
context of that of a dominant position. This is consistent with the emphasis in previous 
literature and research; also, most of the disputes about the relevant market in the 
judicial application of the competition policy have arisen in cases involving the 
definition of dominance. 
In Chapter 1, it was explained that the concept of the market was implicit not only in 
A rticle 86 of the EEC treaty but also in A rticle 85, prohibiting anti-competitive 
agreements, and it may also arise in the application of A rticle 92, which regulates aid to 
enterprises granted by member states (see p. 8 above). 
A. DEFINITION FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE 85 
1. General commenQ 
Article 85 (i) is a general prohibition of all agreements, joint decisions or concerted 
practices on the part of undertakings 
“which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their 
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition 
within the common market...” 
The third clause, A rticle 85(3) provides for exemptions in the case of specified 
economic benefits (improvement of the production or distribution of goods or - 
promotion of technical or economic progress), provided that this does not afford 
the undertakings concerned “the possibility of elim inating competition in respect 
of a substantial part of the products in question.” 
Focsaneanu (1975) claimed to have observed, in the early years of Community 
competition policy a degree of vacillation on the part of the Commission between 
narrow and broad interpretations of “the product in question”. The narrow 
definition was the specific product to which the agreement, joint decision or 
practice related; the broad definition introduced similar or substitutable products. 
This broad definition has now become the norm and is embodied in the current 
regulations for block exemptions under Article 85(3), obviating the need for 
individual cases which meet the conditions stated. 
2. Block exemptions under Article 85(31 
Six Regulations providing for block exemptions under Article 85(3) have been 
introduced by the Commission since 1983, mostly revising earlier provisions. These 
Regulations refer to agreements between undertakings within the following categories:- 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
Exclusive distribution - Regulation 1983/83 
Exclusive purchasing - Regulation 1984/83 
Patent licensing - Regulation 2349/84 
Certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing - Regulation 
123/85 
(VI Certain categories of “specialization” - Regulation 417/85 
(vi) Research and development - Regulation 418/85 
Each of these contains conditions to ensure that there should remain a sufficient level of 
competition in the supply of the product. This relevant product is defined in each of 
the six regulations in a very similar way (there are only slight variations in the form of 
words): 
“Identical products or services or products or services considered by users 
as equivalent in view of their characteristics, price and intended use.” 
(Reg. 2349/84, Article g(2)) 
Very similar wording has been used in all regulations providing for exemptions under 
Article 85(3), since the first block exemptions for exclusive dealing under Regulation 
67/67. It was pointed out in Chapter 2 that this definition of the relevant product 
corresponds fairly closely with the concept of “Bedarfsmarkt” in the German language 
literature; it emphasises the importance of demand-substitution and requires the analysis 
set out in Section A of the analytical framework of Chapter 3. 
The importance of the definition of the product market varies between the different 
regulations and there are also differences in the approach to geographical market 
definition. 
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Regulations 1983/83 and 1984/83 exclude from  exemption exclusive dealing 
arrangements* between manufacturers of “identical goods or of goods considered by 
users as equivalent...” Under Article 6 of Regulation 1983/83 the Commission may 
withdraw the benefit of the block exemption for an exclusive distribution agreement 
when the goods covered by that agreement are not subject, “in the contract territory, to 
effective competition from  identical goods or goods considered by users as equivalent...” 
or when “access to other suppliers to the different stages of distribution within the 
contract territory is made difficult to a significant extent.” This restriction involves 
definition of the product market, assessment of competition within that market and also 
of potential competition. The geographical area to be taken into account is the area to 
which the exclusive distribution agreement applies. 
Regulation 2349/84 relating to patent licensing agreements contains a provision for 
withdrawal of benefit by the Commission which is very similar to that of Regulation 
1983/83: 
“where the licensed products... are not exposed to effective competition in 
the licensed territory from  identical products or services or products or 
services considered by users as equivalent (etc)...” 
(op. cit., A rticle 9) 
This seems to avoid the problem  of geographical market definition. 
Regulation 123/85 relating to distribution and servicing agreements in the motor vehicle 
trade gives explicit recognition to competition in a wider geographical area. A rticle 10 
of this Regulation empowers the Commission to withdraw the benefit of block 
exemption for an agreement in the following circumstances (inter alia): 
“where in the common market or a substantial part thereof, contract goods 
or corresponding goods are not subject to competition from  products 
considered by consumers as similar by reason of their characteristics, 
price and intended use.” 
This appears to require consideration of whether the area affected by the agreement 
constitutes a separate geographical market or whether it forms  part of a wider area, . . 
within which competition may reduce any adverse effects. 
Regulations 417/85 and 418/85 relating to agreements on specialization and research and 
development require definition of the relevant market, in terms  both of products and 
* except when these are non-reciprocal and neither undertaking has an annual turnover 
exceeding 100 m illion ecu. 
geographical area, and also the quantification of sales in that market. Article 3 of 
Regulation 417/85 states that the block exemption shall apply only if (inter alia): 
“the products which are the subject of the specialization together with the 
participating companies* other products which are considered by users to 
be equivalent in view of their characteristics, price and intended use do 
not represent more than 20% of the market for such products in the 
common market or a substantial part thereof.” 
Regulation 418/85 states that when two or more of the parties to a research and 
development agreement are competing manufacturers of products to be improved or 
replaced, the block exemption will apply only when their combined share of the output 
of these products does not exceed 20% of total sales in the common market “or a 
substantial part thereof”. (Article 3.(2)) After five years from the introduction of 
products covered by any agreement, the exemption will continue to apply only 
“as long as the production of the contract products together with the 
parties’ combined production of other products which are considered by 
users to be equivalent in view of their characteristics, price and intended 
use does not exceed 20% of the total market for such products in the 
common market or in a substantial part thereof.” (Article 3(3)) 
To summarise, the administration of all six of the block exemptions introduced since 
1983 requires definition of the relevant product market, that dealing with exclusive 
distribution involves additionally the assessment of potential competition. The 
exemptions involving motor vehicle distribution, specialization and research and 
development also require definition of geographical markets; the last two necessitate the 
estimation of total sales within the market as delineated both in terms of products and 
geographical boundaries. 
3. Wider considerations 
The detailed analysis of the conditions for block exemptions demonstrates primary 
attention to demand-side substitution and to current trading patterns - existing shares 
within a geographical area of products which the purchasers would consider substitutes. 
The definition of the relevant market in this sense is covered by Sections A to C of the 
framework in Chapter 3 (relevant products, geographical area and quantification of the 
denominator fof calculation of market shares). Does this mean that the application of 
Article 85 does not require consideration of the degree to which any power derived from 
dominance of the relevant market (defined in terms of demand substitution) may be 
diminished by potential competition (supply-substitution) or competition in another 
interdependent market? 
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Both Focsaneanu (1975) and Schroter (1977(b)) imply a negative answer to this question 
in emphasising the common objectives of A rticles 85 and 86. After quoting judicial 
pronouncements on these common objectives, Schroter commented: 
“Or, s’il est vrai que les articles.. 85 et 86 constituent un ensemble de 
dispositions homogbnes qui doivent ttre interpret&es suivant les memes 
criteres et surtout dans le m tme sens, on ne peut guire s’imaginer que la 
mCme rbgle ne s’appliquerait pas a la definition du ‘march6 en cause’. 11 
faudra, par centre, conclure a l’identite de cette notion 00 qu’elle soit 
utilisee dans le droit communautaire de concurrence.” 
(op. cit., p469) 
If an agreement affects only a fairly small part of a market defined in terms  of demand 
substitition then its effect on competition cannot be substantial - this is the logic of 
including only demand-side substitution in the conditions for block exemptions (that 
relating to exclusive distribution also requires no interference with potential 
competition). A  share of the market, so defined, which is and remains below 20% is 
sufficiently small to ensure that the companies involved in specialixation or research and 
development agreements continue to operate in a competitive environment. Application 
of the block exemption is therefore admissible. 
When the agreement concerned affects a much greater share of the relevant market, so 
that the parties concerned face little current competition in the relevant product range, 
its exemption from  Article 85(l) requires further examination. The assessment of such 
agreements requires a comparison of their benefits to the consumer, (for example, 
economies of scale, better distribution, product innovation) with their anti-competitive 
effects. The possible importance of these anti-competitive effects will vary inversely 
with potential competition from  newcomers to the market and with restraints imposed by 
competition in wider markets. There is also a further factor to be considered - conflict 
of interest among the parties to the agreement. 
The economic theory relating to collusion between companies is fairly complex (see 
Waterson, 1984, pp. 47-52 for a succinct summary). In particular, it would be naive to 
assume that the principal aim  is always to maximise joint profits and still worse to 
assume that any joint-profit maximisation will always be achieved. This approach 
ignores conflict of interest within the group - quite often the agreement represents a 
compromise between these conflicting interests. This means that the anti-competitive 
effects of an agreement cannot simply be analysed by combining data for the parties 
concerned, treating these as a group and using the analytical framework of Chapter 3 to 
determ ine whether they hold a position of collective dominance, which they are able to 
abuse to mutual advantage. 
4. Application of the framework of ChaDter 3 to agreements 
covered bv Article 85 
In order to illustrate how the framework set out in Chapter 3 for analysis of market 
dominance may be applied in modified form to agreements or concerted practices, two 
practical examples will be considered. 
The first of these is resale price manitenance on books - the system practised in some 
EEC countries, notably the UK, Ireland and France, whereby the final retail prices of 
books are determined by publishers. This arrangement has been the subject of two 
Article 85 cases, one involving Dutch language books in Belgium and the other the legal 
enforcement of fixed retail prices in France. The subject has also been examined in a 
series of studies financed by the Commission of the European Communities at the 
instigation of the European Parliament. The resale price maintenance arrangements in 
the United Kingdom were upheld by the UK Restrictive Practices Court in 1961 and, 
because they also affect sales by UK publishers to the Irish Republic, are the subject of 
an outstanding request to the Commission of the European Communities for exemption 
under Article 85(3).* 
*Selection from Community documentation relating to resale price maintenance on 
books:- 
Commission of the EC: Decision no. IV/428 VBBB/VBVB 
(Dutch-Flemish books), OJ L54, 1982 
Court of Justice of the EC: Judgement in joint cases 43 and 63/82 
Dutch-Flemish books), Luxembourg, 1984 
II Judgement in case 229/83 
Reference from French courts of appeal against 
r.p.m. by Leclerc), Luxembourg, 1985 
Fishwick F & Preston D: Book Publishing and Distribution, CEC 1982 
Fishwick F: Book Prices in Australia and North America, CEC, 
1982 
De Jong H W et al: Production and Distribution of Books in the 
Netherlands and Flanders, CEC, 1982 
Toussaint-Desmoulins N 
et al: La production et la distribution du livre dans la 
zone linguistique francophone, CEC, 1983 
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The second illustration is not a judicial case but a matter of current controversy in the 
United Kingdom - the explicit concerted attempt by distributors of petrol (gasolene) to 
raise prices to a common level acceptable to all of them. (This example is chosen for its 
simplicity) 
(a) Definition of the relevant Droduct 
The starting point, the most narrow definition should be the good or service which is the 
subject of the agreement, in which competition is restricted. In the case of resale price 
maintenance on books, this starting point is the retail distribution of the books affected. 
In the case of petrol (now a fairly homogeneous product) this is the starting point. 
Because of the general application of resale price maintenance on books, the only current 
substitute within the United Kingdom or France for existing distribution channels is 
book clubs, which distribute only a limited range and are inappropriate for the single 
specific purchase. 
There is no immediate substitute available for petrol for use in the motor car (supplies 
of functional substitues such as alcohol derivatives are not accessible), especially since 
outlets in the United Kingdom are owned by or vertically tied to petrol distributors. 
Although some cars are powered by diesel and a few by electric motors, the barriers to 
substitution by existing car owners are very substantial. 
Generally, in order to define the relevant product, for the specific purposes of the block 
exemptions or for other cases, it will be necessary and sufficient to apply Section A of 
the Chapter 3 framework - to analyse functional and reactive interchangeability, to 
consider barriers to substitution and to try to find any “substitution gap.” 
Certain of the statistical tests of substitutability may be easier to apply to products 
affected by agreements, simply because data on both quantities and prices are more 
likely to be available. 
(b) Geonrauhical markeG 
Section B of the framework in Chapter 3 may be used to assess the geographical area of 
the market in which any agreement has its effect. It should be stressed that this market 
may be greater or smaller than the area covered by the agreement. For example, the 
market for the retail purchase of books is very fragmented, especially since most books 
are purchased only after visual inspection and over half on impulse (Fishwick and 
Preston, 1982). The same applies to the market for petrol. Almost all filling stations in 
Great Britian are currently charging 37.4 pence per litre, but a London motorist would 
not be deterred from paying this price even if petrol were available at 35~ per litre in 
Edinburgh. 
Institutional purchasers of books might be able to transfer demand to overseas suppliers, 
if UK distributors were to have very high margins. This possibility is limited by the 
application by publishers of international market segmentation but direct purchases from 
overseas retailers can circumvent such arrangements. 
In order to assess whether the geographical market for certain Engligh language books 
should be extended to all English-speaking countries it would be necessary to consider 
all barriers to demand transfer, including (in this case significant) transport costs. 
(cl Definition of relevant market sales 
Especially in the case of block exemptions, many studies of the anti-competitive effects 
of agreements will end at this stage, where the products covered by the agreement will 
be related to the total sales of substitutable products within the geographical area 
defined in (b). 
The texts of Regulations 417/85 and 418/85 do not specify whether market share is to 
be measured in terms of value or volume. The comments of Section C of Chapter 3 
therefore apply - in most cases value will be the more acceptable measure but in some 
(for example shares of travel by different modes) volume figures may be equally or even 
more important. 
(d) Potential competition 
Even if an agreement restricts competition between companies with a combined share 
close to 100% of the relevant market defined in sections (a) to (c), the adverse effects on 
customers (or suppliers in the case of a collective buying agreement) may be mitigated 
by the threat of potential competition. 
Even though an agreement may not be aimed at joint profit maximisation, its objective 
must be to increase profitability by some means or to make the same level of profits 
available with less effort (to provide a quiet life). The adverse effects of agreements 
may include high prices or diminished product quality or variety (e.g. agreed limits on 
the length of life of electric lamps, restricted opening hours for shops, specified limits 
on legroom on aircraft). The existence of high or “easy” profits and/or the potential 
market among customers affected by the agreement are likely to attract new suppliers 
who will not be parties to the agreement, unless there is some insuperable barrier to 
entry. 
De-regulation of air travel between the UK, the Irish Republic and the Netherlands has 
led to the entry of additional carriers offering either lower fares or fares subject to 
fewer restrictions. De-regulation has removed the main barrier to entry. As suggested 
in Chapter 3, the air travel market is much more contestable than either shipping 
(restricted harbour facilities) or railways (unrecoverable expenditure on non-transferable 
fixed assets). The agreements between the major national carriers, under IATA, were 
sustainable only as long as governments restricted the entry of new competitors. 
In the case of books, there is a barrier to entry in as much as the system of resale price 
maintenance in the UK is enforced by publishers, the majority of whom consider that 
sales of books are increased significantly by the greater display achieved through the 
removal of price competition in retailing .* A new retailer who slashed the prices of new 
“net” books might find his supplies withdrawn. However, if the margins required by 
retailers became too high or if the absence of competition protected inefficient retailing 
of books, publishers would be free to use other channels of distribution, such as direct 
mail or subscription. Book clubs are seen by some observers are resulting, at least 
partly, from the absence of price competition in book retailing. 
In the case of petrol the main barriers to entry of new low-margin retailers are the 
ownership or control of sites by major distributors and oil refiners. The entry into 
retailing of petrol by some companies with chains of hypermarkets has been one element 
of competition - the operations of these independent retailers depend on supplies from 
wholesalers outside the control of the major multinationals. This element of low-margin 
sales, supplied by an independent source, has undermined some previous attempts by the 
“majors” to secure a stable agreed price at a level which they find acceptable. 
1a-w 
-- 
* If this view is correct, it implies that r.p.m. has a positive welfare effect for the 
consumer, see Marvel, H.P. and McCafferty, S., The Welfare Effects of Resale Price 
Maintenance, Journal of Law and Economics, Chicago, May 1985 
W Product interdenendence 
Neither book retailing nor petrol is consumption goods. Book retailing is one stage in 
the chain of supply of books; petrol is used almost exclusively for burning in the engines 
of motor vehicles. To what degree are the anti-competitive effects of agreements 
relating to stages of supply or essential inputs constrained by the substitutability of the 
final product. 
Section E of the framework in Chapter 3 requires consideration of three ratios - the 
proportion of the relevant product used in a final or composite product (Pl) the 
proportion of the final product which used the relevant product (Pz) and the ratio of the 
cost of the relevant product to that of the final or composite product (P3). 
The “final” or “composite” product is to be defined at the point where the user has a 
choice of substitutes which do not incorporate the relevant product. In the case of 
petrol, this product will be car use rather than ownership, since the owner of a car has a 
choice as to how much he will use it. For petrol Pl = 1; P2 is about 0.95 (a small 
number of diesel engines); P3 = (approx.) 0.7 (the cost of fuel as a proportion of the 
marginal cost of car use). This means that PlP2P3 = (approx.) 0.6 and that the degree to 
which agreements can put up petrol prices will be limited by any price-sensitivity in the 
use of cars. Alternatives to use of cars include alternative means of transport (including 
telecommunications) and reduction of travel, by substitution or relocation of activities. 
In the case of petrol it is also possible to reduce consumption per kilometre by choice of 
engine and speed of driving. 
Experience of recent attempts at concerted price increases confirms econometric 
observations that the price-elasticity of total demand for petrol in the UK, while below 
unity (in absolute value), is significantly greater than zero. In certain districts and on 
certain routes, where a higher proportion of motoring is for non-essential purposes or 
where there is a good public transport system to which a car may be used to gain access, 
price-elasticity may well be greater than unity. Once retailers in such areas feel the 
effects of resistance to price increases, the first cracks occur in the solidarity of common 
prices. 
In the case of books, substitutability varies between individual titles. Econometric 
studies, undertaken by the present author in a number of countries, suggest an overall 
price-elasticity of demand for books of about - 1; that is, total quantity purchased varies 
in inverse proportion to average price. This observation while remarkably consistent 
- 
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between countries (see Fishwick and Preston 1982 and Fishwick 1984), must conceal 
wide variations, between certain unique standard texts at one extreme and highly 
interchangeable general leisure interest books at the other. There is no doubt that price 
competition between different books and between books and other means of information 
or entertainment must diminish the anti-competitive effects of price-fixing in book 
retailing. 
(f) Conflicts of interest amonn contractinp barties 
Sub-sections (a) to (e) suggest no particular problems in the application to anti- 
competitive effects of agreements of the framework set out in Chapter 3, for definition 
of the relevant product and geographical markets, and for assessing whether the markets 
so defined were also relevant to the concept of dominance. However, it is necessary to 
consider one further aspect of an agreement - possible divergences of objectives or 
interests among the parties to it. Even if these parties together control a relevant market 
and their collective power is not appreciably diminished by the threat of potential 
competition or by competition in a market on which the relevant product depends, they, 
will be able to abuse this collective power only when this will be of mutual advantage. 
In the case of petrol, where there is no formal agreement, the price-elasticity of demand 
for the individual retailer or for the individual brand is very high. The application of 
government standards has made petrol a homogeneous commodity. Marginal costs vary 
between retailers, between distributors, between refiners. When any one trader believes 
he has a cost advantage over his competitors which would make it difficult for them to 
match a price cut, he is tempted to reduce his price, perhaps only slightly. When prices 
are raised to a common level, as in the two weeks preceding this analysis, those retailers 
(and their distributors) who were selling petrol at prices lower than their immediate 
competitors will observe a drop in market share. They will observe that their own sales 
are price-elastic and (on the evidence of previous unsuccessful truces in the petrol 
price-war) will tend to cut prices again soon. 
The books case is more complex. In general, publishers would prefer low margins and 
support resale price maintenance only because protection from possible rapid 
depreciation of stock is believed to encourage retailers to stock and display more books. 
Some retailers stock only a narrow range of titles and by passing on some of the benefits 
of economies of scale could possibly increase their share of the market considerably. 
Their agreement to resale price maintenance may be reluctant or may reflect their ability 
to use the fixed margins to finance sales promotion, shop improvements etc. as an 
alternative means of increasing share. The diversity of interests is such that one cannot 
conclude that the margins on books are raised to the point at which combined profits for 
retailers and publishers are maximised. 
Indeed, research in Australia and North America (see Fishwick 1984) showed that, in the 
absence of resale price maintenance in those countries, average actual retail margins 
were higher than in the United Kingdom. The comparatively low margins in the 
UK may well reflect the diversity of commercial interest which is embodied in resale 
price maintenance - in return for the publisher’s help in guaranteeing margins, retailers 
may be prepared to accept that these margins be lower than otherwise. 
w Conclusions on the apolication of the analvtical 
framework to apreements considered under Article 85 
The objective in applying the framework to analysis of the effects of an agreement is an 
assessment of what differences the agreement may produce in the competitive structure 
and (ultimately) in the value for money obtained by the consumer. 
In the case of resale price maintenance on books, one may conclude that the parties to 
the agreement collectively control the UK retail book trade and that there is only limited 
potential competition. However, the price-elasticity of demand for some books places an 
upper limit on the retail margins which can be fixed and it is not in the interests of all 
parties to the agreement that these retail margins should be higher than they would be in 
the absence of the agreement. 
The analytical framework may be used in such cases to identify the possible effects an 
an agreement. Where possible, this approach should be supplemented by direct 
comparison of markets affected by such agreements and similar markets with no 
equivalent collusion. 
B. DEFINITION FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE 92 
Article 92 prohibits, with certain specified derogations, the granting by member states 
of aid to enterprises which affects trade between states and “distorts or threatens to 
distort competition”. Analysis of the anti-competitive effects of state aids is particularly 
important when a discretionary dispensation is sought under Article 92(3). In such cases 
it is necessary to balance the claimed advantages of state aids with their possible effects 
on inter-state trade and competition. Can the concept of the relevant market and the 
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f ramework  p r o p o s e d  in  C h a p te r  3  b e  u s e ful ly  app l i ed  to  th e  assessmen t o f th e s e  a n ti- 
c o m p e tit ive e ffec ts? 
1 . P e fin i t ion o f th e  re levant  ma rke t n o t leaa l lv  necessa ry?  
In  a  lega l  sense , th e  dec is ion  o f th e  E u r o p e a n  Cou r t o f Just ice in  th e  case  o f Ph i l i p  
Mor r is  Ho l l and  B V  versus  Commiss i on  o f th e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i ties  a p p e a r s  to  imp ly  
th a t expl ic i t  fo rma l  d e fin i t ion o f th e  re levant  ma rke t is n o t requ i red  in  such  cases*.  
Ph i l i p  Morr is ,  a  m u l tin a tiona l  c igaret te p roducer ,  h a d  asked  th e  Cou r t to  dec la re  vo id  a  
dec is ion  o f th e  Commiss i on  o f th e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i ties  th a t a n  e l e m e n t o f inves tment  
subs idy  p r o p o s e d  by  th e  N e the r l ands  g o v e r n m e n t c o n t ravened  A rt icle 9 2  b e c a u s e  o f its 
a n t i -compet i t ive e ffects. T h e  a id  in  q u e s tio n  w o u l d  h a v e  a m o u n te d  to  just u n d e r  4 %  o f 
th e  to ta l  cost  o f a  project ,  invo lv ing  th e  c losure  o f o n e  o f Ph i l i p  Mor r is’s two factor ies 
in  th e  N e the r l ands  a n d  th e  expans ion  o f capac i ty  a t th e  o ther .  T h e  pro ject  was  expec te d  
to  inc rease  Ph i l i p  Mor r is’s o u tp u t in  Ho l l and  by  4 0 % , equ iva len t  to  a  1 3 %  inc rease  in  
to ta l  c igaret te p roduc tio n  in  th e  c o u n try. 
O n e  o f th e  g r o u n d s  o f Ph i l i p  Mor r is’s a p p e a l  was  th a t th e  Commiss i on  h a d  n o t u s e d  
appropr ia te  cr i ter ia fo r  dec id ing  w h e the r  th e  a id  in  q u e s tio n  restr icted c o m p e titio n . T h e  
cr i ter ia shou ld  b e  th e  s a m e  (accord ing  to  th e  appe l l an ts) as  th o s e  app l i ed  to  cases  u n d e r  
A rt icles 8 5  a n d  8 6 :- 
“T h e  Commiss i on  m u s t first d e te rm ine  th e  * re levant  ma rke t’ a n d  in  o rde r  
to  d o  so  m u s t ta k e  a c c o u n t o f th e  p roduc t, th e  terr i tory a n d  th e  pe r i od  o f 
tim e  in  q u e s tio n . . ..B u t th e s e  essen tia l  aspec ts o f th e  m a tte r  a re  n o t fo u n d  
in  th e  d ispu ted  dec is ion.” 
(ECJ,  p .2 6 8 8 )  
T h e  Cou r t d id  n o t c o m m e n t expl ic i ty o n  th is  par t icu lar  g r o u n d  o f a p p e a l . Ins tead,  it 
d i smissed  th e  ob jec t ion  b e c a u s e  und i spu te d  ev idence  a b o u t th e  econom ic  e ffects o f th e  
pro ject  s h o w e d  th a t th is  w o u l d  a ffect  c o m p e titio n  in  th e  ma rke t fo r  c igaret tes in  th e  
E E C :- 
“It is c o m m o n  g r o u n d  th a t w h e n  th e  app l i can t  h a s  c o m p l e te d  its p l a n n e d  
inves tment  it wi l l  a c c o u n t fo r  near l y  5 0 %  o f c igaret te p roduc tio n  in  th e  
N e the r l ands  a n d  th a t it e xpec ts to  expor t  ove r  8 0 %  o f its p roduc tio n  to  
o the r  M e m b e r  S ta tes.” 
( ib id)  
l  E u r o p e a n  Cou r t o f Just ice, C a s e  7 3 0 /7 9 , E C R  (1980 )  p p .2 6 7 1 - 2 7 0 4  
The Court proceeded to decide that material aid to the company must in these 
circumstances distort competition between undertakings established in different member 
states. It upheld the Commission’s decision and did not overrule it for the procedural 
reason that it contained no definition of the relevant market. 
2. The effects of state aids on intra-Communitv comDetition: some basic DrinciDles 
In order to assess the effects of any particular aid by government on competition 
between undertakings in different states it is necessary to compare the probable 
evolution of the pattern of supply if the aid were allowed with that which might be 
expected to occur in its absence. One must not compare the likely pattern of supply and 
the nature of competition if the aid goes ahead with the present or previous conditions; 
instead, the comparison must be between two hypothetical futures - with and without 
the aid. 
The application of this basic principle is complicated by the uncertainties which are 
likely to surround such hypothetical predictions. Some of the concepts presented in 
Chapters 2 and 3 above may be applied to reduce these uncertainties but, in many cases, 
the uncertainties themselves may make it impossible to apply rigorously the framework 
set out in Chapter 3. 
3. The aDDlicabilitv of the ChaDter 3 framework to consideration of state aids. 
(a) Product market 
The definition of the relevant product market in the Chapter 3 framework begins with a 
narrow starting point - the “reference product” in a general case, any product with 
concentrated supply in the case of a merger or the product which provides the source of 
power for alleged abuse. From this narrow starting point the product range is widened 
to include goods (or services) which can be regarded as substitutes (in terms of both 
technical properties and the perceptions of purchasers). 
This procedure could have been applied fairly easily to the Philip Morris case. The 
starting point would have been cigarettes and the criteria set out in Section A of the 
framework could have been used to decide how far the product range should be widened 
to include goods with varying degrees of substitutability - loose tobacco, own-roll 
cigarettes, etc. In this case the aid was related to a single, specific product. 
Article 92(3) lists four forms of aid which may be considered to be compatible with the 
Common Market. These include assistance by governments which may not be specific to 
a single product. For example: aid to promote economic development or aid to remedy 
“a serious disturbance in the economy of a member state”. Specific illustrations include 
aid to multi-product companies to ensure survival, to companies in declining industries 
to enable them to diversify into new products, and grants for research and development. 
In these instances it is not possible to specify a starting point for definition of a relevant 
product - one objective of the aid may be to encourage enterprises to enter new product 
markets. 
In cases where the aid is not product-specific, Section A of the framework cannot be 
used. Factors influencing supply-side substitution may be more important than 
substitution in demand. In other words, the influence of the aid may be on product 
markets not associated, in terms of end-use, with the existing products of the companies 
concerned. 
In considering aid directed at geographical criteria - for example, grants to all 
companies relocating to steel-making areas badly affected by unemployment - it is 
impossible to relate this to a relevant product market. Rigid adherence to the analytical 
framework set out in Chapter 3 would be possible only if the grant to each individual 
company could be considered and then only if the company were a single-product firm. 
(b) Geoeranhical market 
Definition of the geographical market in cases of proposed state aids may be possible 
even less frequently than that of the product market. When the latter cannot be defined, 
for example with aids to depressed areas or for research and product innovation, it will 
also be impossible to define the geographical market. Even when the aid is product- 
specific, for example grants for machine-tool companies to assist the introduction of 
computer controls, it is not always correct to use these companies’ existing sales areas as 
a starting-point. The subsidy may enable some of them to develop new geographical 
markets, thereby distorting competition over a wider area. The procedure of Section B 
of the framework is no! appropriate for this. 
When the definiti0.n of 8 geographical market is required for assessment of a dominant 
position, of an individual enterprise or a group of enterprises acting in collusion, that 
definition must recognise artificial barriers to competition between member states. In 
assessment of state aids, the Commission and Court of the European Communities are 
asked to consider whether these would hinder interstate trade. Except when there are 
barriers of a physical or technical nature, the analysis is based on the presumption that 
there ought to be competition between enterprises in the Common Market. This 
approach is different from that adopted in definition of dominance - except where 
technical factors indicate otherwise, the geographical area to be considered on principle 
is the Common Market as a whole. 
This view was expressed by the Advocate-General in the Philip Morris case:- 
“It is permissible to start from the presumption that any 
public aid granted to an undertaking distorts competition 
. . . . unless exceptional circumstances exist (for example the 
total absence in the Common Market of goods which may 
be identical to or may be substituted for those 
manufactured by the recipient of the aid)“. (my own 
emphasis - FF) 
In summary, there are good reasons for analysing state aids in the context of the 
Community as a whole. In many cases it would be impossible to do otherwise, because 
the geographical effects of assistance to companies are not easily predictable. 
(cl Potential competition 
This aspect may be important in the case of state aids and the arguments presented in 
Section D of the framework are pertinent. 
A recent case* demonstrates this. The provision of equity capital by the regional public 
authority for the Walloon region of Belgium to a paper manufacturer was declared by 
the Commission of the European Communities in 1982 to be incompatible with Article 
92. The total package of assistance by the regional authority also included a loan to 
finance restructuring - the closure of factories producing general papers and 
development of speciality papers. The equity capital injection, which exceeded the 
company’s previous net assets, was regarded by the Commission as a means of ensuring 
the survival of the undertaking which might otherwise have failed. 
Intermills appealed against this decision on the grounds that the Commission had failed 
to show that the additional injection of funds would not be required to finance 
redundancies which would arise under the restructuring plan and that the distinction 
between the loan and equity capital was invalid. This appeal was upheld by the Court. 
* European Court of Justice, Decision on Case 323/82 (Intermills) Luxembourg, 
November 1984 
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In  c o m m e n tin g  o n  th e  dec is ion  in  th e  Four teen th  R e p o r t o n  C o m p e titio n  Po l icy  (pp. l27-  
30)*  th e  Commiss i on  recogn i sed  th e  n e e d  to  “clari fy its o w n  pos i t ion” a n d  a c k n o w l e d g e d  
th a t th e  dist inct ion b e tween  fo rms  o f a id  was  i r re levant.  
In  its c o m m e n ts, th e  Commiss i on  e m p h a s i s e d  th a t m e a s u r e s  wh ich  h a v e  as  the i r  e ffect  
th e  p reserva t ion  o f a n  u n d e r tak ing  f rom fa i lu re  distort  c o m p e titio n : 
“In ter-state t rade m a y  a lso  b e  a ffec ted  . . . in  cases  w h e r e  th e  o u tp u t o f a  
firm  wh ich  is k e p t a l ive  art i f icial ly by  t ransfus ions o f a id  supp lan ts th e  
t rade wh ich  w o u l d  o the rw ise  h a v e  ta k e n  p lace.  If th e  invest igat ion o f th e  
e ffect  o n  t rade is n o t to  b e  restr icted to  a  pure ly  static o r  re t rospect ive 
a p p r o a c h , th e  ana lys is  m u s t a l so  ta k e  into a c c o u n t th e  p o te n tia l  
c o m p e titio n  wh ich  cou ld  reasonab l y  b e  expec te d  to  a ffect  t rade flows” 
(op.  cit., p .129 )  
Therefore ,  in  assess ing  th e  a n t i -compet i t ive e ffects o f state a id,  ana lys is  o f t rade 
statistics m a y  in  th e  Commiss i on’s v iew b e  inconc lus ive;  th e  assessmen t m u s t ta k e  into 
a c c o u n t th e  d e v e l o p m e n t o f t rade wh ich  m a y  fo l low if c o m p a n i e s  wi thout  a id  a re  
e l im ina ted  by  th e  c o m p e tit ive process.  
@ I P roduct  i n t e rdeoendence  
In  th e  c o n text o f state a ids  th is  m a y  h a v e  a  w ide r  m e a n i n g  th a n  in  cases  o f d o m i n a n c e  
o r  col lect ive pract ices.  Ass is tance to  a  c o m p a n y  m a y  b e  to  th e  d i sadvan tage  n o t on ly  o f 
its o w n  c o m p e tito rs  b u t a l so  to  c o m p e tito rs  o f its suppl iers .  
For  e x a m p l e , o n e  o f th e  just i f icat ions fo r  ass is tance by  th e  U K  g o v e r n m e n t to  th e  ( then)  
B rit ish Ley l and  c o m p a n y  was  th a t m a n y  c o m p o n e n t m a n u facturers  in  G reat  B r i tain 
d e p e n d e d  o n  th a t c o m p a n y . It cou ld  b e  a r g u e d  converse ly  th a t th is  a id  d is tor ted 
c o m p e titio n  n o t on ly  in  th e  car  ma rke t b u t a l so  in  th a t fo r  c o m p o n e n ts. For  e x a m p l e , it 
pena l i sed  th o s e  B rit ish c o m p a n i e s  which,  p red ic t ing  th e  d e m i s e  o f the i r  p r inc ipa l  
customer ,  h a d  inves ted  m o n e y  a n d  e ffort in to es tab l ish ing  l inks wi th F rench  a n d  G e r m a n  
veh ic le  p roducers .  
A IB Q ~ ~ W  wider  aspec t to  b e  cons ide red  is th e  impac t o n  th e  pr ice  o f p roduc tio n  i npu ts to  
o the r  u n d e r tak ings  a n d  industr ies.  B y  p reserv ing  th e  W e s t M id lands  m o tor  indust ry  in  
th e  m id -1970’s th e  U K  g o v e r n m e n t m a y  h a v e  p reven te d  a  fa l l  in  w a g e  leve ls  wh ich  
w o u l d  h a v e  b e n e fite d  o the r  indust r ies  in  th e  a rea . T h e  U K  text i le indust ry  comp la i ned  
bit ter ly in  th e  late 1 9 7 0 ’s a b o u t th e  a id  g i ven  to  “sunr ise” indust r ies  (such  as  c o m p u ter  
l  C E C , Four teen th  R e p o r t o n  C o m p e titio n  Pol icy,  B russe ls -Luxembourg ,  1 9 8 5  
manufacturing) in textile areas, because this subsidisation enabled the newer industries to 
pay higher wages, forcing up rates of pay in the existing local economy. 
Although these elements of product interdependence may be important and state aid to a 
particular enterprise may have adverse consequences for non-competitiors in the same 
country, these may not be of major concern to Community competition authorities. 
Such indirect effects may cross national boundaries in certain cases but it would be 
inappropriate to set out a procedure, similar to that in Section E of the Chapter 3 
framework, to be applied generally. In the isolated case where an indirect effect of this 
kind were very significant, it is likely that those affected would bring their problem to 
public attention. 
(d Conclusion 
Although there are some cases in which the analytical framework set out in Chapter 3 
could be applied to assessment of the anti-competitive effects of state aids (Philip Morris 
was an example), there are many to which it is inapplicable. In the evaluation of aid to 
multi-product companies of grants for diversification or for research and development 
and of any schemes not specific to one firm (eg for geographical areas), it is not possible 
to define product markets. The definition of geographical markets is even less easy and 
it is also questionable whether any area smaller than the Common Market as a whole is 
relevant to the assessment of state aids (except where there are physical or technical 
barriers). 
Certain of the concepts presented and analysed in Chapters 2 and 3 are pertinent to the 
assessment of the distorting effects of state aids. Potential competition is particularly 
important - both in terms of product and geography. However, the relevant market 
concept and the analytical framework proposed in this report cannot be generally applied 
to the consideration of state aids. 
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